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CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND THE
WAR ON TERRORISM
Curtis A. Bradley* and Jack L. Goldsmith**
This Article presents a framework for interpreting Congress's September 18, 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the central statutory enactment related
to the war on terrorism. Although both constitutional theory and constitutional practice
suggest that the validity of presidential wartime actions depends to a significant degree on
their relationship to congressional authorization, the meaning and implications of the
AUMF have received little attention in the academic debates over the war on terrorism.
The framework presented in this Article builds on the analysis in the Supreme Court's
plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which devoted significant attention to the
AUME Under that framework, the meaning of the AUMF is determined in the first
instance by its text, as informed by a comparison with authorizations of force in prior
wars, including declared wars. In ascertaining the scope of the "necessary and
appropriate force" that Congress authorized in the AUMF, courts should look to two
additional interpretive factors: Executive Branch practice during prior wars, and the
international laws of war. Although nondelegation concerns should not play a significant
role in interpreting the AUMF, a clear statement requirement is appropriate when the
President takes actions under the AUMF that restrict the liberty of non-combatants in the
United States. The authors apply this framework to three specific issues in the war on
terrorism: the identification of the enemy, the detention of persons captured in the United
States, and the validity of using military commissions to try alleged terrorists.
I. INTRODUCTION
he "war on terrorism" following the September 11, 2001, attacks
lacks many of the usual features that define, justify, and limit the
conduct of war. The enemy intermingles with civilians and attacks ci-
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vilian and military targets alike. The traditional concept of "enemy
alien" is inapplicable in this conflict; instead of being affiliated with
particular states that are at war with the United States, terrorist ene-
mies are predominantly citizens and residents of friendly states or even
the United States. The battlefield lacks a precise geographic location
and arguably includes the United States. It is unclear how to concep-
tualize the defeat of terrorist organizations, and thus unclear how to
conceptualize the end of the conflict. Uncertainty about whether and
when the conflict will end, in turn, raises questions about the applica-
bility of traditional powers to detain and try the enemy.
These uncertainties are magnified by the Bush Administration's
sweeping description of the post-September i i conflict. President
Bush's statement on September 20, 2001, is typical:
Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that
supports them.
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped
and defeated.'
This conception of a general and potentially unbounded war against
terrorists, combined with the legal novelties implicated by such a war,
has led to an outpouring of academic literature raising concerns about
Executive Branch unilateralism and, in particular, about the absence
of principled limits on Executive power to identify, target, detain, and
try terrorists.
2
In our view, this literature devotes insufficient attention to the leg-
islative underpinnings of the post-September i i war on terrorism.
3
I President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People
(Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200Io9/200Io92o-8.html; see also, e.g.,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2oo2) ("The
United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a
single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism - premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."), available at http://www.white
house.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Diane
Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (2004); Laura A. Dickinson, Us-
ing Legal Process To Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals,
and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1413-21 (2002); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H.
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, iI YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Pe-
ter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Pro-
cedure After September 1, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004).
3 The neglect of Congress's September i8, 2ooi Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) is exemplified by a set of articles published last year in the Yale Law Journal. Neither
Bruce Ackerman's imaginative analysis of the need for an enhanced congressional role in deciding
detention and related issues following terrorist attacks, see Ackerman, supra note 2, nor the two
responses to his essay, see David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's
Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-
Emergency Constitution, 3 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004), mention, much less analyze, the AUMF. In
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On September i8, 2001, after negotiation with the President and sig-
nificant discussion, Congress authorized the President to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September ii, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of inter-
national terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.
4
There are several reasons why this Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) deserves to be a more central part of the analysis of the
war on terrorism.
First, even in more traditional military conflicts, presidential ac-
tions have often lacked such a congressional authorization. Indeed,
most uses of military force in U.S. history, including significant mili-
tary engagements such as the Korean War and the Kosovo bombing
campaign, have been initiated without express congressional authoriza-
tion. Here, by contrast, Congress specifically authorized the use of
force against the nations, organizations, and individuals responsible for
the September i i attacks. This important exercise of congressional
authority warrants close examination because it may provide guidance
on the validity of presidential action and, more broadly, help define
and limit the war on terrorism.
Second, under Justice Jackson's widely accepted categorization of
presidential power,5 "the strongest of presumptions and the widest lati-
tude of judicial interpretation" attach "[w]hen the President acts pur-
suant to an express or implied authorization of Congress. '6 This
his reply to the responses, Professor Ackerman briefly mentions the AUMF in two footnotes, but
he mischaracterizes it as authorizing a "classical war[] against ... Afghanistan," Bruce Ackerman,
This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1876 n.17 (2004), and he never analyzes its relevance to
the conflict with al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, the central theme of his essays, see
id. at 1876 n.17, 9oi n.8o.
4 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (20o). The
AUMF was approved by both houses of Congress on September 14, 2001, and signed by the
President on September r8, 2001.
5 In what he acknowledged to be an oversimplified grouping, Justice Jackson outlined three
categories of presidential power in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Presidential actions supported by a congres-
sional grant of authority fall into the highest category of presidential power, where Executive
Branch authority "is at its maximum." Id. at 635. Presidential actions neither supported by a
congressional grant of authority nor contrary to a congressional denial of authority fall into an
intermediate category, where "there is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." Id. at 637. In the third
category, "[wlhen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." Id.
6 Id. at 635, 637; see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000)
(quoting this language); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668, 674 (1981) (same); LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 123 (2d ed. 1996)
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proposition applies fully to presidential acts in wartime that are au-
thorized by Congress.7 By contrast, presidential wartime acts not au-
thorized by Congress lack the same presumption of validity, and the
Supreme Court has invalidated a number of these acts precisely be-
cause they lacked congressional authorization.8 The constitutional im-
portance of congressional approval is one reason why so many com-
mentators call for increased congressional involvement in filling in the
legal details of the war on terrorism. Before assessing what additional
actions Congress should take, however, it is important to assess what
Congress has already done.
Third, basic principles of constitutional avoidance counsel in favor
of focusing on congressional authorization when considering war pow-
ers issues. 9 While the President's constitutional authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief is enormously important, determining the scope of
that authority beyond what Congress has authorized implicates some
of the most difficult, unresolved, and contested issues in constitutional
law. 10 Courts have been understandably reluctant to address the scope
of that constitutional authority, especially during wartime, when the
consequences of a constitutional error are potentially enormous. 1 In-
("When the President acts by Congressional authority he has the sum of the powers of the two
branches, and can be said 'to personify the federal sovereignty,' and in foreign affairs, surely, the
President then commands all the political authority of the United States." (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636 (Jackson, J., concurring))); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 2, at
1274 (referring to Justice Jackson's "three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of
separation of powers").
7 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Ap-
proach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. i, 44 (2004) (canvassing Su-
preme Court decisions and concluding that, in the war context, "[w]here both legislature and ex-
ecutive endorse a particular tradeoff between liberty and security, the courts have accepted that
judgment").
8 See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (invalidating military convic-
tions of civilians in Hawaii during World War II); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304 (1944) (in-
validating presidential detention of loyal Japanese Americans during World War II); see also Issa-
charoff & Pildes, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that, "[where] the executive has acted ... without
legislative approval, the courts have invalidated executive action, even during wartime").
9 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). For invocations of this principle in the foreign affairs context, see, for example, Christopher
v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002); and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
374 n.8 (2000).
10 See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("These cryptic words [of the
Commander in Chief Clause] have given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our
constitutional history.").
11 A notable exception is the Youngstown decision. The Court in Youngstown, however, did
not have the opportunity to consider the meaning of a congressional authorization of force be-
cause Congress did not expressly authorize or declare war in the Korean War. The absence of an
express authorization or declaration of war was relevant to the analysis in both the majority opin-
ion and Justice Jackson's concurrence. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 ("The President's power,
if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.
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stead, courts have attempted, whenever possible, to decide difficult
questions of wartime authority on the basis of what Congress has in
fact authorized.1 2 This strategy makes particular sense with respect to
the novel issues posed by the war on terrorism.
Finally, much of the literature concerning the war on terrorism has
been pitched at a high level of generality, speaking in sweeping and of-
ten abstract terms about the tension between national security and
civil liberties. 13 Focusing on the AUMF, by contrast, grounds the dis-
cussion on a terrain where lawyers have particular competence. The
resulting discussion, in our view, is more likely to be helpful to courts
in deciding concrete cases and to the Executive Branch in ascertaining
the sources and limits of its authority to act.
To say that the AUMF should play a central role in an analysis of
the war on terrorism is not to say that interpreting its meaning is an
easy task. The President's authority is at its highest "[w]hen the Presi-
dent acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress." 14 The difficult issue is determining what Congress has implic-
itly authorized. The vast literature on constitutional war powers has
largely ignored this issue, focusing instead on the antecedent questions
of whether and when the President must receive congressional au-
thorization before engaging in armed conflict. 15
By contrast, interpretation of the AUMF was a central focus of the
Supreme Court's decision last Term in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.16 Five Jus-
tices in Hamdi (four Justices in a plurality opinion authored by Justice
O'Connor and Justice Thomas in his dissent) concluded that the
There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did
here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such
a power can fairly be implied."); id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (criticizing the argument "that
the President having, on his own responsibility, sent American troops abroad derives from that
act 'affirmative power' to seize the means of producing a supply of steel for them" (emphasis
added)).
12 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (plurality opinion); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942); see also CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 6 (expanded ed. 1976) ("The judges ... will do everything in their
power to avoid considering an unusual action in terms of the President's power alone, and will
seize with manifest relief on any evidence of congressional approval.").
13 See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Jules Lobel, The War on
Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767 (2002); David Luban, The War on Terror-
ism and the End of Human Rights, PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y Q., Summer 2oo2, at 9; Mark Tushnet,
Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273.
14 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also supra
note 5.
15 For surveys of this literature, see Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1548-69 (2002); and William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the
Power To Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 696-98 (1997).
16 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). The majority opinions in the other two combatant decisions from
last Term -Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)
- did not purport to interpret the AUMF.
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AUMF had implicitly authorized the President to detain "enemy com-
batants"'7 until the end of hostilities, even if they were U.S. citi-
zens."' The plurality reasoned that the AUMF's authorization to the
President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" included the
power to detain enemy combatants until the end of hostilities.1 9 In
support of this conclusion, the plurality looked to Executive Branch
practice, judicial precedent, the international laws of war, and the
functional need of preventing enemy combatants from returning to the
field of battle.20 Based on similar factors, the plurality also concluded
that the AUMF authorized the President to detain enemy combatants,
like Hamdi, who were U.S. citizens.2 1 For purposes of its decision,
however, the plurality expressly limited its construction of the AUMF
to individuals engaged in armed conflict against the United States in
Afghanistan.2 2  It thus did not address whether or to what extent the
AUMF authorizes detention of terrorist suspects in other settings.
23
Nor did it address issues of presidential power other than detention,
17 The government has used the term "enemy combatant" in the post-September ii war on
terrorism to refer generally to individuals engaged in hostilities against the United States. See,
e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 3, Hamdi (No. 03-6696) [hereinafter Hamdi Respondents Brief]
("When an individual is captured, commanders in the field, using all available information, make
a determination as to whether the individual is an enemy combatant, i.e., whether the individual
Iwas part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners, and engaged in
an armed conflict against the United States."' (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FACT SHEET.
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES 5 (2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb200 4/d2oo4o22odet.
pdf)), available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s6oNewsDocumentOrder/FileUploadsoo/2i6/
BriefLRespondents.pdf. The plurality noted in Hamdi that "[t]here is some debate as to the
proper scope of [the term 'enemy combatants'], and the Government has never provided any
court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such." Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at
2639 (plurality opinion). The plurality nevertheless accepted the term as a legal category, while
noting that the category "has not been elaborated upon in great detail" and that its bounds "will
be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them." Id. at 2642 n.i. The
Supreme Court had earlier used the term "enemy combatant" in decisions upholding the use of
military commissions to try individuals for offenses under the international laws of war during
and immediately after World War II. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946): Quirin. 317 U.S.
at 31. Then, as now, the term included members of the enemy armed forces who were not viewed
as entitled to prisoner-of-war status. See id. We consider the meaning of the term "enemy com-
batant" in relation to the AUMF below in Part V.
18 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (plurality opinion); id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (plurality opinion).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 2640. A different majority of the Court (the four-Justice plurality and Justices Souter
and Ginsburg) concluded that Hamdi was entitled as a matter of due process to "notice of the fac-
tual basis for his classification [as an enemy combatant], and a fair opportunity to rebut the Gov-
ernment's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." Id. at 2648; see id. at 2653 (Souter,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
22 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (plurality opinion).
23 The plurality did agree with the petitioner that Congress had not authorized "indefinite de-
tention for the purpose of interrogation," id. at 2641, but its statement left open the possibility
that Congress had authorized indefinite detention for a reason that the plurality had previously
credited, namely, to prevent the detainee from returning to the battlefield, see id.
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such as the targeted killing of terrorists or trial of terrorists by military
commission.
2 4
Building on the Hamdi plurality's analysis, this Article presents a
framework for interpreting the AUMF in the context of the war on ter-
rorism. Part II clears away two misconceptions relevant to interpret-
ing the authority that Congress has granted in the AUMF. First, we
show that Congress need not declare war in order to provide its full
authorization to the President to prosecute a war. An authorization of
military force can be sufficient and, in fact, might even be necessary.
Second, we address the claim that the authorization conveyed by the
AUMF is somehow limited or truncated because an armed conflict
with terrorists is not a "real war." The authority conferred by the
AUMF does not depend on whether the conflict meets some meta-
physical test for war, but rather on how the political branches view the
conflict and how they characterize the belligerents in it. As we show,
the political branches have clearly indicated that the conflict with the
nations, organizations, and persons responsible for the September i i
attacks is a war requiring a full military response by the President.
Parts III and IV set forth our framework for interpreting the
AUMF. Part III examines the text of the AUMF and places it in com-
parative historical perspective. Based on this examination, we con-
clude that, notwithstanding the absence of a declaration of war and
the AUMF's focus, in part, on non-state actors, the AUMF confers au-
thority comparable to that conferred by congressional authorizations in
declared wars.
Part IV discusses interpretive factors relevant to answering detailed
questions about the AUMF's meaning. Following the Hamdi plurality,
we explain why courts should give content to the AUMF by looking to
prior Executive Branch wartime practice and the international laws of
war. We also explain why the AUMF, like other congressional authori-
24 The plurality offered several hints about how its analysis might apply to the broader war on
terrorism. First, in acknowledging that the petitioner's concern about indefinite detention was
not "far-fetched," the plurality observed that "the national security underpinnings of the 'war on
terror,' although crucially important, are broad and malleable," and noted the government's con-
cession that "given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal
cease-fire agreement." Id. (quoting Hamdi Respondents Brief, supra note 17, at 16). Second, the
plurality noted that its understanding that the AUMF authorizes detention until the end of hostili-
ties might "unravel" "[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war." Id. Third, by finding authoriza-
tion for the detention of individuals who were "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in armed conflict against the United
States there," id. at 2639 (quoting Hamdi Respondents Brief, supra note 17, at 3 (quoting U.S.
DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 5)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the plurality suggested
that al Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan would be evaluated under the same standards as
those applied to the petitioner. Other than these passing hints, however, the Hamdi decision pro-
vides little guidance about the war on terrorism.
2054 [VOL. 118:2047
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zations that implicate the concurrent constitutional powers of the
President, need not specify all approved presidential wartime actions.
As an exception to this latter point, we conclude that it is appropriate
for courts interpreting the AUMF to apply a clear statement require-
ment when the President acts pursuant to the AUMF to restrict the
liberty of non-combatants in the United States.
Part V applies the interpretive framework from Parts III and IV to
three issues in the war on terrorism. Section V.A explains how to con-
ceptualize the enemy against which Congress authorized force. The
main challenge here comes from Congress's authorization of force
against "organizations" that have a nexus to the September i i attacks.
We argue that, while the nexus requirement is an important limitation
on the scope of the AUMF, the AUMF nonetheless encompasses terror-
ist organizations other than those responsible for the September i i at-
tacks if they have a sufficiently close connection with the responsible
organizations. We also explain the principles that should govern the
assessment of whether an individual has a sufficient connection with a
terrorist organization covered by the AUMF. Section V.B focuses on
the application of the AUMF in the United States. It concludes that
Congress authorized the President to use force in the United States
against the covered enemies. As we explain, this authorization in-
cludes the power to detain persons covered by the AUMF who are
found in the United States, but it does not definitively address the in-
stitutions or procedures appropriate for determining whether a person
captured on U.S. soil is in fact an enemy combatant, and in particular
does not affect the traditional availability of habeas corpus review. We
also argue that the AUMF's implied authorization to detain enemy
combatants, when applied to terrorists outside the conflict in Afghani-
stan, should be viewed as lasting with respect to each combatant as
long as that combatant continues to pose a threat to the United States.
Section V.C argues that Congress has authorized the use of military
commissions to try individuals covered by the AUMF for violations of
the laws of war, but that such commissions cannot be used to try indi-
viduals who fall outside the scope of the AUMF unless the President
has independent constitutional authority to wage war against such in-
dividuals.
Two caveats are appropriate before we proceed: First, we do not at-
tempt here to analyze comprehensively the actions that the President
may take in armed conflict with terrorists. Such an analysis would re-
quire us to catalog not only the powers granted by Congress in the
AUMF, but also the President's independent powers under Article II of
2005] 2055
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the Constitution. 25 Instead, we will focus on the President's independ-
ent constitutional authority only collaterally, when such a focus is nec-
essary to an interpretation of the AUMF. As will become clear from
our analysis, however, some presidential actions in the war on terror-
ism cannot plausibly be justified by reference to the AUMF and thus
will depend for their validity on the scope of the President's independ-
ent constitutional authority.
Second, our focus on the legal doctrines relevant to interpreting the
AUMF is not meant to suggest that those doctrines will always yield
determinate answers, or that such doctrines are the only considerations
in determining the validity of presidential actions in the war on terror-
ism. There are inherent uncertainties associated with applying legal
rules developed in other contexts to the war on terrorism - uncertain-
ties that we attempt to grapple with throughout this Article. In addi-
tion, the decisions of judges and Executive Branch officials in this con-
text will inevitably be influenced by factors other than legal doctrine,
including their perceptions about terrorist threat levels and potential
risks to civil liberties. To take an obvious example, judicial assess-
ments of the legality of Executive Branch action under the AUMF are
likely to be affected by whether, when, and on what scale there are
further terrorist attacks inside the United States. Without denying the
significance of these factors, we nonetheless believe that the framework
established by the AUMF should play a central role in any legal analy-
sis of government action against suspected terrorists and terrorist
threats, and that the AUMF warrants more extended analysis than it
has received to date.
II. Two MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE AUMF
In this Part, we attempt to clear away two misconceptions relevant
to interpreting the authority that Congress has granted in the AUMF.
The first is that the powers being granted to the President are limited
or truncated in some fashion because Congress has not declared war.2 6
25 It would also require us to analyze the applicability, content, and scope of other potential
legal restrictions on Executive Branch action during war against terrorist organizations, such as
the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West Supp. 2004), the federal criminal torture statute, 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2340-23 4 oA (West 2000 & Supp. 2004), the Uniform Code of Military Justice, io
U.S.C.A. §§ 8o-946 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. Io, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No.
100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, and the Geneva Conventions, see, e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. We discuss some of
these potential restrictions in passing throughout the Article, but in general the effect of these re-
strictions is beyond the Article's scope.




As we explain, a declaration of war is not required in order for Con-
gress to provide its full authorization for the President to prosecute a
war. An authorization of military force can be sufficient and, in fact,
may even be necessary.
The second misconception is that the powers granted to the Presi-
dent in the AUMF are limited or truncated in some fashion because an
armed conflict with terrorists is not a "real war. '27 Presidents have ex-
ercised their full Commander-in-Chief powers in a number of military
conflicts throughout U.S. history that involved many of the purport-
edly non-traditional elements present in the current conflict with ter-
rorists. More importantly, the scope of authority conferred on the
President by a congressional authorization of force has never turned on
the metaphysical question of whether a particular conflict qualifies as
a "war." Rather, it has always turned on how the political branches
view the conflict and how they characterize the belligerents in the con-
flict. The political branches have clearly indicated, in the AUMF and
elsewhere, that the conflict with the terrorists responsible for the Sep-
tember i i attacks is a war requiring a full military response by the
President.
A. War Declarations and Force Authorizations
Many war powers scholars argue that the President is constitution-
ally required to obtain some form of congressional authorization before
initiating significant offensive military operations.28 These scholars
frequently tie this requirement to Congress's constitutional power to
"declare War."29 Nevertheless, they do not typically argue that Con-
gress's authorization must take the form of a formal declaration of
war. Instead, they accept that an authorization to use force is an ade-
quate mechanism for Congress to "constitutionally manifest its under-
standing and approval for a presidential determination to make war."30
27 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 1032-33; Cole, supra note 13, at 958. But see Rosa
Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Con-
flict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 677, 68i (2004) (arguing that the erosion of
boundaries between "war" and "non-war" is an "inescapable social fact").
28 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3-10 (1993); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR
POWER 1-16 (2d ed. 2004); HENKIN, supra note 6, at 76, 97-1Os. But see ROBERT F. TURNER,
REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 8o-96 (i99i) (arguing that the President has the authority to initiate armed
conflict in the absence of congressional authorization); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad
Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L. REV. 833 (1972) (similar argument); John C. Yoo, The Con-
tinuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 167, 170-75 (1996) (similar argument).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. ii.
30 Harold Hongju Koh, The Coase Theorem and the War Power: A Response, 41 DUKE L.J.
122, 126 (1991).
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The extent to which this "pro-Congress" understanding of war
powers is in accord with the understandings of the constitutional
Founders is the subject of significant debate. 3 1 Several statements by
the Founders suggest that they understood that, under the Constitu-
tion, the United States would not be able to initiate war without con-
gressional authorization. 32 The first three presidents of the United
States expressed similar views. 33 The Declare War Clause, however, is
an uncertain textual basis for this proposition. The clause refers to a
particular congressional action - declaring war - and does not state
that Congress has the more general authority to "authorize" or "initi-
ate" war.34  Moreover, there were numerous undeclared wars in the
years leading up to the Constitution, 35 and the Federalist Papers spe-
31 Compare, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639
(2002), with Ramsey, supra note 15, and Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers
Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. i685 (2002).
32 For example, James Wilson stated in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that "[i]t will
not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress [of
war], for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large." 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 583 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); see
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in i5 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 397 (Julian P Boyd ed., 1958) ("We have already given in example
one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Ex-
ecutive to the Legislative body .... ").
33 President Washington explained his refusal to undertake significant offensive operations
against Indian tribes as follows: "The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Con-
gress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they shall
have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure." Letter from George Washing-
ton to Governor William Multrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 73, 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). President Adams evinced a similar attitude
about presidential war power in connection with the Quasi-War with France at the end of the
17OOs, noting that it was Congress's duty "to prescribe such regulations as will enable our seafar-
ing citizens to defend themselves against violations of the law of nations." 7 ANNALS OF CONG.
57 (1797). President Jefferson expressed a comparable view - at least in public - with respect to
responding to attacks by the Barbary Pirates in the early 18oos. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-i8OI, at 88 & n.264 (I997).
But cf. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, i8oi-
1829, at 127-29 (2001) (describing how Jefferson took more aggressive offensive actions than his
prior public pronouncements suggested were appropriate).
34 See Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 5o B.U. L. REV. 19, 25-33 (970); Yoo,
supra note 28, at 242-50; Phillip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Re-
sponsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV 1364, 1375-
1400 (1994) (reviewing ELY, supra note 28). A draft of the Constitution would have given Con-
gress the power to "make" war. The word "make" was changed during the Federal Convention to
"declare." See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-i9 (Max
Farrand ed., 191 1) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS]. For discussion of the significance of
this change, compare, for example, Bobbitt, supra, at 1376-81, with Charles A. Lofgren, War-
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 8i YALE L.J. 672, 675-78 (1972).
35 See J.F. MAURICE, HOSTILITIES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR: AN HISTORICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE CASES IN WHICH HOSTILITIES HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN
CIVILIZED POWERS PRIOR TO DECLARATION OR WARNING: FROM 1700 TO 1870 (London,
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cifically noted that "the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has
of late fallen into disuse. '36 It therefore seems unlikely that the Foun-
ders believed that a congressional declaration of war was a constitu-
tional prerequisite for U.S. warmaking.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, at the time the Consti-
tution was drafted and ratified, declarations of war served particular
legal functions separate from domestic authorization. In 1789, war
was a "fundamental concept in public international law" 37 - sharply
distinguishable from "peace" - to which particular legal consequences
attached. During war, elaborate rules of belligerency governed rela-
tions between warring states, and equally elaborate rules of neutrality
governed relations between belligerents and neutral states. "War," so
understood, was different from other uses of military force, which did
not by themselves necessarily trigger all of the rules of belligerency
and neutrality. Sometimes this distinction was framed in terms of the
differences between "perfect" and "imperfect" war,38 or between "gen-
eral" and "limited" war.39 A declaration of war was a method by
which states could trigger the full array of international law rules gov-
erning neutral and belligerent states on issues such as rights to seizure
of vessels, shipment of contraband, and institution of blockades, as
well as domestic laws related to war and emergency powers.
40
Whatever the implications of the Founding history for the issue of
whether Congress must authorize war, almost no one argues today that
Congress's authorization must take the form of a declaration of war.
41
One reason is historical practice. Starting with early conflicts against
Indian tribes and the Quasi-War with France at the end of the 1700s,
the United States has been involved in hundreds of military conflicts
Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1883); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 54-55
(i98i); Yoo, supra note 28, at 204-17.
36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 16i (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 98.
38 See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (i8oo) (opinion of Washington, J.); Miller v.
The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 19, 21 (781).
39 See, e.g., Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.); cf. id. at 45 (opinion of Paterson,
J.) (stating that "[t]he United States and the French republic are in a qualified state of hostility"
(emphasis omitted)).
40 See, e.g., I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *250; 3 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW
OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 255 (photo. reprint 1995) (James Brown
Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) (1758); cf. Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) i, 28 (i8oi) ("[C]ongress may authorize general hostilities, in which
case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of
war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed.").
41 But cf. BRIEN HALLETT, THE LOST ART OF DECLARING WAR 25-26, 145-68 (1998)
(advocating the use of war declarations in modern times); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41
DUKE L.J. 27, 120-21 (I99I) (same).
2059,2005]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
that have not involved declarations of war.42  This practice has been
especially evident since World War II: the United States has not de-
clared war in any of its many post-World War II conflicts, even
though some of them have been significant and prolonged. In three of
the most significant of these conflicts - Vietnam and the two Iraq
Wars - Congress enacted authorizations of military force rather than
declarations of war,43 and both Congress and the President treated
those authorizations as fully empowering the President to prosecute
the wars. 44 In addition, in 1973, Congress enacted the War Powers
Resolution 4 in an effort to regulate congressional-executive relations
concerning war, and the Resolution expressly envisions that authoriza-
tions to use force can serve as the vehicle for the initiation of war by
the United States. 46  Finally, courts - including the plurality in
Hamdi - have also treated authorizations to use force as fully em-
powering the President to conduct war within the terms of the
authorizations.
47
42 See, e.g., RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2001 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code
RL 3 01 72, Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crsRL 3o172.pdf; U.S. Dep't of State,
Office of the Legal Adviser, The Legality of U.S. Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 112
CONG. REC. 5504, 5508 (1966), reprinted in I THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 583, 597 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1968).
43 The Korean War was neither declared nor expressly authorized by Congress. Congress did,
however, appropriate funds for the war and also renewed selective service laws to allow for the
military draft. See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 382 n.37. Whether President ftuman had the legal
authority to involve the United States in the Korean War has been the subject of debate. Com-
pare, e.g., Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 21, 37 (0995) (arguing that he lacked authority), with Robert F. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the
Constitution: Debunking the "Imperial President" Myth, I9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533, 583
(1996) (arguing that he had authority). President Truman claimed that he had the authority to
commit troops because, among other things, the United Nations Security Council had authorized
the use of force. Whether a Security Council authorization can substitute for congressional au-
thorization of the President's use of force has also been the subject of debate. See Curtis A. Brad-
ley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1557, 1568-69 & n.53 (2003) (describing this debate and citing advocates for both positions).
44 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which the
Johnson Administration relied upon as authorization for the Vietnam War, see infra notes 119,
128.
45 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
46 See id. § 2(c), 87 Stat. at 555 (codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1541 (2ooo)) ("The constitutional
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (i) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories
or possessions, or its armed forces."). Although the Resolution was enacted over President
Nixon's veto, and has been objected to on constitutional grounds by presidents ever since, neither
President Nixon nor subsequent presidents have taken issue with the proposition that Congress's
authorization of war need not take the form of a declaration of war.
47 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) (plurality opinion). In the Quasi-War
with France in the late 1700s, the Supreme Court recognized that the United States could be at
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Another reason why almost no one argues that Congress's authori-
zation of war must take the form of a declaration of war is that the in-
ternational law role for declarations of war has largely disappeared.
The United Nations Charter, which now regulates the portion of the
international laws of war known as jus ad bellum,48 refers not to
"war," but rather to "armed attack," "use of force," and "threat[s] to the
peace. '49  A similar shift away from "war" as the determinative con-
cept has taken place in the law of armed conflict (jus in bello).50 The
applicability of the law of armed conflict was once triggered by the ex-
istence of a state of "war," which in turn could be triggered by, among
other things, a declaration of war.5 ' The Geneva Conventions of 1949
changed this regime by making clear that their jus in bello rules ap-
plied not only to "cases of declared war" but also more broadly to "any
other armed conflict" between states, regardless of whether a "state of
war" was recognized by one of the parties.5 2 Today, "armed conflict"
- not "war" - is the relevant jurisdictional concept for jus in bello.5 3
As a result, it now appears that declarations of war serve little purpose
under international law. 4 This is a principal reason why, despite hun-
war despite the absence of a declaration of war. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43-46
(i8oo) (opinions of Chase and Paterson, JJ.). In the Vietnam War, several courts held that a decla-
ration of war was not constitutionally required in order for Congress to authorize war. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird, 45I F.2d 26, 34 (ist
Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971).
48 Jus ad bellum translates as "law to war" and refers to the body of international law govern-
ing the circumstances under which states may resort to the use of force.
49 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."); id. art.
39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression.. . ."); id. art. 42 (authorizing the U.N. Security Council to take mili-
tary action "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security"); id. art.
51 (stating that nothing in the U.N. Charter "shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence" in response to an "armed attack").
50 Jus in bello is the body of international law that governs the conduct of warfare, including
the use of particular weapons, targeting, and treatment of combatants and civilians.
51 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 19-20 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 196o); see
also, e.g., Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, art.
2, 32 Stat. 1803, 18o8-o9, I Bevans 247, 251 (stating that the annexed regulations concerning the
laws and customs of war on land were applicable only "in case of war"),
52 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of August 12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 42, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 3544, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, 314 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
53 See, e.g., HILAIRE McCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGU-
LATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 24 (i99O); Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in
Modern International Law, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 283, 304 (1987).
54 See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. ii, 16-17
(20o). There continue to be reasons unrelated to international law for issuing a declaration of
war. A declaration might serve a political signaling function: it could, for example, be a "solemn
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dreds of armed conflicts around the world during this period, some of
them quite intense and prolonged, it appears that no nation has de-
clared war since the late i94os.55
In sum, in light of the longstanding political branch practice of ini-
tiating war without a formal declaration of war, consistent judicial ap-
proval of this practice, changes in international law that render war
declarations less relevant, and general scholarly consensus, it seems
clear that Congress need not issue a formal declaration of war in order
to provide its full authorization for the President to prosecute a war.
Not only is a force authorization sufficient to provide full congres-
sional authorization to the President to prosecute a war, one could ar-
gue, based on political branch practice since the Founding, that a force
authorization is necessary to so authorize the President. Examination
of declared wars throughout U.S. history reveals that Congress's war
declarations have never by themselves constituted Congress's authori-
zation for the President's use of military force. Rather, even when
Congress has declared war, it has always taken the additional step of
authorizing the President to use force to prosecute the war.
The World War II joint resolution concerning war with Germany
illustrates this point. The title of the joint resolution made clear that
the resolution did two things: it both "[d]eclar[ed] that a state of war
exists between the Government of Germany and the Government and
the people of the United States" and "ma[de] provision to prosecute the
same. '5 6 The body of the resolution did precisely these two things:
Therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between
act of state which serves as a means of arousing popular support at home and abroad and which
is usually reserved for extreme cases." Note, Congress, the President, and the Power To Commit
Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1968); see also Clyde Eagleton, The Form and
Function of the Declaration of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 19, 34 (1938) (describing a variety of pos-
sible functions for declarations of war); Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1586 (arguing that, at the time
of the Founding, declarations of war were primarily a communicative and rhetorical device). In
addition, the operation of some domestic statutes turns on whether there is a declaration of war.
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 198(b) (2000) (concerning adjournment by Congress); 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000)
(concerning removal of enemy aliens).
55 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 28, at 14o n.5; cf. Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Execu-
tive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility,
34 VA. J. INT'L L. 903, 915 n.54 (994) ("There is some debate over whether statements made by
Egyptian officials during the 1956 Suez Crisis and a Panamanian legislative act in December 199o
constituted such a declaration [of war]. Neither is likely such a declaration. However, even if a
few exceptions could be found, the basic state practice has been to avoid such instruments."). But
see HALLETT, supra note 41, at 35 (noting a possible exception in 1967, when "Algeria, Iraq, Ku-
wait, Sudan, and Syria appear to have made formal declarations of war against Israel"). As noted
below, al Qaeda (which is not a nation) declared war on the United States in the 19gos. See infra
p. 2068.
56 Joint Resolution of Dec. I I, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796.
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the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been
thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the Presi-
dent is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and
military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government
to carry on war against the Government of Germany; and, to bring the
conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are
hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
57
The identical pattern of expressly distinguishing between Congress's
war declaration and its authorization for the President to use force is
evident in every other statute declaring war in U.S. history - the
other World War II joint resolutions,5 8 the World War I joint resolu-
tions,5 9 and the statutes declaring war in the Spanish-American War,
60
the Mexican-American War,61 and the War of 1812.62
To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever analyzed the signifi-
cance of this consistent historical practice of Congress providing ex-
press authorizations for the President to use force in declared wars
separate from its actual declarations of war.63 This congressional prac-
57 Id. (some emphasis omitted, other emphasis added).
58 Joint Resolution of June 5, 1942, ch. 325, 56 Stat. 307 (World War H: Rumania); Joint Reso-
lution of June 5, 1942, ch. 324, 56 Stat. 307 (World War 11: Hungary); Joint Resolution of June 5,
1942, ch. 323, 56 Stat. 307 (World War I: Bulgaria); Joint Resolution of Dec. II, 1941, ch. 565, 55
Stat. 797 (World War II: Italy); Joint Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (World War
H: Japan). Except for differences in the identity of the enemy, these resolutions are all worded
identically to the German resolution.
59 Joint Resolution of Dec. 7, 1917, ch. I, 40 Stat. 429 (World War I: Austro-Hungary); Joint
Resolution of Apr. 6, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. i (World War I: Germany).
60 Act of Apr. 25, I898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364. In contrast to the World War I and World War II
resolutions, the title of this statute did not separate the war-declaring and force-authorizing func-
tions, but the body of the statute clearly did so:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, First. That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to
exist, and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April, [1898], including said
day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.
Second. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and
empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into
the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as
may be necessary to carry this Act into effect.
Id. (some emphasis omitted, other emphasis added).
61 Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9. The Mexican-American War is typically included
among the United States's five "declared" wars, even though Congress did not state that it was
declaring war, but rather recognized that "a state of war exists" between the United States and
Mexico. Id. In any event, the Act, like the above-discussed declarations of war, proceeded spe-
cifically to authorize the President to use military force. See id.
62 Act of June I8, 1812, Ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755. Like the title of the Act authorizing the Spanish-
American War, the title of the Act authorizing the War of 1812 did not distinguish between the
war-declaring and force-authorizing functions, but the body of the statute did so.
63 But cf. FRANcIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR:
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 55 (2d ed. 1989) (noting that every
resolution declaring war "authorized the President to use the army, the navy, and the militia for
the prosecution of war"); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Ely, Black, Grotius & Vattel, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
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tice suggests that while declarations of war may have served the inter-
national law functions alluded to above, they have not by themselves
served the function of providing congressional authorization for the
President to use military force.
64
This practice might further support the view that if Congress has
the power to control the initiation of war, that power comes not (as is
typically thought) from the Declare War Clause alone, but more
broadly from all of Congress's Article I war-related powers and from
the assumptions of the Founders about how these powers would oper-
ate in practice. 65 The Declare War Clause is one of six clauses in Arti-
cle I, Section 8 related to war. The clause itself includes not only the
power to declare war, but also the power to grant letters of marque
and reprisal and the power to make rules concerning land and sea cap-
tures - all powers related to international law issues implicated by
war. The Declare War Clause is followed by clauses empowering
Congress to provide for, maintain, and regulate the army and navy,
and to organize, arm, discipline, and call forth the militia. Congress's
power to appropriate money for the military, which, in the case of the
81, 85-89 (1995) (discussing separately the declaration of war and authorization of force in the
War of 1812).
64 For judicial reliance on consistent historical practice as informing constitutional meaning,
especially in the foreign affairs context, see, for example, American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,
123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386-87 (2003); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 61o-ii
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 327-28 (1936). See generally Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation
of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv 109, 147 (1984) (proposing "a method of inquiry for
determining when the inaction of one branch, in the face of an established practice of another
branch, may properly be deemed to authorize the actions of the latter"); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties,
Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001) (proposing a
theory of "constitutional increments," in which the constant historical interplay among the
branches informs constitutional interpretation).
65 Cf. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 75 (199o) (noting that the Framers granted "Con-
gress, not the president, . . . the dominant role" in foreign affairs, including "all manner of powers
regarding raising, supporting, maintaining, and regulating the army, navy, and militia, which
could be exercised both domestically and abroad"); i LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-6, at 662-67 (3 d ed. 2000) (arguing that "the Constitution mandates
a major role for Congress in supervising executive military operations" on the grounds that the
Framers "tied the military power to Congress' control of the public purse" and that the Constitu-
tion "gives Congress a host of other military-related powers"). Some commentators have argued
that by virtue of the Vesting Clause in Article II (which states that "[tlhe executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America," U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. I), the Presi-
dent has been granted all foreign affairs powers not expressly granted to Congress. See, e.g.,
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, iii
YALE L.J. 231, 252-54 (2001). Under that theory, one might argue that if the Declare War Clause
is not a war initiation power, then such a power has not been expressly assigned to Congress and
thus must rest with the President. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 31, at 1677-78. For a critique of the
Vesting Clause theory of presidential power, see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Execu-
tive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004).
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army, the Constitution limits to two years, 66 would have been particu-
larly crucial at the Founding, when there was essentially no standing
army and no navy.67 That appropriations authority, along with Con-
gress's authority to regulate the use of the militia, would have required
early presidents to seek and secure statutory authority to use military
force for any extended period, regardless of whether war had been
declared.
68
We do not want to overstate the significance of this pattern. 69 A
full analysis of its implications for the President's power to initiate
armed conflict in the absence of congressional authorization would
need to consider not only the War Powers Resolution, in which, as
noted above, Congress appears to have viewed war authorizations and
war declarations as substitutes,70 but also the judicial decisions that
have referred to declarations of war as authorizing military action by
the President.7 Such an analysis would also need to answer the ques-
tions of whether Congress could declare war and not authorize force
and, if so, what the consequences of such a declaration would be. Our
interest is in the different issue of whether authorizations, as opposed
to declarations, are capable of conferring full congressional authoriza-
tion on the Commander-in-Chief. With respect to this issue, we be-
lieve that the pattern of congressional action in declared wars provides
additional support for the modern consensus that force authorizations
66 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
67 See Bobbitt, supra note 34, at 1385.
68 See id. at 1385, 1392, 1396.
69 The pattern does, however, complicate many scholarly war powers theories. For example, it
is in tension with the common assumption in the literature that war declarations themselves
amount to an authorization to use force. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 28, at 25 (stating that a decla-
ration of war is a "paradigmatic combat authorization"). If that were so, it is not clear why Con-
gress has always separately authorized the President to use force when declaring war. The pat-
tern also suggests that, contrary to the standard pro-Congress view of war powers, Congress has
not viewed war declarations and authorizations to use force to be pure substitutes. Congress ap-
pears to have believed that a declaration served a different function than an authorization and
that it did not serve the function of providing Congress's authorization for the President to use
military force; otherwise, Congress would not have added a separate authorization to use military
force to every declaration. The pattern also raises questions concerning Professor Yoo's view that
the President has plenary legal authority to initiate war even in the absence of authorization from
Congress. See Yoo, supra note 28, at 304. As suggested above, the pattern might support his
claim that Congress's power to declare war is not the constitutional basis (or at least the sole con-
stitutional basis) for authorizing the use of force. But it also can be understood to suggest that
Congress's authority is not limited to a declaratory act with international law consequences, since
Congress has always taken the additional step in declared wars of authorizing the President's use
of military force. The pattern is also a problem for Greg Sidak's view that the Constitution re-
quires (or should require) Congress to use declarations rather than authorizations to approve of
presidential use of force, see generally Sidak, supra note 41, since it suggests that Congress be-
lieves that declarations themselves cannot, or do not, constitute approval of the use of force.
70 See supra p. 2060.
71 See, e.g., Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (185o).
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can confer full congressional authorization for the President to prose-
cute a war. This pattern shows that it is misleading, and probably
wrong, to compare the authority conferred by war declarations in de-
clared wars with the authority conferred by authorizations to use force
in authorized but undeclared wars, much less to view a war declara-
tion as a more extensive form of congressional approval than a force
authorization. Instead, to determine the extent to which Congress has
authorized the use of force, one must compare force authorizations in
all armed conflicts, declared or not.
7 2
B. Is This a "Real" War?
Without specifically considering the AUMF, some commentators
have suggested that the conflict with al Qaeda does not qualify as a
"real" war, but rather is war in a metaphorical sense, akin to the war
on drugs, war on poverty, or war on crime. 73 A conflict with a terror-
ist organization is not a genuine war, they argue, because it is not be-
tween states, making it difficult to identify the enemy and unclear
when, if ever, the conflict will end. Some commentators also contend
that non-state actors, like terrorist organizations or their members,
cannot be viewed as "combatants" or "belligerents" under the laws of
war.74 Because of the novel features of the current conflict, these
commentators suggest, the President does not possess the same array
of wartime powers that he possesses in traditional wars between states.
As we noted in the Introduction, there are indeed differences be-
tween this conflict and more traditional interstate conflicts. Although
these differences may have implications for how the powers conferred
by the AUMF can be applied in practice - an issue explored below in
Part V - we do not believe that they affect the conclusion that Con-
gress has authorized the President to fully prosecute a war against the
entities covered by the AUMF.
To begin with, Congress was aware that it was authorizing the
President to use military force against non-traditional actors. Indeed,
the AUMF specifically refers to those actors even while mirroring in
other respects authorizations to use force in more traditional conflicts.
Furthermore, a number of prior authorizations of force have been di-
rected at non-state actors, such as slave traders, pirates, and Indian
tribes.75  In addition, during the Mexican-American War, the Civil
72 We make such a comparison below in Part Il.
73 See sources cited supra note 27.
74 See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 348 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power To Determine the
Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 513 n.30 (2003).
75 See infra pp. 2073-74. Although U.S. law recognized Indian tribes as sovereign for some
purposes, the federal government treated Indian tribes as essentially non-state actors in interac-
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War, and the Spanish-American War, U.S. military forces engaged
military opponents who had no formal connection to the state enemy.
76
Presidents also have used force against non-state actors outside of au-
thorized conflicts. President McKinley's use of military force to put
down the Chinese Boxer Rebellion was primarily directed at non-state
actors.7 7 President Wilson sent more than seven thousand U.S. troops
into Mexico to pursue Pancho Villa, the leader of a band of rebels op-
posed to the recognized Mexican government.7 8 And President Clinton
authorized cruise missile strikes against al Qaeda targets in Sudan and
Afghanistan.7 9 In all of these instances, presidents as commanders-in-
chief exercised full military powers against non-state actors - some-
times with congressional authorization, and sometimes without.80
tions with them. They were "subject to the legislative power of the United States" and lacked
"the external powers of sovereignty." FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 123 (1988). As the Supreme Court explained, Indian tribes were understood as "domestic
dependent nations" rather than foreign states. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) i, 17
(1831); see also Montoya v. United States, 18o U.S. 261, 265 (19O1) ("The North American Indians
do not and never have constituted 'nations' as that word is used by writers upon international
law .... ). In addition, the United States used military force against less-organized "bands" of
Indians that were undoubtedly non-state actors. See Conners v. United States, 180 U.S. 2 71, 275
(1901).
76 See WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 123-24,
354-55 (rev. 3 d ed. 1914); i WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 783-84
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. rev. 2d ed. 1896); 2 id. at 832-34.
77 The Boxer Rebellion was an uprising by a Chinese anti-foreign, anti-Christian secret soci-
ety. See generally DIANA PRESTON, BESIEGED IN PEKING: THE STORY OF THE 19oo
BOXER RISING 25-30 (1999); CHESTER C. TAN, THE BOXER CATASTROPHE 35-36 0955)- In
i9oo, President McKinley sent five thousand U.S. troops to participate in an international relief
force that rescued U.S. and European citizens who were besieged by the Boxers in Peking's lega-
tion district. See FISHER, supra note 28, at 58. Although the Rebellion was initially targeted at
both foreigners and the ruling Manchu dynasty, by the time the relief force arrived, the Chinese
Empress had endorsed the Boxer movement and some government forces had joined in the attack
on the foreign legations. See RICHARD O'CONNOR, THE BOXER REBELLION 115 (1973);
TAN, supra, at 93. The Chinese government even declared war on the United States. See ANN
VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT 13 (1982). However, most of the forces that the relief force encountered on its way to
Peking were operating beyond the control of the government, which was itself divided and weak.
See TAN, supra, at 94.
78 See JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, INTERVENTION! THE UNITED STATES AND THE
MEXICAN REVOLUTION 1913-1917, at 231-6o (1993).
79 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 117 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.9-
I icommission.gov/reportl9i Report.pdf. Similarly, Vice President Cheney authorized the shoot-
ing down of the fourth hijacked airplane on September i i. See id. at 41.
80 The post-September ii war on terrorism has sometimes been compared to the Barbary
Wars of the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., Richard Leiby, Terrorists by Another Name: The
Barbary Pirates, WASH. POST, Oct. i5, 2001, at Ci; see also Robert F. Turner, State Responsibil-
ity and the War on Terror: The Legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 121 (2003). Although these wars were in response to acts of piracy against U.S. ships,
the Barbary pirates were under the control of North African monarchs and thus were arguably
state actors. Moreover, the United States attacked not only pirate ships, but also the cities of
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Furthermore, despite its novel features, the post-September i i war
on terrorism possesses more characteristics of a traditional war than
some commentators have acknowledged.8 1 Al Qaeda declared war
against the United States and attacked U.S. military and diplomatic
facilities numerous times prior to September 11.82 On the basis of
these attacks and related threats, the Clinton Administration con-
cluded in the 199os - as a prerequisite to participation in efforts to
kill Osama bin Laden - that the United States was in an armed con-
flict with al Qaeda.83 The scale and organized nature of the Septem-
ber i i attacks and the scope of their destruction in terms of lives, eco-
nomic loss, and psychological trauma also transcend what is typical of
mere criminal action. So too does the ongoing nature of the al Qaeda
threat; the al Qaeda network has long sought weapons of mass de-
struction, and has long stated its intention to use them against the
United States.8 4  Its goals, moreover, are political in nature, unlike
typical criminal enterprises.8 5  The United States's continuing combat
operations and related use of significant military resources against al
Qaeda in Afghanistan and other countries also make a war characteri-
zation at least plausible.
In addition, the AUMF was enacted against an international law
backdrop that focuses not on "war," but rather on "armed attacks" and
"armed conflicts" - concepts that are not limited to state actors. The
United Nations Charter recognizes the right of states to use force in
self-defense in response to an "armed attack. '8 6 The Charter does not
specify that the attack must come from another state, and the Security
Council appears to have recognized that the September ii attacks
were armed attacks triggering the right of self-defense under the Char-
ter.8 7 Similarly, both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
Tripoli and Derna. And, during the Barbary War of I8oi to 1805, both Tripoli and Morocco for-
mally declared war on the United States. See generally MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF
PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER 3-29 (2002); ABRAHAM D.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 2o8-24 (1976); JOSEPH
WHEELAN, JEFFERSON'S WAR: AMERICA'S FIRST WAR ON TERROR i8oi-i8o5 (2003).
81 We are addressing here only the legal plausibility of using a war framework, not the policy
wisdom of doing so. For an argument that it is undesirable as a matter of policy to treat the con-
flict with international terrorism as a war (because of, among other things, its effect on resource
commitments), see PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WIN-
NING WITHOUT WAR 19-33 (2oo3).
82 See 91il COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 79, at 47, 59-70, 190-97.
83 See id. at 132, 485 n.123.
84 See id. at 6o-61, 38o-81.
85 See id. at 361-63.
86 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
87 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, Jan. 2001-July 2002, at 291, U.N. Doc. S/RES/13 73 (2OOl);
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, Jan. 20oI-July 2002, at 290, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 3 68 (2001).
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Organization of American States treated the attacks as "armed at-
tacks" for purposes of their collective self-defense provisions."8
Modern jus in bello rules, which, as discussed above, are triggered
by "armed conflicts" rather than "war,"8' 9 also extend to conflicts with
non-state actors. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, for
example, expressly applies to armed conflicts "not of an international
character."90  While this provision was designed to address internal
conflicts between a state and insurgents, 91 it demonstrates that as early
as 1949, the law of armed conflict recognized conflicts between states
and non-state actors. Since that time, the law of armed conflict has
been preoccupied with regulating conflicts with non-state actors. The
two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, for example, seek to
extend international humanitarian protections to a variety of such con-
flicts.92 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via has also recognized that the concept of "armed conflict" under in-
ternational law extends beyond the categories of traditional interstate
and internal conflicts, and has concluded, without reference to these
88 See Press Release, North Atlantic Council, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept.
12, 2001), http://www.nato.intldocu/pr/20OI/poI-I24e.htm; Lord Robertson, Statement by NATO
Secretary General, Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), http://www.nato.intldocu/speech/2o01/SO11o2a.
htm; Organization of American States, Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Terrorist Threat to the Americas (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/RC.24e.htm.
89 See supra P. 2o61.
90 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38.
Common Article 3 requires that persons who are not taking an active part in hostilities be treated
"humanely," and it prohibits certain actions, such as torture and murder, directed at such persons.
See id.
91 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 51, at 28-34; Derek Jinks, September
ri and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. i, 39-40 (2003). But cf INT'L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, supra note 5 1, at 36 ("We think . .. that the scope of application of the Article must
be as wide as possible.").
92 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, art. I(4),
112 5 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (covering "armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist r~gimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination"); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, art. i(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 6o9, 611 (covering all armed conflicts
not covered by the First Protocol "which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, un-
der responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol"); see also
Jinks, supra note 91, at 27 ("As a result of the two Protocols, the Geneva Conventions now recog-
nize and regulate four distinct categories of armed conflict: inter-state armed conflict under Com-
mon Article 2; internal 'wars of national liberation' as defined in Protocol I; 'civil wars' proper as
defined in Protocol II; and 'armed conflicts not of an international character' under Common Ar-
ticle 3."). The United States has not ratified these Protocols and thus is not bound as a matter of
treaty law by their terms. Nevertheless, these Protocols show that the AUMF was enacted against
a backdrop of international law that has increasingly moved in the direction of regulating con-
flicts between states and non-state actors.
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distinctions, that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is
... protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups. ''93 As other commentators have noted, an ex-
tended conflict between a state and a terrorist organization appears to
satisfy this standard.
94
Finally, and most importantly, both Congress and the President
have treated this conflict as a war, and have treated the entities identi-
fied in the AUMF as enemy combatants under the laws of war. The
President characterized the conflict as a war on September i i, and has
continued to do so ever since. 95 Congress in the AUMF authorized the
President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those re-
sponsible for the September ii attacks. The AUMF states, moreover,
that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within
the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. '96  The
President has since filed a number of reports with Congress - de-
scribed as "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution - that relate
to the war on terrorism. 97 Congress has also appropriated billions of
dollars for military activities relating to the war on terrorism (includ-
ing the conflict in Afghanistan), the detention of terrorist enemy com-
batants, and the use of military commissions.
When, as here, both political branches have treated a conflict as a
"war," and that characterization is plausible, there is no basis for the
courts to second-guess that determination based on some metaphysical
conception of the true meaning of war. Determinations of what consti-
93 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT- 9 4 -I-AR 7 2, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber
Oct. 2, 1995) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/5 oo2.
htm.
94 See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 91, at 27-28, 38; Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White,
An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. I, 4-5 (2002).
95 On the night of September ii, President Bush addressed the nation and referred to a "war
against terrorism." See President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to
the Nation (Sept. ii, 2ooi), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20oI/09/2o009Ii-i6.html.
The next day, after meeting with his National Security Team, he stated, "The deliberate and
deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of ter-
ror. They were acts of war." President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Op-
portunity with the National Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/2OOlO912-4.html. In subsequently authorizing the detention and military trial of
terrorist enemy combatants, President Bush observed that the September ii attacks were "on a
scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed
Forces." Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § i(a), 3 C.F.R. 918, 918 (2001), reprinted in io U.S.C.A.
§ 8ol (West Supp. 2004) [hereinafter Military Order].
96 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(b)(i), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
97 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: AFTER THIRTY
YEARS (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL 32267, Mar. ii, 2004),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html.
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tutes a war for purposes of the President's Commander-in-Chief au-
thority have always been contextual and have always depended on po-
litical branch determinations about how the United States should re-
spond to particular threats, not on whether the conflict satisfied
certain definitional criteria.
The Prize Cases provide an instructive analogy.98 In i86i, after
Southern forces had attacked Fort Sumter and while Congress was in
recess, President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports.
The Prize Cases involved the capture of four neutral vessels that had
allegedly violated the blockade.99 The owners of the vessels argued
that the President did not have the authority to institute the blockade
because the Civil War was a mere "insurrection," rather than a
"war."100 Anticipating modern critics of the war on terrorism, they ar-
gued that the conflict did not satisfy the traditional criteria for war -
it was not between nations, Southern forces were mere "insurgents" or
"traitors" rather than "belligerents" or "enemies," and the usual conse-
quences of war did not apply to this form of conflict. 1 1 In rejecting
this argument, the Supreme Court deferred to the President's charac-
terization of the conflict as a civil war, noting that whether the threat
by the insurrectionists warranted their characterization as "belliger-
ents" was a "question to be decided by him, and this Court must be
governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted.' 10 2 The Court added:
"The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence
to the Court that a state of war existed which demanded and author-
ized a recourse to such a measure, under the circumstances peculiar to
the case.' 10
3
In the Prize Cases, deference to the political branch determination
of belligerency was relatively easy because the President had used
force in response to an attack and because Congress had ratified the
President's actions after the fact.10 4 The issue is more complex when
the President takes action beyond repelling attacks without the au-
thorization of Congress. This complication is not implicated in the
conflict covered by the AUMF, however, since Congress has in fact au-
98 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
99 Id. at 636-38 (reporter's summary).
100 Id. at 642 (argument of ship owners' counsel).
101 See id. at 644; id. at 657 (argument of United States counsel); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
at 669-7o, 672; id. at 687 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
102 Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 668 ("If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only




thorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force in
that conflict.
III. THE AUMF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In this Part, we compare the AUMF with other authorizations of
force throughout U.S. history. Section III.A introduces an analytical
framework for comparing force authorizations. This framework dis-
tinguishes between limited authorizations to use force, which restrict
the resources and methods of force that the President can employ, of-
ten restrict the targets of the authorization, tend to have narrowly de-
fined purposes, and often have procedural or timing restrictions; and
broad authorizations to use force, which do not restrict resources or
methods, do not restrict targets other than to identify an enemy, invoke
relatively broad purposes, and impose few if any timing or procedural
restrictions. Employing these criteria, section III.B shows that the
AUMF confers authority that is comparable in scope to that conferred
by congressional authorizations in declared wars.
A. Historical Comparison of Authorizations To Use Force
Congress has expressly authorized the President to use military
force dozens of times in U.S. history.1 0 5  As a prelude to analyzing the
September i8, 2ooi AUMF, we compare, contrast, and categorize these
authorizations and consider their potential implications. We limit our
analysis of authorizations to use force to those that empower the
President to use force. 0 6 For purposes of comparison, these authoriza-
tions can be broken down into five analytical components:
(i) the authorized military resources;
(2) the authorized methods of force;
(3) the authorized targets;
(4) the purpose of the use of force; and
(5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force.
We begin with the authorizations to use force against French naval
vessels in the Quasi-War of the late I79os. This war grew out of
105 See, e.g., WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 63, at 309-15; David M. Ackerman & Rich-
ard F. Grimmett, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Back-
ground and Legal Implications, in DECLARATIONS OF WAR i, 8-22 (Ernest V. Klun ed., 2002).
106 Congress sometimes authorizes entities within the Executive Branch to take actions involv-
ing military force, but those authorizations are typically much more limited in scope than presi-
dential authorizations. For example, 1o U.S.C. § 124 authorizes the Department of Defense to use
Department personnel and equipment to intercept certain maritime and aerial drug carriers for
purposes of communicating with the carrier and directing it to a location ordered by civilian offi-
cials. Similarly narrow is IO U.S.C. § 374, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to employ
Department personnel and equipment, on the request of a federal law enforcement agency, for
various specifically designated law enforcement tasks.
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French seizures of U.S. merchant vessels during France's war with the
European powers.107 The first congressional authorization empowered
the President (i) to instruct U.S. armed vessels, (2) to seize, bring into
U.S. ports, and proceed against legally, (3) French armed vessels that
had illegally committed certain depredations against U.S. commercial
vessels, (4) to protect the commercial shipping of the United States, (5)
without restriction as to procedure or timing. 10 8 Soon thereafter, Con-
gress authorized the President (I) to instruct U.S. armed vessels, (2) to
seize, bring to port, and proceed against, (3) any French armed vessel,
(4) to protect the commercial shipping of the United States, (5) without
procedural or timing limitation.109
These two authorizations were typical of the Quasi-War in empow-
ering the President to use particular armed forces in a specified way
for limited ends. They did not authorize him to use all of the armed
forces of the United States or to conduct military incursions beyond
specified military targets, and they limited the geographical scope of
the authorized conflict to the high seas. In short, Congress "au-
thori[z]ed hostilities on the high seas by certain persons in certain
cases," but it gave "no authority ... to commit hostilities on land; to
capture unarmed French vessels, nor even to capture French armed
vessels lying in a French port."' 10 The Supreme Court described this
war as a "limited," "imperfect," or "partial" one - that is, a war "con-
fined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and
things.""'
Most authorizations to use force in U.S. history have been of this
limited or partial nature. For example, beginning early in U.S. history,
Congress authorized the President to use various specified military re-
sources and methods related to the repulsion, suppression, or protec-
tion of Indians. 112 Congress twice authorized the President to use lim-
107 See generally ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLO-
MACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797-18oi (1966); STANLEY ELKINS &
ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 643-62 (993); SOFAER, supra note 8o, at 131-
66.
108 Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561; see also Act of June 28, 1798, ch. 62, i Stat. 574
(supplementing Act of May 28, 1798).
109 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578.
110 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37, 43 (18oo) (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted).
111 Id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.); see also id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.) (Congress may
authorize war "limited in place, in objects, and in time"). But cf. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (i
Cranch) I, 33 (18o1) ("There must then be incidents growing out of those acts of hostility specifi-
cally authorized, which a fair construction of the acts will authorize likewise.").
112 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1834, ch. i61, §§ io-1i, 4 Stat. 729, 73o; Act of May 28, 1830, ch.
148, 4 Stat. 411; Act of Mar. 3, 799, ch. 46, § 5, 1 Stat. 743, 745; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 5,
* Stat. 469, 47o; Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424; Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264;
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. Io, § 6, 1 Stat. 119, 121; Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95, 96.
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ited force to occupy and control Florida. 113  It also authorized the
President to use limited force against slave traders and pirates and
against the Barbary states that had been preying on U.S. shipping.1 14
Other limited authorizations have concerned relatively trivial matters,
such as ensuring payments of indemnity"15 and protecting certain
fisheries. 116
The limited authorizations described above stand in sharp contrast
to authorizations in declared wars. These latter authorizations all
have had the same basic form. The authorization against Germany in
World War I is typical. It "authorized and directed" the President (i)
"to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States
and the resources of the Government," (2) without restriction on the
method of force, (3) without express restriction on targets, but implic-
itly directed at Germany, (4) "to carry on war against the Imperial
German Government," (5) without procedural or timing restriction.117
There are four crucial differences between authorizations in de-
clared wars and authorizations in more limited conflicts. First, au-
thorizations in declared wars do not purport to restrict the resources
available to the President. He can employ all the military forces of the
government. Second, authorizations in declared wars do not limit the
methods of force that the President can use. A number of authoriza-
tions outside of declared wars, by contrast, have been limited to par-
ticular methods of force, such as subduing or seizing certain entities, or
compelling certain actions. 118 Third, unlike in the Quasi-War authori-
zation, for example, which empowered the President only to seize
ships, authorizations in declared wars place no express limit on author-
ized targets. Of course, the targets authorized in declared wars are
implicitly limited by the named enemy and by the purpose of carrying
on and bringing to a successful termination the war against that en-
113 See Act of Mar. 3, i819, ch. 93, 3 Stat. 523; Act of Jan. i5, 18il, 3 Stat. 471.
114 See Act of Mar. 3, I819, ch. ilo, 3 Stat. 532 (slave traders); Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3
Stat. 5 so (pirates); Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 90, 3 Stat. 23o; Act of Feb. 6, 1802, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 129.
115 See Joint Resolution of June i9, i89o, No. 28, 26 Stat. 674; Resolution of June 2, 1858, No.
15, ii Stat. 370.
116 See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 415, § 3, 25 Stat. IOO9, ioo9-IO.
117 Joint Resolution of Apr. 6, 19,7, ch. 1, 40 Stat. i.
118 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 16i, §§ Ic-ii, 23, 4 Stat. 729, 730, 733 (authorizing the
President to remove certain traders and settlers from Indian lands); Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 90, 3
Stat. 230 (authorizing the President to subdue, seize, and take public vessels of the Dey of Algiers);
Act of Mar. i, 18o9, ch. 24, § I, 2 Stat. 528, 528 (authorizing the President to compel certain Brit-
ish and French ships to depart U.S. waters); Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, § 7, 2 Stat. 426, 428 (au-
thorizing the President to seize, take, and bring into U.S. ports certain U.S. ships violating the
slave trade ban); Act of Mar. 3, 1805, ch. 40, §§ 4-5, 2 Stat. 339, 341-42 (authorizing the President
to repel and move certain ships from U.S. harbors and waters); Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, §§ 1-2,




emy. The authorization to use force in the war with Germany could
not be viewed as an authorization to attack Mexico (at least not with-
out some nexus between the attack on Mexico and the authorization of
force against Germany). With the exception of this implicit nexus re-
quirement, which is present in every authorization to use force, au-
thorizations in declared wars impose no additional limitation on the
President's targets. Finally, the purpose of the authorization in de-
clared wars - to defeat the enemy and bring the war to a successful
conclusion - is significantly broader than in limited conflicts.
Now consider the significant post-World War II congressional au-
thorizations of force (other than the AUMF, which we analyze below).
The most famous concerns the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, following its passage in August 1964 and until its repeal in
January 1971, was the primary congressional authorization for the
Vietnam War.119 It provided that "Congress approves and supports
the determination of the President ... to take all necessary measures
to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and
to prevent further aggression."' 2 0 This is an extraordinarily broad au-
thorization to use force. Broken down into our five components, it au-
thorized the President (i) to use all necessary measures, without speci-
fication of particular resources, (2) without restriction on the method of
force, (3) without restriction on authorized targets, except that the tar-
gets must have attacked the United States or, perhaps, threatened fur-
ther aggression, (4) with the purpose of repelling attacks and prevent-
ing aggression, and (5) without procedural or timing limitation. It is
possible to read into the Resolution an implicit nexus requirement re-
lated to combat action in Southeast Asia. 12 ' Even with this limitation,
the authorization
was expressed in broad language which clearly showed the state of mind
of the Congress and its intention fully to implement and support the mili-
tary and naval actions taken by and planned to be taken by the President
at that time in Southeast Asia, and as might be required in the future "to
prevent further aggression. I'122
119 Joint Resolution of Aug. Io, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384. The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution was passed after alleged attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. ships in the Gulf of
Tonkin. The Resolution was controversial in part because of its breadth, but also because there
was evidence that the Johnson Administration may have misrepresented what happened in the
Gulf of Tonkin in order to prompt Congress to act. See ELY, supra note 28, at 19-2o.
120 Joint Resolution of Aug. so, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, § 1, 78 Stat. 384, 384. It also stated
that the United States was "prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, in-
cluding the use of armed force, to assist any member ... of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." Id. § 2, 78 Stat. at 384.
121 See ELY, supra note 28, at 26 (reading in a nexus requirement based on one of the "whereas"
clauses in the resolution, which referred to a "campaign of aggression that the Communist regime
in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors").
122 Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 197).
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The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is as broad as force authorizations in
declared wars along the crucial dimensions of resources, methods, tar-
gets, and purpose, and is arguably broader (or at least more open-
ended) with respect to targets and purpose.
The authorization to use force against Iraq in 2002 is slightly nar-
rower than the authorization in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, but it is
closer in scope to that authorization, and to the authorizations in de-
clared wars, than to typical authorizations in undeclared wars. The
Iraq authorization empowers the President to use (i) "the Armed
Forces of the United States," (2) "as he determines to be necessary and
appropriate," (3) without express restriction on targets, but implicitly
directed at Iraq, (4) for the purpose of "defend[ing] the national secu-
rity of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq;
and ... enforc[ing] all relevant United Nations Security Council Reso-
lutions regarding Iraq," and (5) with two procedural conditions: (a) the
President must determine that diplomatic or peaceful means will not
achieve these purposes, and that action against Iraq is consistent with
the war against those responsible for the September i i attacks; and (b)
the President must report to Congress concerning the authorization
every sixty days.
123
Although not necessarily as broad as the authorization in the Viet-
nam War, which placed no express limit on available resources, or the
authorizations in some declared wars, which pledged the resources of
the government beyond the armed forces, the 2002 Iraq authorization
is significantly broader than typical authorizations in undeclared wars.
The President is authorized to use the "United States Armed Forces,"
rather than only a subset of U.S. forces as in many limited conflicts.
The Iraq authorization places no apparent restriction on methods of
force; certainly the President did not view the term "necessary and ap-
propriate" as placing restrictions on the invasion of Iraq. The implicit
target of the authorization - Iraq - is similar to targets in declared
wars. The purposes of the authorization - which include defending
U.S. national security - are comparable in scope to the purposes of
authorizations in declared wars and the Vietnam War. Although the
procedural conditions in the 2002 authorization have no analogue in
authorizations in declared wars and in the Vietnam War, they do not
impose significant limitations on presidential action.
The Vietnam authorization and the 2002 Iraq authorization con-
trast with other, narrower post-World War II authorizations. The
1955 authorization to use force in Taiwan gave the President the abil-
ity to use broad resources ("the Armed Forces of the United States"),
123 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
243, § 3, II6 Stat. 1498, 1501.
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but it had a relatively narrow "specific purpose" ("securing and pro-
tecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack"), as well as
a time limitation and a reporting requirement. 2 4 The i99i authoriza-
tion to use force against Iraq similarly allowed the President to use
broad resources ("the United States Armed Forces"), but it had a rela-
tively narrow purpose (implementing various United Nations Security
Council resolutions related to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) and various
procedural restrictions.
2 5
The authorizations to use force in Lebanon in I983 and Somalia in
1993 were even narrower. In the Lebanon authorization, Congress
limited the President's use of the armed forces to the performance of
certain functions (as specified in an agreement with Lebanon), estab-
lished an eighteen-month limitation on the authorization, and imposed
detailed reporting requirements. 12 6 Similarly, the Somalia authoriza-
tion had a very limited purpose (most notably, the protection of U.S.
personnel and bases), a time limitation of approximately five months,
and (in a later statute) a reporting requirement.
127
This survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress has
authorized the President to use force in many different situations, with
varying resources, an array of goals, and a number of different restric-
tions. All of the authorizations restrict targets, either expressly (as in
the Quasi-War statutes' restrictions relating to the seizure of certain
naval vessels), implicitly (based on the identified enemy and stated
purposes of the authorization), or both. Such restrictions may be con-
stitutionally compelled. Congress's power to authorize the President to
use force, whatever its scope, arguably could not be exercised without
specifying (at least implicitly) an enemy or a purpose. 28
124 The authorization stated that it would "expire when the President shall determine that the
peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action
of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall report to Congress." Joint Resolution of Jan. 29,
1955, Pub. L. No. 4, 69 Stat. 7.
125 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-i, 105
Stat. 3 (199').
126 See Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-1i9, §§ 3-4, 6, 97 Stat. 8o5,
8o6-07 (I983).
127 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 815i, 107 Stat.
1418, 1475-77 (1993); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year i994, Pub. L. No. 103-
i6o, § 1512, 107 Stat. 1547, 1840-41 (993).
128 See I TRIBE, supra note 65, § 4-6, at 66i. Some scholars argued that the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution was unconstitutional on precisely this ground. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, Con-
gress, the President, and the Power To Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 137-40 (197);
Francis D. Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CAL. L. REV. 623, 692-
700 (1972). But see William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues - Administration Position,
45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 636-37 (1970) ("It has been suggested that there may be a question of
unlawful delegation of powers here [with respect to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution], and that Con-
gress is not free to give a blank check to the President. Whatever may be the answer to that ab-
stract question in the domestic field, I think it is plain from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
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The primary differences between limited and broad authorizations
are as follows: In limited authorizations, Congress restricts the re-
sources and methods of force that the President can employ, sometimes
expressly restricts targets, identifies relatively narrow purposes for the
use of force, and sometimes imposes time limits or procedural restric-
tions. In broad authorizations, Congress imposes few if any limits on
resources or methods, does not restrict targets other than to identify an
enemy, invokes relatively broad purposes, and generally imposes few if
any timing or procedural restrictions. With these distinctions in mind,
we turn to the September i8, 2001 AUMF.
B. The September 18, 2001 AUMF
The AUMF can be evaluated using the five analytical components
we have previously identified. Its authorization "to use all necessary
and appropriate force" appears to straddle components (i) and (2) by
specifying in a single phrase both the resources that the President can
use and the methods that he can employ. 129 As for the other compo-
nents, the President is authorized to use such force (3) "against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
I i, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons," (4) with the pur-
pose of "prevent[ing] any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons," and (5)
with an arguable requirement to report to Congress every six months
on the status of the authorized hostilities. 130
A number of factors suggest that the AUMF confers as much au-
thority on the President to prosecute the war against covered entities
as did authorizations in declared wars.13' We begin with the AUMF's
port Corp. .. . that the principle of unlawful delegation of powers does not apply to the field of
external affairs." (footnotes omitted)); but cf. ELY, supra note 28, at 25-26 (arguing that to satisfy
the nondelegation doctrine, a congressional authorization to use force must specify an enemy and
that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution did so implicitly in its preamble).
129 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)
(emphasis added).
130 The AUMF states that "[n]othing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War
Powers Resolution." Id. § 2(b)(2), Y15 Stat. at 225. The War Powers Resolution, in turn, imposes
reporting requirements for situations in which U.S. armed forces are introduced into hostilities in
"the absence of a declaration of war." See 5o U.S.C. § 1543 (2ooo). Because the war on terrorism
is authorized but not declared, the reporting requirements probably apply. Since September ii,
the President has regularly reported to Congress on the state of the war against terrorism, but he
has done so "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution, the typical presidential phrase designed
to indicate that the President does not concede that he is bound by the Resolution. See supra p.
2070.
131 Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, i CONST. COMMENT. 215, 252
(20o2) (stating that the AUMF is "arguably the broadest congressional delegation of war power in
our nation's history"). It is worth noting that some members of Congress proposed that the
United States declare war against terrorist organizations in response to the September i i attacks.
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nexus requirement. The AUMF extends to "nations, organizations, or
persons" whom the President determines have certain specified connec-
tions to the September ii attacks. The President initially requested
the broader authority to "deter and pre-empt any future acts of terror-
ism or aggression against the United States," without regard to the en-
tities involved.132 After negotiations with the White House, however,
Congress declined to authorize the use of military force to prevent ter-
rorist attacks by those unconnected to September i 1.133 According to
several members of Congress, the AUMF limited its targets to avoid
the perceived overbreadth of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which, as
noted above, had authorized the President to use force, arguably with-
out specifying any particular enemy.134 Many members of Congress
stated or implied in floor debates that this nexus limitation was the
sole textual limitation on the President's authorization to use force.
135
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 62, Io 7 th Cong. (2001); 147 CONG. REC. H5653 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2ooi)
(statement of Rep. Barr).
132 According to the Democratic Chief Counsel to the House Committee on International Rela-
tions, the President originally asked Congress to approve the following authorization:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored [sic],
committed, or aided in the planning or commission of the attacks against the United
States that occurred on September 1i, 2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts
of terrorism or aggression against the United States.
David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political Considera-
tions in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 7', 73
(2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Draft Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force).
133 See, e.g., John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Congress Clears Use of Force, $40 Billion in
Emergency Aid, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at A 4 ; David G. Savage, Vietnam Ghost Haunts
Senate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. i6, 2ooi, at Ai 4 .
134 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H563 3 (daily ed. Sept. i4, 2001) (statement of Rep. DeFazio)
("The earlier drafts ceded too much authority to the executive branch. In fact, one of the earlier
drafts had provisions nearly identical to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which had led to the un-
accountable use of U.S. military forces in Vietnam."); id. at H 5 64 8 (statement of Rep. Mink) ("I
have read [the AUMF] a dozen times over, because I want to make sure that the War Powers Act
that we enacted right after the conflagration in Vietnam is not in any way jeopardized. I think we
have to call attention to those sections which say 'Nothing in this resolution supersedes the war
powers resolution.' On that basis, I support the passage of this resolution tonight."); id. at HS6 75
(statement of Rep. Jackson) ("I am not voting 'Yes' on September 14, 2001, for an open-ended
Tonkin Gulf-type Resolution.... I'm not willing to give President Bush carte blanche authority
to fight terrorism. We need to agree to fight it together within traditional constitutional bounda-
ries."). But cf. id. at H 5 672 (statement of Rep. Lee) (arguing against the AUMF by describing the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and stating, "I fear we make the same mistake today").
135 See, e.g., id. at H5666 (statement of Rep. Cardin) ("[This is] a resolution ... against those
responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States and its citizens .... This
resolution limits [its authorization of military force] to respond to the September i i attacks on our
Nation."); id. at S9417 (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("[I]t does not contain a broad grant of powers,
but is appropriately limited to those entities involved in the attacks that occurred on September
i i."); id. at S94 16 (statement of Sen. Levin) ("[T]his authorization for the use of force is limited to
the nations, organizations, or persons involved in the terrorist attacks of September i i. It is not a
broad authorization for the use of military force against any nation, organization, or persons who
were not involved in the September ii terrorist attacks."); id. at H5 642 (statement of Rep. Nor-
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This September i i nexus limitation, like nexus limitations in au-
thorizations in declared wars, implicitly restricts authorized targets by
virtue of the named enemy and the purposes of the authorization.
Also, like authorizations in declared wars but unlike authorizations in
many undeclared wars (such as the Quasi-War with France), the
AUMF contains no additional limitation on targets. Similarly, the
AUMF's purpose of "prevent[ing] any future acts of international ter-
rorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or per-
sons" is as broad as the purposes in authorizations in the Vietnam War
("to prevent further aggression") and in declared wars (such as
"carry[ing] on war against the Government of Germany" and
"bring[ing] the conflict to a successful termination"), and contrasts with
the narrower purposes in limited authorizations of, for example, pro-
tecting U.S. commerce, 136 enforcing neutrality restrictions,1 37 or im-
plementing U.N. Security Council resolutions.1 38 Moreover, as with
authorizations in declared wars, in the Vietnam War, and in the recent
Iraq war, the AUMF does not appear to impose any limitation on ei-
ther the resources or the methods that the President can employ.1 39 In-
stead, the AUMF broadly authorizes the President to use "all necessary
and appropriate force" to prosecute the war.
ton) ("[Tihe language before us is limited only by the slim anchor of its September ii reference,
but allows war against any and all prospective persons and entities."); cf id. at S9419 (statement
of Sen. Snowe) ("I rise in support of the joint resolution authorizing the use of U.S. Armed Forces
against those responsible for the recent act of war against this Nation, to deter future attacks, and
to disable the machinery of terror."). Some commentators argue that the AUMF's final "whereas"
clause, which recognizes that "the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to
deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States," amounts to a congres-
sional recognition of inherent presidential authority to engage in preemptive action against terror-
ists. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority To
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 515 (2002); Paulsen, supra note i3i, at 252-53.
This is possible, but another possibility is that Congress merely was recognizing that its authoriza-
tion did not exhaust all bases for presidential use of force.
136 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 6, 1802, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 129.
137 See, e.g., Act of June I5, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 5, 40 Stat. 217, 22 1-23.
138 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-I, 105
Stat. 3 (199I).
139 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H5662 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Rep. Davis) ("Al-
though [the AUMF] is not a formal declaration of war, the resolution gives the President full au-
thority to use force against these terrorists and is similar to the use of force resolution authorizing
military operations during the Persian Gulf conflict in I991."); id. at H56 3 9 (statement of Rep.
Hyde) ("We must grant the President the fullest authority to employ all of the resources of the
United States, to make war on our enemy, to destroy their ability to harm us and to defend our
beloved country."); id. (statement of Rep. Lantos) ("The resolution before us empowers the Presi-
dent to bring to bear the full force of American power abroad in our struggle against the scourge
of international terrorism.").
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One could argue that the phrase "necessary and appropriate,"
which does not appear in force authorizations in declared wars, 140 was
meant to restrict presidential action. We do not believe, however, that
it should be read in this manner. The legislative debates on the
AUMF overwhelmingly suggest that Congress did not view the "neces-
sary and appropriate" phrase as a limitation on presidential action.
1 41
Moreover, analogous phrases in the Constitution have not been con-
strued restrictively. The Necessary and Proper Clause, for example,
which is similar to the wording in the AUMF, has been interpreted as
enlarging rather than diminishing Congress's powers. 1 42  It seems
unlikely that Congress, which views the Necessary and Proper Clause
expansively, and has the most to gain from a broad interpretation of
the clause, would have used the phrase "necessary and appropriate" as
a way to constrain presidential authority. We do not mean to suggest
that the AUMF confers unrestricted authority on the President. As we
explain in Part IV, Executive Branch practice in prior wars and the in-
ternational laws of war inform the boundaries of a broad authorization
of force such as the AUMF, and the phrase "necessary and appropri-
140 The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, by contrast, authorized the President to take "all necessary
measures," but did not use the term "appropriate." Joint Resolution of Aug. io, 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (emphasis added).
141 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S9422 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("The
authority [in the AUMF] permits the President wide latitude to use force against the broad range
of actors who were responsible for the September i i attacks."); id. at H 5 64 6 (statement of Rep.
Schiff) (describing the authorization to use necessary and appropriate force against an identified
enemy as a "broad delegation of authority to make war on those who have attacked us"); id. at
H564 9 (statement of Rep. Spratt) ("On occasions in the past, we have been aware of invoking the
War Powers Act and becoming implicated in military actions we were not sure about. But the
world should note that in this instance we set such concerns aside and give the President broadly
the power to use all necessary and appropriate force."); see also supra note 139. But cf. 147
CONG. REC. H5673 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2oo1) (statement of Rep. Clayton) ("The authorization we
give the President today is not unlimited. Congress will monitor progress of our military actions
and work with the President to ensure that our actions under this resolution are necessary and
appropriate, consistent with our values, in conjunction with our friends and allies, and in accor-
dance with international laws.").
142 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-14, 420-21 (18i9); see also
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 183, 214 (2003) ("[I]t is the latitudinarian gloss on the meaning of 'necessary' [in McCulloch]
that survives to this day largely unchallenged."); Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judi-
cial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV 1341, 1378
(1983) ("Since the time of McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been clear that the Clause presents no
formidable barriers to legislative activity."). Similarly, the reference to "appropriate legislation" in
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted as conveying "the same broad pow-
ers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650
(1966). While recent Supreme Court decisions require "congruence and proportionality" between
the means and ends of legislation enacted under Section 5, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 520 (997), the Court continues to state that Congress's power under Section 5 is "a broad
power indeed," Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, i985 (2004) (quoting Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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ate" can be viewed as encompassing these boundaries. Our claim is
simply that there is no reason to think that "necessary and appropri-
ate" was meant as an independent and additional restriction.
43
The AUMF is arguably more restrictive in one respect, and argua-
bly broader in another respect, than authorizations in declared wars.
It is arguably more restrictive to the extent that it requires the Presi-
dent to report to Congress on the status of hostilities. This difference
from authorizations in declared wars, however, does not purport to af-
fect the military authority that Congress has conferred on the Presi-
dent. The AUMF is arguably broader than authorizations in declared
wars in its description of the enemy against which force can be used.
The AUMF authorizes the President to use force against those "na-
tions, organizations, or persons he determines" have the requisite nexus
with the September ii attacks. This provision contrasts with authori-
zations in declared wars in two related ways. First, it describes rather
than names the enemies that are the objects of the use of force. 144 Sec-
ond, it expressly authorizes the President to determine which "nations,
organizations, or persons" satisfy the statutory criteria for enemy
status.145 One could argue that the effect of the "he determines" provi-
sion is to give the President broad, and possibly unreviewable, discre-
tion to apply the nexus requirement to identify the covered enemy -
at least to the extent that his determination does not implicate consti-
tutional rights. 46  Even if this argument is correct, this provision
143 This construction of the AUMF is further supported by the general interpretive principle,
analyzed in Part IV, that congressional authorizations in areas of concurrent presidential authority
should be construed broadly. See infra section IV.C, pp. 2100-02.
144 There are other examples of authorizations in U.S. history that have described rather than
named the enemy, implicitly leaving the determination of the particular entities satisfying the de-
scription to the President. See, e.g., Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 5, § 9, 40 Stat. 217, 223 (au-
thorizing the President to employ necessary force against persons and vessels violating the neu-
trality statute); Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 48, 12 Stat. 314 (authorizing the President to seize ships
built for piracy); Act of Mar. 3, i799, ch. 46, § 5, 1 Stat. 743, 745 (authorizing the President to use
military force and measures as he judges necessary to remove illegal settlers from certain Indian
lands); Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (authorizing the President to employ the
militia against "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings").
145 The "he determines" provision has no analogue in authorizations in declared wars or the
Vietnam War, but it is similar to provisions in other war authorizations. See Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, ii6 Stat. 1498 (au-
thorizing the President to use U.S. armed forces against Iraq "as he determines to be necessary
and appropriate" (emphasis added)); Joint Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955, Pub. L. No. 4, 69 Stat. 7
(authorizing the President to employ armed forces "as he deems necessary" to protect Formosa and
the Pescadores against armed attack (emphasis added)); Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 8o6, 39
Stat. 756, 799-800 (authorizing the President to use force against belligerent powers based on his
determination that various neutrality laws are violated).
146 See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 5II U.S. 462, 474 (1994) ("[L]ongstanding authority holds that
[judicial review] is not available when the statute in question commits the decision to the discre-
tion of the president."); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 6oo-oi (1988) (holding that the decision
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probably adds little to the President's already-broad authority to de-
termine the existence of facts related to the exercise of his authority
under the AUMF.1
47
In sum, a comparison with prior authorizations shows that the
AUMF is as broad as authorizations in declared wars with respect to
the resources and methods it authorizes the President to employ, and
with respect to the purposes for which these resources can be used.
The AUMF should therefore be interpreted as conferring full congres-
sional authorization for the President to prosecute a war against the
nations, organizations, and persons that he determines have the requi-
site connection to the September i i attacks.
IV. ADDITIONAL INTERPRETIVE FACTORS RELEVANT TO
CONSTRUING THE AUMF
In Part III, we analyzed the AUMF's text and its relationship to
prior congressional authorizations of force, and concluded that the
AUMF is as broad as the authorizations that Congress has enacted in
declared wars. To go beyond this general conclusion and answer more
detailed questions about the AUMF's scope, we must consider addi-
tional interpretive factors.
The plurality's analysis of the AUMF in Hamdi provides a useful
starting point. The plurality interpreted Congress's authorization to
the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" as including
the power to take actions involving the "fundamental incident[s] of
waging war," and it suggested that the fundamental incidents of wag-
ing war are informed by Executive Branch practice during prior
armed conflicts and the international laws of war that define permissi-
ble conduct during wartime. 48  In addition, the plurality did not re-
quire either a tight fit between the language in the AUMF (authorizing
force) and the particular incident of war (detaining enemy combatants)
whether to terminate employees of the Central Intelligence Agency was committed to the discre-
tion of the Director of Central Intelligence and thus was not subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act). It is worth emphasizing that the discretion conferred by the
phrase "he determines" in the AUMF concerns the determination of which nations, organizations,
or persons were involved in the September i i attacks, and not (as was at issue, for example, in
Hamdi) the determination of which persons are members of organizations involved in such at-
tacks. As we explain, this distinction may be relevant to the scope of the President's authority to
designate someone an enemy combatant. See infra pp. 2121 -23.
147 Cf. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31-32 (1827) (noting, in the context of interpret-
ing a congressional authorization for the President to call forth the militia to suppress insurrec-
tions and repel invasions, that "[wihenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to
be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that
the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts").
148 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640-41 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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or, relatedly, a clear statement that the particular presidential action
relating to this incident of war was in fact authorized.
1 49
The plurality in Hamdi did not explain or analyze these interpre-
tive factors. In this Part, we attempt to provide a more systematic ac-
count of how and why these factors are relevant to interpreting the
AUMF.°5 0 In section IV.A, we explain why Executive Branch practice
during prior armed conflicts is relevant to interpreting the AUMF. In
149 See id. at 2641 ("[I]t is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of
detention.").
150 Although beyond the scope of our Article, judicial construction of the AUMF could also be
affected by deference to the Executive Branch. For example, Executive Branch interpretations of
the AUMF might be entitled to deference under, or by analogy to, the Chevron doctrine in admin-
istrative law. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (concluding that courts should defer to an administrative agency's construction of the stat-
ute that it administers when the statute is silent or ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable); see also Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 37o F.3 d 41, 63 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.,
concurring) (noting that, although the "applicability of Chevron to presidential interpretations is
apparently unsettled," Chevron would clearly apply if the statute had been directed at the Secre-
tary of State, and "[iut is puzzling why the case should be so much harder when the authority is
given to the Secretary's boss"); cf United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2ooi) (holding
that Chevron deference is appropriate only when it is "apparent ... that Congress would expect
the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or
fills a space in the enacted law'). Such interpretive deference may be particularly appropriate in
the context of the AUMF because it is a statute regulating foreign affairs. See, e.g., INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 45, 425 (1999) ("[W]e have recognized that judicial deference to the
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials 'exercise
especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations."' (quoting INS
v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988))). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and For-
eign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2ooo). Moreover, even if the Executive Branch were not entitled
to deference with respect to the meaning of the AUMF per se, it might be entitled to deference
concerning the content of the international laws of war, a body of treaty-based and customary law
that, as discussed below, can inform the meaning of the AUMF. The Supreme Court gives "great
weight" to the Executive Branch's interpretation of treaties. E.g., United States v. Stuart, 489
U.S. 353, 369 (I989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982)). The justifications for such deference - including the Executive Branch's role as princi-
pal spokesperson for the United States in foreign affairs and the desirability of having the United
States speak with one voice concerning its international law obligations - are probably even
stronger with respect to customary international law, an amorphous and evolving body of law, the
content of which has always been informed by political discretion and national self-interest. See,
e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1964) ("When articulating prin-
ciples of [customary] international law in its relations with other states, the Executive Branch
speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts,
but also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for the community of nations and pro-
tective of national concerns."). Finally, courts often defer to the President's determinations con-
cerning the status of military conflicts, see, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 16o, 167-70 (1948)
(deferring to the President's determination that a state of war continued to exist with respect to
Germany in World War II after Germany's surrender); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 701-
02 (1871) (deferring to presidential proclamations concerning when hostilities began and ended in
the Civil War), and it is easy to imagine that such deference could affect judicial application of the
AUMF. The relevance of these and other deference doctrines to the interpretation of the AUMF
would depend on the specific issue in question and the position taken on that issue by the Execu-
tive Branch.
2c,84 [Vol. 1 18:2047
WAR ON TERRORISM
section IV.B, we analyze the complex role that the international laws
of war should play in the interpretation of the AUMF. In section IV.C,
we examine the relevance of the President's independent constitutional
authority during wartime to the degree of fit required between the
language of the AUMF and presidential actions taken under it. In sec-
tion IV.D, we consider the proper role of clear statement requirements
in interpreting the AUMF.
A. Executive Branch Practice
In concluding that the AUMF authorized the President to detain
enemy combatants until the end of the relevant conflict, the plurality
in Hamdi looked to prior Executive Branch practice during wartime to
inform its interpretation. In particular, it cited the "universal
•.. practice" during wartime of capturing, detaining, and trying enemy
combatants.' The plurality also relied on prior Executive Branch
practice for its conclusion that the detention authority under the
AUMF extends to U.S. citizen enemy combatants. 152
Courts often rely on past Executive Branch practice to inform the
meaning of a federal statute related to that practice. In general, Con-
gress is presumed to be aware of relevant Executive Branch practice
when it legislates. 153  Especially when this practice is longstanding,
courts will often conclude that Congress has approved the practice
when it enacts a related statute. In United States v. Midwest Oil
Co.,' 54 for example, the President suspended a statutory land grant
program in a way that did not appear to be authorized by the statute.
The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the suspension, reasoning that
the President had for many years prior to the enactment of the statute
exercised the power to suspend similar land grant programs. The
Court explained that, "in determining the meaning of a statute or the
existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself - even
when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation," and
added that the past Executive Branch practice created a "presumption
that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often re-
peated as to crystallize into a regular practice. ' 155
151 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 28
(1942)).
152 The plurality relied in particular on the Lieber Code adopted by the Union during the Civil
War, which contemplated that "captured rebels" would be treated as "prisoners of war," and on
the military trial during World War II of a U.S. citizen for violation of the laws of war. See id.
153 See, e.g., Nat'l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920); United States v. Wilson,
290 F.3d 347, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
154 236 U.S. 459 (I5).
155 Id. at 472-73; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (applying this
aspect of Midwest Oil).
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Although courts do not always infer congressional intent to ratify
prior Executive Branch practice in this way,15 6 the inference is nor-
mally "stronger in the foreign affairs arena" than in other contexts.1
5 7
Courts rely more heavily on Executive Branch practice in the foreign
affairs area because Congress faces "practical limitations on [its] capac-
ity to forge ex ante standards for executive national security action,
15 8
and because the Executive Branch has special fact-gathering and in-
terpretive expertise in this context.'5 9 In addition, as discussed in
more detail below, the President has significant concurrent constitu-
tional authority in the foreign affairs (and especially the war powers)
field.1 60 Concurrent constitutional authority is one reason why judicial
interpretation of constitutional foreign affairs powers has always been
heavily informed by historical practice and interbranch understand-
ings. 16 ' It also explains why presidential practice is given so much
weight in the interpretation of foreign affairs statutes. As the Supreme
Court noted in Dames & Moore v. Regan,162 "the enactment of legisla-
tion closely related to the question of the President's authority in a
particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President
broad discretion may be considered to 'invite' 'measures on independ-
ent presidential responsibility. "'1163
A trilogy of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Secretary of
State's authority over passports illustrates the importance of Executive
Branch practice in the foreign affairs context. The decisions con-
cerned a 1926 statute, still in effect, which provides that "[t]he Secre-
156 See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (,978) (declining to presume congressional acqui-
escence in a thirty-four-year-old practice of the Securities and Exchange Commission, despite the
fact that the Senate committee having jurisdiction over the Commission's activities had long ex-
pressed approval of the practice). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 9o-1o8 (1988) (explaining the pitfalls of inferring congressional
intent from legislative silence in the face of Executive Branch practice).
157 Eskridge, supra note i56, at 74.
158 See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander
in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 848 (I994).
159 See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, i"i (1948); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321-22 (1936).
160 See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. I; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
637 (952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing "a zone of twilight in which [the President] and
Congress may have concurrent authority"); HENKIN, Supra note 6, at 92, 94 (noting that it is
"now accepted" that there is "some undefined zone of concurrent authority in which [the President
and Congress] might act, at least when the other has not acted").
161 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
162 453 U.S. 654 (I98I).
163 Id. at 678 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)). The Court added
this caveat: "At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when,
as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the
President." Id. at 678-79; cf WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 63, at 140 (noting that in the
war powers context "Executive usage finds its proper role not in the interpretation of the Consti-
tution but in the interpretation of statutes").
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tary of State may grant and issue passports.., under such rules as the
President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United
States.'1 64  In Kent v. Dulles, 65 the Court invalidated State Depart-
ment regulations under the 1926 statute that had, among other things,
required denial of passports to members of the Communist Party.
166 It
reasoned that because the Executive Branch prior to 1926 had gener-
ally denied passports only for reasons relating to the applicant's citi-
zenship or allegiance, or for fraud or violations of U.S. laws, only those
grounds for denial "could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress
in light of prior administrative practice.'
1 67
In the second passport decision, Zemel v. Rusk,168 the Court held
that the 1926 statute had implicitly authorized the Secretary of State to
impose area restrictions on the use of passports and thus to decline to
validate passports for travel to Cuba. 69 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court relied on Executive Branch imposition of "both peacetime
and wartime area restrictions" during the decade preceding the Act, as
well as "the State Department's continued imposition of area restric-
tions during both times of war and periods of peace since 1926."17o In
the final passport decision, Haig v. Agee, 7 ' the Court held that the
1926 statute authorized the Secretary of State to revoke a passport
based on a determination that the passport holder's activities abroad
were likely to cause serious damage to U.S. national security or foreign
policy.7 2 The Court relied on the Executive Branch's long history,
both before and after enactment of the 1926 statute, of asserting au-
thority to withhold passports "on the basis of substantial reasons of na-
164 22 U.S.C. § 2ia (2000). Prior to 1952, a passport was not typically required for entry into
or exit from the United States, except during wartime. In 1952, however, Congress provided that
if the President proclaimed a national emergency and found that it was in the interest of the
United States to impose restrictions on entry and exit, it would be "unlawful for any citizen of the
United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless
he bears a valid passport." Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 215, 66 Stat. 163,
190 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § ii85(b) (2000)).
165 357 U.S. i16 (1958).
166 Id. at 129-30.
167 Id. at 128.
168 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
169 See id. at 7-8.
170 Id. at 8-9. The Court in Zemel distinguished Kent on the ground that in Kent there was no
"administrative practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the conclusion that
Congress had implicitly approved it." Id. at 12. The Court also noted that the 1926 Act "must
take its content from history," and that it "authorizes only those passport refusals and restrictions
'which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative prac-
tice."' Id. at 17-18 (quoting Kent, 357 U.S. at 128).
171 453 U.S. 280 (i98i).
172 Id. at 309-10.
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tional security and foreign policy."173 The Court also emphasized that
"in the areas of foreign policy and national security," congressional si-
lence in the face of consistent Executive Branch practice "is not to be




A more dramatic example of how Executive Branch practice can
inform statutory authorization in the foreign affairs context is Dames
& Moore v. Regan.x75  There, the Supreme Court concluded that, as
part of resolving the Iran hostage crisis, the President "was authorized"
to suspend private claims against Iran pending in U.S. courts, despite
the fact that the Court could not point to any particular federal statute
that conferred this authority.17 6  The Court's conclusion rested on
many factors, some of which are discussed below, but central to its
conclusion was a long history of Executive claims settlement known to
and not disapproved of by Congress. 7 As Professor Eskridge has ob-
served, Dames & Moore stands for the proposition that in the foreign
affairs context, more than in others, "the Court will routinely infer leg-
islative approval of executive practices, where 'Congress has consis-
tently failed to object to [such practices] ... even when it has had an
opportunity to do s0." 178
In sum, the Hamdi plurality's reliance on Executive Branch prac-
tice in prior wars to give content to the AUMF is consistent with a
long line of decisions that rely on Executive Branch practice when in-
terpreting congressional authorizations of presidential foreign affairs
activity.
B. The AUMF and the International Laws of War
The plurality in Hamdi relied extensively on the international laws
of war in interpreting the AUMF, but it did not explain how or why
these laws were relevant. In this section, we first explain how the laws
173 Id. at 293; see also id. at 293-303 (reviewing this history). The Court in Haig distinguished
Kent as involving a situation in which "it was shown that the claimed governmental policy had
not been enforced consistently." Id. at 303.
174 Id. at 291.
175 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
176 Id. at 686; see also id. at 675-84. The Court's use of the passive voice in the phrase "was
authorized" is revealing since the Court never made entirely clear whether it was Congress, Arti-
cle II, or both, that authorized the President to suspend the claims in question, or whether Con-
gress had "authorized" or merely "accepted" or "consented" to the President's action. Cf id. at 678
(suggesting that the President was acting "with the acceptance of Congress"); id. at 686 (conclud-
ing that "Congress may be considered to have consented to the President's action in suspending
claims"). It is thus unclear whether the Court decided that Congress authorized the suspension of
claims or rather merely supported the suspension in a way that was less than authorization but
more than silence.
177 Id. at 686.
178 Eskridge, supra note 156, at 74 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682 n.Io). For criti-
cism of this method of statutory interpretation, see KOH, supra note 65, at 139-42.
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of war can both give content to the powers that the AUMF confers on
the President and provide boundaries on the scope of Congress's au-
thorization. We then explain why the AUMF should not be read as
prohibiting the President from violating the laws of war (although
other legal sources might prohibit such violations).
In examining the role that the laws of war should play in the inter-
pretation of the AUMF, our focus is on the laws of war relating to
proper conduct during warfare (jus in bello), and not on the laws of
war governing the circumstances under which nations are permitted to
use force (jus ad bellum).'7 9 By expressly authorizing the use of force
in the AUMF, Congress has probably overridden whatever jus ad bel-
lum constraints there might have been on that use of force.' 80 More
generally, as we show below, there is a long tradition, dating back to
the Founding, of courts and the political branches referring to jus in
bello to give content to both congressional authorizations to use force
and the President's constitutional wartime powers.""' There is no
similar tradition with respect to jus ad bellum, in part because jus ad
bellum had little limiting content at the Founding and for much of our
nation's history.
8 2
Furthermore, although modern jus ad bellum rules, as reflected in
the United Nations Charter, sharply restrict the allowable use of force
to situations involving self-defense or Security Council authoriza-
tion, 18 3 Congress has not insisted on compliance with such restrictions.
Indeed, a number of congressional authorizations to use force during
the period since adoption of the Charter - including the Vietnam War
authorization and the 2002 Iraq authorization - have been highly
179 Recent treatments of jus ad bellum include YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE (3d ed. 2OO); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002); and CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000). Recent treatments ofjus in bello (which is often referred
to today as "the law of armed conflict" or "international humanitarian law") include YORAM
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT (2004) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES]; LESLIE
C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 2000); and THE
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS (Dieter Fleck ed., i995). See
also Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 905
(2002).
180 It is well settled that, for purposes of the U.S. legal system, Congress has the authority to
override international law. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 6oo-oi
(1889); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § i (i)(a) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
181 See infra section IV.B.i, pp. 2091-94.
182 Prior to the post-World War I formation of the League of Nations and the adoption of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, war was understood to be a generally available instrument of for-
eign policy. See, e.g., 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS IN-
TERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 189 (1922).
183 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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controversial with respect to their international legality.18 4 In addition,
in the War Powers Resolution - Congress's most significant effort to
regulate the use of U.S. military force - Congress made no attempt to
require consistency with the U.N. Charter or any other aspect of jus
ad bellum. 15  And, on numerous occasions since the enactment of the
War Powers Resolution, Presidents have ordered the use of military
force without congressional authorization and arguably in violation of
the U.N. Charter. 18 6 The limited attention Congress has given to these
actions has focused primarily on their constitutionality and not their
consistency with jus ad bellum rules. 187 Nor has Congress sought af-
firmatively to incorporate jus ad bellum rules into U.S. domestic law,
184 Some have argued that U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War violatedjus ad bellum rules of
international law. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the
Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966). But see John Norton Moore, International Law and the
United States Role in Viet Nam: A Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051 (1967). For arguments that the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003 violated jus ad bellum rules, see, for example, Thomas M. Franck, What
Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003); and Sean D. Mur-
phy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004). But see William H. Taft IV
& Todd F Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003);
John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2003). Even with re-
spect to the less controversial conflict in Afghanistan, there was no formal approval of the use of
force by the Security Council, and some scholars have questioned whether the United States's
right of self-defense can be invoked against non-state actors, and whether whatever right of self-
defense there was with respect to al Qaeda gave the United States the right under international
law to attack the Taliban regime. See, e.g., Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and Inter-
national Law After ii September, 5I INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, Use of
Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533,
540-44 (2002).
185 See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555,555 (1973).
186 A prominent example is the Kosovo conflict, which involved a high-intensity United States-
NATO aerial bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia without either congressional or U.N.
Security Council authorization, and without a plausible claim of self-defense. For arguments that
this campaign violated the U.N. Charter, see, for example, MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF
LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 13-35 (2OO); and
Jules Lobel, Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, I CHI. J. INT'L L.
19 (2000).
187 For example, congressional criticisms and recommendations in response to the Reagan Ad-
ministration's unauthorized covert operations in support of the Nicaraguan Contras do not ap-
pear to have addressed the ostensible jus ad bellum international law violations implicated by the
affair - even though the International Court of Justice had prominently ruled, just the year be-
fore, that these actions did violate international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146-50 (June 27); REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, S. REP.
No. xoo-216 (1987). Similarly, when members of Congress have sought judicial assistance to stop
presidents from using force abroad without congressional authorization, they typically complain
of violations of the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution, not international law. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3 d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Kosovo); Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F2d 1124,
1126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Grenada); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (El Sal-




even though it has incorporated a number of jus in bello rules through,
for example, the War Crimes Act of 1996.188
i. The Laws of War as a Source of Authorized Powers. - The
AUMF authorizes the President to use "all necessary and appropriate
force" against the nations, organizations, and persons responsible for
the September i i attacks, without restriction as to resources and
methods. Because the authorization contemplates warfare, it is rea-
sonable to assume that, absent other indicia of statutory meaning,
Congress intended to authorize the President to take at least those ac-
tions permitted by the laws of war. Otherwise, the Commander-in-
Chief would be placed at a unilateral disadvantage vis-a-vis the enemy
and might be unable to prosecute the war effectively. In limited cir-
cumstances, there may be exceptions to this general conclusion. Be-
cause the laws of war are but one source of interpretation, another
possible source (such as prior Executive Branch practice) might sug-
gest that Congress did not convey the full authority available under
the laws of war. Or there might be constitutional reasons to presume
that Congress has not implicitly delegated a certain type of authority.
Absent such a special circumstance, however, the AUMF should be
read as authorizing the President to do what the laws of war permit.
Judicial precedent and political branch practice support this con-
clusion. Throughout U.S. history, both courts and presidents have in-
terpreted broad authorizations to use force as authorizing what is per-
missible under the international laws of war. As early as 18oo, Justice
Washington noted that in a "perfect" and "declared" war, "all the
members [of the nation] act under a general authority, and all the
rights and consequences of war attach to their condition."'' 1 9 During
the Mexican-American War - a declared war with an unqualified au-
thorization to use force' 90 - the Executive Branch argued, and the
Supreme Court agreed, that the President's exercise of various bellig-
erent rights in occupied California was valid, even in the absence of
specific congressional authorization, because the rights were "the bel-
ligerent rights of a conqueror" that accorded with "the law of arms and
the right of conquest" under the laws of war.' 9 ' Similarly, during the
188 See i8 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000) (criminalizing various violations of jus in beUo rules, including
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).
189 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (i8oo); see also HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (Phila., Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1836) ("A perfect war is where one
whole nation is at war with another nation, and all the members of both nations are authorized to
commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every case and under every circum-
stance permitted by the general laws of war.").
190 Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9.
191 Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (i6 How.) 64, i9o (1854); see also id. at 193 (noting that the oc-
cupation government "had its origin in the lawful exercise of a belligerent right over a conquered
territory"); id. at i8o-8 (excerpt from brief of the Attorney General).
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Civil War - a war retroactively authorized by Congress months after
it began 19 2 - both President Lincoln and the Supreme Court viewed
the President as possessing all the authority permitted by the laws of
war.1 93  More broadly, in various nineteenth- and twentieth-century
decisions upholding the validity of presidential actions during war,
various members of the Supreme Court suggested, usually in dicta or
dissents, that in the absence of express congressional restriction, the
only limitations on presidential power during wartime were the laws of
war.194 Whatever the significance of these decisions for a presidential
obligation to comply with international law,195 they imply that during
wartime the President can, in the absence of effective congressional re-
striction, do what the laws of war permit.
In light of this background, it is not surprising that the plurality in
Hamdi relied on the laws of war to inform its interpretation of the
AUMF. In authorizing the President to "use all necessary and appro-
priate force," the plurality reasoned, Congress had authorized the
"fundamental incident[s] of waging war," one of which is the ability to
detain enemy combatants for the duration of active hostilities. 96 To
support this proposition, the plurality relied in part on "longstanding
law-of-war principles."' 97 The clear inference is that the AUMF au-
thorizes what the laws of war permit.198
192 See Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281.
193 The Executive Branch defended Lincoln's blockade of the South on the ground that it was
permitted by the laws of war. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 66o-6i (1863) (quoting ar-
gument from Richard Dana, lawyer for the government, that "[t]he function to use the army and
navy being in the President, the mode of using them, within the rules of civilized warfare, and
subject to established laws of Congress, must be subject to his discretion"). All nine Justices in
the Prize Cases, including the dissenters, accepted this proposition. See id. at 672-73; id. at 684-
85 (Nelson, J., dissenting). See generally David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law,
and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 363,
386-87 (2003). Lincoln also justified the emancipation of Southern slaves on the ground that it
was a wartime action permitted by the laws of war. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James
C. Conkling (Aug. 26, 1863), in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 4o6, 4o8
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). See generally DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 154-55
(2003) (explaining Lincoln's reliance on the laws of war in emancipating the slaves).
194 See, e.g., New Orleans v. The S.S. Co., 87 U.S. (2o Wall.) 387, 394 (1874); Brown v. United
States, r2 U.S. (8 Cranch) iio, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting); Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43 (opinion
of Chase, J.).
195 See infra note 220.
196 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004) (plurality opinion).
197 Id.
198 The plurality did not specifically identify the source of the law-of-war rule it was invoking.
Presumably, it was relying on customary international law, which "results from a general and con-
sistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT, su-
pra note 180, § 102(2). Although the plurality subsequently referred to Article i18 of the Third
Geneva Convention, which provides that prisoners of war must be repatriated at the end of hos-
tilities, see Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641 (plurality opinion), the President had determined that Tali-
ban fighters such as Hamdi were not entitled to the prisoner-of-war protections of that Conven-
tion, see Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to Vice President Richard Cheney et al.
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This generally accepted view - that a broad and unqualified au-
thorization to use force empowers the President to do to the enemy
what the laws of war permit - is in tension with an early nineteenth-
century Supreme Court decision, Brown v. United States.199 Brown
arose from the War of 1812, in which Congress both declared war and
authorized the President in general terms to use force. The issue was
whether Congress had thereby authorized the President to confiscate
enemy property located within the United States - an action permit-
ted by the laws of war.2 00 The declaration did not authorize the con-
fiscation, concluded the Court, because it had "only the effect" of creat-
ing a state of war.2 0 1 The Court further held that the authorization to
use force did not support the confiscation, reasoning that the President
could not seize enemy property in the United States without specific
authorization from Congress
2 0 2
Brown has little significance for the interpretation of the AUMF.
Its holding rests on, and is probably limited by, the Constitution's as-
signment to Congress of the power to make rules concerning captures
on land and on the particular array of statutes associated with the War
of i812. More broadly, Brown was decided in an era in which the
presidential war power was "still in its infancy, '20 3 and when Congress
micromanaged wars. The Court's requirement in Brown of specific
congressional authorization for seizure of enemy property probably did
not survive the Civil War, in which President Lincoln and the Su-
preme Court together greatly expanded presidential war powers, in-
cluding the power to seize both enemy property and neutral vessels
operating in violation of a blockade, even in the absence of specific
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/o20702
bush.pdf, and the plurality did not take issue with the President's determination. Thus, the plu-
rality was probably relying on Article 118 as evidence of a customary rule of international law.
Indeed, it cited Article 118 and provisions in treaties predating the Third Geneva Convention as
support for "a clearly established principle of the law of war." Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641 (plural-
ity opinion) (emphasis added).
199 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) iio (1814).
200 Id. at 122-23.
201 Id. at 125-26.
202 Id. at 126-27. Beyond declaring war, Congress had specifically authorized the President to
keep prisoners of war, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, and to treat alien enemies in certain
ways, but had said nothing about captures on land. Id. The Court inferred from these statutes,
combined with Congress's Article I power to make rules concerning captures on land, that the
Constitution required Congress to authorize specifically the President to capture enemy property.
Id. The Court failed to explain, however, why this authority was not entailed by the authoriza-
tion to use U.S. military forces "to carry the war into effect." Id. at 127. In dissent, Justice Story
argued that the President, in prosecuting a war, has "a right to employ all the usual and custom-
ary means acknowledged in war, to carry it into effect," and that, therefore, "by the act declaring
war, the executive may authorize all captures which, by the modern law of nations, are permitted
and approved." Id. at 145 (Story, J., dissenting).
203 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 104.
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congressional authorization.20 4  That expanded presidential wartime
authority continued through World War II and was reflected in legisla-
tion, Executive Branch practice, and judicial precedent.20 5 During the
period following the War of 1812 and particularly during and after the
Civil War, wartime presidents occupied territory, captured and de-
tained prisoners of war, held military trials, and negotiated armistice
agreements - all in the absence of specific congressional authoriza-
tion.10 6  This broader conception of presidential authority is reflected
in many modern Supreme Court decisions, including Hamdi, that re-
quire much less specific congressional authorization of particular war-
time actions than was required in Brown.
207
2. The Laws of War as a Limitation on Authorized Powers. -
Since the international laws of war can inform the powers that Con-
gress has implicitly granted to the President in the AUMF, they logi-
cally can inform the boundaries of such powers. For example, the in-
ternational laws of war permit the detention of enemy combatants
without trial until the end of hostilities. 208 The terms of this interna-
tional law rule suggest that, in order for the detention to be authorized
under the AUMF, the detained individuals must be enemy combatants
and hostilities must be ongoing. The plurality in Hamdi appeared to
rely on international law in this limiting manner when it stated that
"indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not
authorized. ''2
0 9
The fact that the international laws of war can inform the bounda-
ries of the powers that Congress has implicitly granted to the President
does not mean that such powers are conditioned on perfect compliance
204 See id. at 104 ("[Ljater, during the Civil War, the Supreme Court in effect rejected much of
what Marshall had written [in Brown] when it upheld seizure of vessels pursuant to Lincoln's
blockade."). One could also argue that the Emancipation Proclamation, in which Lincoln freed
Southern slaves without congressional authorization, and which he justified by reference to the
laws of war, is inconsistent with Brown. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 193, at 385.
205 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT. OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 262-
97 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984); HENKIN, supra note 6, at 45-5o; LOUIS WILLIAM
KOENIG, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE CRISIS: POWERS OF THE OFFICE FROM THE
INVASION OF POLAND TO PEARL HARBOR 55-57, 67-68, 97, 120 (i944); REVELEY, supra note
35, at 135-69.
206 See, e.g., Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (i6 How.) 164, i9o (1854) (upholding presidential ac-
tions taken pursuant to the "right of conquest"); BIRKHIMER, supra note 76, at 351-55 (providing
examples of presidential use of military commissions); CORWIN, supra note 205, at 294-95 (noting
examples of presidents concluding armistice agreements); John Yoo, ransferring Terrorists, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1221 (2004) (surveying U.S. history and concluding that in the
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, the
Vietnam War, the invasion of Panama, and the iggi Gulf War, Congress "never sought to regulate
the disposition of [prisoners of war] or asserted that it has any authority over them").
207 See infra section IVC, pp. 2100-02.
208 See supra p. 2092.
209 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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with all requirements of the international laws of war. A violation of
international law would negate a claim of implied authority under the
AUMF only if the international law requirement in question was a
condition of the exercise of the particular authority. For example, it is
a condition of the power to detain an enemy combatant under the in-
ternational laws of war that the detainee actually be an enemy com-
batant, lawful or unlawful. 210  In contrast, even though prisoners of
war covered by the Third Geneva Convention are entitled to receive
monthly pay, access a canteen, and receive musical instruments, 211 a
violation of those requirements (assuming they apply to the particular
detainee) would not undermine the authority to detain because none of
these requirements is a condition of the authority to detain a prisoner
of war. Similarly, if the President ordered photographs to be taken of
a prisoner of war in a way that violated the duty in the Third Geneva
Convention to protect prisoners from "insults and public curiosity,'
212
this would not mean that he lacked authority to detain the prisoner.
Instead, it would mean that he lacked authority to treat the prisoner in
this manner.
213
Justice Souter's concurrence in Hamdi appears to confuse this dis-
tinction between international law rules that are conditions precedent
for the exercise of authorized powers, and those that are not. Justice
Souter argued that the government could not rely on the international
laws of war to detain Hamdi because it had not acted consistently
with the international laws of war in its military campaign against the
Taliban. In particular, Justice Souter argued that Taliban combatants
appeared to qualify under the Third Geneva Convention for prisoner-
of-war status, but that the government had declined to accord them
this status and had also declined to conduct status hearings before a
"competent tribunal" that, Justice Souter maintained, are required by
the Third Geneva Convention and military regulations.2 1 4 As a result,
said Justice Souter, the government could not claim the authority to
210 In situations governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention, non-combatants may be interned
"only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary." Fourth Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 52, art. 42, 6 U.S.T. at 3544, 75 U.N.T.S. at 314. Such interned persons, like
enemy combatants, are to be released "as soon as possible after the close of hostilities." Id. art.
133, 6 U.S.T. at 3608, 75 U.N.T.S. at 378. Even before the close of hostilities, however, an in-
terned person must be released "as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no
longer exist." Id. art. 132, 6 U.S.T. at 3606-o8, 75 U.N.T.S. at 376-78.
211 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, arts. 28, 6o, 72, 6 U.ST. at 3340, 3362, 3372,
75 U.N.T.S. at 158, i8o, 19o.
212 Id. art. i3, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
213 Cf. Khalid v. Bush, Nos. CIV.I:O4 -s14 2, CIV.1:o 4 -I 66, 2005 WL 100924, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan.
19, 2005) (reasoning that even if conditions of detention violated U.S. law, that would not render
the detention itself unlawful).
214 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2657-59 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and con-
curring in the judgment).
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detain Hamdi pursuant to the laws of war because it had "not made
out its claim that in detaining Hamdi in the manner described, it [was]
acting in accord with the laws of war.
'215
Justice Souter did not contend that the government had violated in-
ternational law in determining that Hamdi was a combatant rather
than a non-combatant. His argument, rather, was simply that the
government may have been violating international law by not treating
Hamdi as a prisoner of war. However, both lawful combatants who
qualify for prisoner-of-war status and unlawful combatants who do
not can, under the laws of war, be detained until the end of hostili-
ties. 216  As a result, Congress should be understood as authorizing
Hamdi's detention as long as he fell into either one of those categories.
If the President incorrectly classified Hamdi as an unlawful combatant
rather than as a prisoner of war, that would simply mean that Hamdi's
treatment was not statutorily authorized, not that Hamdi's detention
was unauthorized.
2 1 7
3. The Laws of War as a Prohibition on Presidential Action. - We
have thus far explained how the international laws of war can inform
the types of authority that the AUMF confers on the President and the
boundaries of that conferred authority. We now consider whether the
AUMF should be read as affirmatively prohibiting presidential actions
that violate the laws of war as embodied in treaties or customary in-
ternational law. 2 18  If the AUMF did have this prohibitory effect, it
would mean that presidential actions that violated the international
laws of war would fall within Justice Jackson's lowest category of
presidential power, since the President would be acting contrary to the
expressed will of Congress in the AUMF. By contrast, if the AUMF
simply failed to authorize presidential violations of international law,
then such violations would, at least with respect to the AUMF, fall
215 Id. at 2659. For a similar argument, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of
Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 39-77, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
216 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942); DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES, supra note 79, at 30-32.
217 Justice Souter appears to have based his argument on the failure of the government to give
prisoner-of-war protections to Hamdi. One could make the different argument that the govern-
ment was also violating international law by failing to follow the correct procedures for determin-
ing whether Hamdi was an innocent civilian and thus not subject to detention at all. If interna-
tional law regulates that procedural issue (and it is not clear that it does from the text of the
relevant article in the Third Geneva Convention, Article 5), and the government was violating it,
then this type of departure from international law might well affect the government's power to
detain under a law-of-war rationale, since it would be a condition of the power to detain.
218 Cf Jules Lobel, International Law Constraints, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE
POWER To GO TO WAR I07, IO9 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., I994) (arguing that




within Justice Jackson's intermediate category, in which the President
enjoys substantial authority.
2 19
We do not think that the AUMF plausibly can be read as a prohibi-
tion on presidential actions that violate international law. 220  The
AUMF is a broadly worded authorizing statute; it does not purport to
prohibit the President from doing anything, much less from violating
the laws of war. There may be international law-related restrictions
on presidential action during wartime that come from the Constitution,
statutes, treaties, or customary international law,2 2' but the AUMF
does not itself incorporate these restrictions. Although the laws of war
inform the boundaries of what the AUMF authorizes, that simply
means that as a general matter the AUMF authorizes no more than
what the laws of war permit, not that it incorporates law-of-war
prohibitions.
Nor does the Charming Betsy 22 2 canon suggest that the AUMF
should be read as having such a prohibitory effect.223 Under this
canon, courts will attempt to construe statutes, when reasonably possi-
ble, so that the statutes do not violate international law.22 4  The
Charming Betsy canon is most often invoked as a justification for lim-
iting the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in ways that would
219 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
220 Some commentators have argued that the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief au-
thority is limited by the evolving international laws of war. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 193, at
364, 374-78; Lobel, supra note 218, at iO8-12. Although this is not the place for a comprehensive
response to this claim, we are skeptical of it. The Supreme Court has never invalidated presiden-
tial action on the ground that the action violated the laws of war. Many of the precedents cited in
support of the claim that the laws of war limit the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief
power are not framed in terms of limitation, but rather simply state that the President may do
everything permitted by the laws of war. Some decisions do talk (in dissents or dicta) about inter-
national law as a limitation, but these statements appear to refer to international law as a limita-
tion on the United States, not the President, even though it is settled that the United States has
the domestic authority to violate international law. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581, 6oo, 602-03 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Moreover, the laws of
war are along most dimensions much more restrictive now than they were in the late 1700s when
the Constitution was drafted and ratified. If the Commander in Chief Clause itself incorporates
evolving law-of-war restrictions, the scope of the Commander-in-Chief power would have shrunk
significantly during the past two centuries, which is contrary to constitutional history.
221 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West Supp. 2004) (criminalizing certain war crimes derived
from international law); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122 (1866) (holding that the Consti-
tution prohibits the President from trying non-combatants by military commission when civilian
courts are open and available).
222 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
223 But see Lobel, supra note 2 18, at IO9 (arguing that presidential violations of international
law are contrary to the implied will of Congress and thus within Justice Jackson's lowest category
of presidential power).
224 See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118; RESTATEMENT, supra note 18o, § 1 14.
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arguably violate international law norms of prescriptive jurisdiction. 2 S
There is a significant question whether the canon applies in the very
different context of a grant of discretionary enforcement authority to
the President,2 26 especially when the grant of discretionary enforce-
ment authority, like the AUMF, overlaps with the President's inde-
pendent constitutional powers.
2 2 7
Assuming that the canon does apply in this context, it would not
follow that the AUMF should be read to prohibit violations of interna-
tional law. The canon simply requires that ambiguous statutes be con-
225 See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004); Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-6 (i993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 1o, 21-22 (1963).
226 A central purpose of the canon is to avoid having judges, who are politically unaccountable
and inexpert in foreign affairs, erroneously place the United States in violation of international
law through their construction of a statute. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO.
L.J. 479, 524-29 (1998). Even if courts construe an authorizing statute like the AUMF to permit
the President to violate international law, however, they would not be placing the United States in
violation of international law. Rather, such a violation would occur, if at all, only after the Execu-
tive Branch, which is both politically accountable and expert in foreign relations, made an inde-
pendent judgment to exercise the authority conferred by Congress in a way that violated interna-
tional law. Cf United States v. Corey, 232 F.3 d 166, 1179 n.9 (9 th Cir. 2000) ("These concerns
[underlying the Charming Betsy canon] are obviously much less serious where the interpretation
arguably violating international law is urged upon us by the Executive Branch of our govern-
ment. When construing a statute with potential foreign policy implications, we must presume
that the President has evaluated the foreign policy consequences of such an exercise of U.S. law
and determined that it serves the interests of the United States."); Auth. of the Fed. Bureau of In-
vestigation To Override Int'l Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 163, 172 (1989) (concluding that the Charming Betsy canon was not applicable to
"broad authorizing statutes 'carrying into Execution' core Executive powers" (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18)).
227 Consider, for example, the Paquete Habana decision, which concerned the seizure by the
U.S. Navy of coastal fishing vessels during the Spanish-American War. See The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677 (i9oo). The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the vessels violated customary
international law (referred to at that time as part of the "law of nations"), and it ordered that the
proceeds from the sales of the vessels and their cargo be restored to the owners. See id. at 714.
The Court also stated, however, that it would apply customary international law only in the ab-
sence of a "controlling executive or legislative act." Id. at 700 (emphasis added); see also id. at 7o8
("This rule of international law is one which prize courts, administering the law of nations, are
bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public
act of their own government in relation to the matter." (emphasis added)). The Court nowhere
suggested that the declaration of war or authorization of force in the Spanish-American War
should be construed to disallow the President from deciding whether to violate customary interna-
tional law. Professor Golove maintains that the Court's statement that it would apply customary
international law in the absence of a "controlling executive act" simply meant that it would apply
customary international law even if there was no Executive act incorporating that law. See
Golove, supra note 193, at 391-92. This interpretation ignores the fact that, as the Court itself
emphasized, the President had issued orders requiring compliance with the customary laws of
war, see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712, and hence there was a controlling Executive act
that would have supported application of the customary principle applied by the Court. The
Court therefore must have been saying that there was no controlling Executive act barring the
application of the customary international law rule.
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strued not to violate international law. At most, then, application of
the canon to the AUMF would yield the interpretation that the AUMF
does not authorize the President to violate international law. It would
not yield the quite different interpretation that the AUMF affirma-
tively prohibits the President from violating international law. To put
the point differently, nothing in international law, or in the Charming
Betsy canon, requires that Congress affirmatively prohibit the Presi-
dent from violating international law when authorizing the use of
force. The allocation between the domestic legislature and the Execu-
tive of domestic authority to comply with or violate international law
is not an issue addressed by international law. 228 Again, Congress or
the treaty-makers (the President and the Senate together) might well
impose independent prohibitions on presidential action in wartime that
are related to international law.2 29 The AUMF, however, is not such
an enactment.
The primary significance of the distinction between interpreting the
AUMF not to authorize violations of international law, and interpret-
ing it affirmatively to prohibit violations of international law, concerns
customary international law. Under domestic constitutional law, the
President probably has a duty to comply with at least self-executing
treaties, on the ground that they are part of the "laws" that he must
faithfully execute under Article 11.230 As a result, law-of-war treaties
can bind the President independent of the AUMF By contrast, there
is a strong argument that the President has the domestic constitutional
authority to violate customary international law. 23 1 If so, then the is-
sue of whether the AUMF incorporates the prohibitions of the custom-
ary international laws of war becomes important. If the AUMF does
not incorporate these prohibitions, presidential actions in violation of
them would fall within the second of Justice Jackson's three categories,
in which the President would retain his preexisting authority to violate
customary international law. But if the AUMF affirmatively prohibits
the President from violating the customary international laws of war,
228 Cf. LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW i59 (4 th ed. 2001) ("The
obligation to respect and give effect to international law is upon the state, not upon any particular
branch, institution, or member of its government .... "); Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany,
25o F.3 d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Because international law is silent on the grant of federal
court jurisdiction at issue, we interpret the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] without reference
to the Charming Betsy canon.").
229 See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 67-70.
230 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Ge-
neva Conventions?, 9o CORNELL L. REV. 97, 123-24 (2004).
231 See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (ifth Cir. 1986) (relying on, among
other sources, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 7oo); RESTATEMENT, supra note i8o, § ii5 re-
porters' note 3. But see, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between
Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 107 1, i116-20 (1985).
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the President's actions in violation of such law would fall within the
lowest of the three categories and would be valid only if they involved
an area of exclusive presidential authority.
C. The President's Independent Constitutional Authority
The AUMF is a congressional authorization for the President to act
in a context - a military response to an attack on the United States -
in which he possesses independent constitutional authority under Arti-
cle 11.232 In such a context, nondelegation concerns are less significant,
so the authorization need not be as precise as would be required in the
absence of concurrent presidential authority.
233
A good illustration of this point is the Supreme Court's decision in
Loving v. United States.234 The issue in Loving was whether the gen-
eral authority conferred on the President by the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) to prescribe court martial punishments entailed
authority to prescribe aggravating factors in the death penalty sentenc-
ing phase of court martial proceedings.23 5 Loving argued that reading
the UCMJ to provide such authority would violate the nondelegation
doctrine because the UCMJ did not provide "an intelligible principle to
guide the President's discretion. '236  In rejecting this argument, the
Court noted that the delegation of authority "was to the President in
his role as Commander in Chief. '237  While it is arguable, said the
Court, that "more explicit guidance as to how to select aggravating fac-
tors would be necessary if delegation were made to a newly created en-
tity without independent authority in the area," in this case "[t]he dele-
gated duty... is interlinked with duties already assigned to the
President by express terms of the Constitution, and the same limita-
tions on delegation do not apply 'where the entity exercising the dele-
232 See supra note i6o and accompanying text; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) ("Whereas, the President has authority under the Consti-
tution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States
233 Cf Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-79 (1948) ("A constitutional power implies a
power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes. - This power is espe-
cially significant in connection with constitutional war powers under which the exercise of broad
discretion as to methods to be employed may be essential to an effective use of its war power by
Congress.").
234 51 7 U.S. 748 (1996).
235 The statutes in question were io U.S.C. § 856, which provides that "[tlhe punishment which
a court-martial may direct for an offense may not exceed such limits as the President may pre-
scribe for that offense," and io U.S.C. § 818, which provides that a court martial "may, under
such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by [the
UCMJ], including the penalty of death when specifically authorized by [the UCMJ]." See Loving,
517 U.S. at 769.
236 Loving, 517 U.S. at 759.
237 Id. at 772.
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gated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject
matter. "',238
The analysis in Loving echoes the principle - dating back at least
to Curtiss-Wright - that the nondelegation doctrine has less force in
areas touching on the foreign relations powers of the President, espe-
cially his war powers. 239 The passport decisions, discussed above, also
support this conclusion. In Kent v. Dulles, the Court addressed the pe-
titioner's delegation concerns by citing a nondelegation decision and
noting that, "if ... power is delegated, the standards must be adequate
to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests. '2 40  Consistent with the princi-
ples outlined above, however, the Court in Kent made clear that it was
"not compelled to equate this present problem of statutory construction
with problems that may arise under the war power."
'24 1
The Court's decisions in Zemel and Haig confirmed what was sug-
gested in Kent: nondelegation constraints do not play a significant role
when the President acts pursuant to a foreign relations statute in an
area in which he possesses independent constitutional authority. In
Zemel, the Court relied on Curtiss-Wright to reject a nondelegation ar-
gument, noting that:
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary interna-
tional relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to in-
formation which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted
upon by the legislature, Congress - in giving the Executive authority
over matters of foreign affairs - must of necessity paint with a brush
broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.
2 4 2
238 Id. (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 097)); see also Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1942) (construing ambiguous references in the Articles of War to mili-
tary commissions as congressional authorization for presidential use of such commissions); Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 3 GREEN
BAG 2D 249, 252-53 (2o02) (analyzing this aspect of Quirin).
239 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936), the Supreme
Court, in a famously expansive opinion, upheld Congress's delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent to impose an arms embargo with respect to certain warring countries. Many aspects of the
Court's reasoning, including its description and use of constitutional history and its conception of
presidential power, have been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. ( (973). The
holding in Curtiss-Wright concerning the limited applicability of the nondelegation doctrine in the
foreign affairs context, however, is less controversial. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 6, at 124 ("If
... some parts of [Justice] Sutherland's essay [in Curtiss-Wright] are not compelling, one might
nonetheless find sufficient reasons for the Court's conclusion about delegation in the realities of
the foreign affairs process." (footnote omitted)).
240 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 1i6, 129 (1958).
241 Id. at 128 (emphasis added). The Court also distinguished Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), in part on the ground that it was a wartime decision. See Kent, 357 U.S. at i28.
242 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). The Court made clear that Congress could not, even
in the area of foreign affairs, "grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice," and it
emphasized that historical context could inform the meaning of general congressional authoriza-
tions. Id. at 17-18. Despite this caveat, Zemel clearly stands for the proposition that delegation
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Haig relied on this passage in Zemel, and on Curtiss-Wright, in con-
cluding that the President had statutory authority to revoke the pass-
port in question.
243
A number of Supreme Court decisions since the passport trilogy
have broadly construed congressional authorizations to the President
on the basis of similar delegation considerations. Dames & Moore v.
Regan, discussed above, demonstrates how these delegation principles
intersect with Executive Branch practice to inform the authorized ba-
sis for presidential action. In relying on Executive Branch practice in
its determination that Congress had implicitly accepted a presidential
authority to suspend claims, the Court in Dames & Moore noted that
"Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible
action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible
situation in which he might act. '244 Similarly, in Regan v. Wald 245 the
Court relied on Curtiss-Wright, Zemel, and Haig to construe broadly,
in the face of a due process challenge, the President's authority to re-
strict travel to Cuba.
246
The plurality in Hamdi did not rely explicitly on these delegation
principles. These principles nevertheless help explain the plurality's
broad construction of the AUMF and, relatedly, why it did not require
a tight fit between the language of the AUMF (authorizing force) and
the particular incident of war (detaining enemy combatants) exercised
by the President.
D. Clear Statement Requirements
Thus far we have outlined three factors - Executive Branch prac-
tice, the international laws of war, and concurrent authority of the
President - that, along with the usual tools of statutory interpretation,
inform the meaning of the AUMF. We now consider whether and
when courts should impose a clear statement requirement in constru-
ing the AUMF If such a requirement were imposed, it would mean
that courts would not interpret the AUMF to authorize a particular
concerns are less serious when Congress authorizes the President to act in foreign relations con-
texts than when it authorizes him to act in purely domestic contexts. See ELY, supra note 28, at
24.
243 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 290, 291-92 (198i).
244 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (i98i).
245 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
246 Id. at 243. The Supreme Court's later-in-time and quite different delegation analysis in
Zemel and Haig of the passport statute at issue in Kent, combined with the Court's subsequent
reaffirmation of the Zemel-Haig analysis in Dames & Moore and Wald, suggest that the delega-
tion analysis in Kent is no longer valid. In addition, the Supreme Court's post-Kent conclusion
that Chevron deference can apply when an agency has changed its position, see, e.g., FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156-57 (2000), calls into question Kent's
analysis of the significance of changing Executive Branch practice.
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presidential action absent a clear statutory indication that Congress in-
tended to authorize the action. 47  Several commentators have argued
that courts should impose such a requirement in various contexts re-
lated to the AUMF - for example, by interpreting the AUMF not to
permit the detention of U.S. citizens in the absence of a clear
statement.
248
The Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. Dulles is, once again, a
useful starting point for analysis. The 1926 passport statute at issue
there authorized the President to withhold passports for any reason.
249
Because of the absence of a clearer and more specific statement from
Congress, however, the Court in Kent declined to read this authoriza-
tion to include the power to withhold passports on grounds of political
affiliation. 250 In addition to the Court's reliance on historical practice
to draw conclusions about legislative intent,2 5 1 the Court cited two
constitutional values that would be served by a clear statement re-
quirement. First, the Court sought to avoid construing the statute in
question as "restricting the citizens' right of free movement" unless
Congress provided for the restriction "in explicit terms. '25 2  Second,
the Court, citing one of the two Supreme Court decisions that invali-
dated a federal statute on nondelegation grounds,25 3 noted that it "hesi-
tate[d] to find in this broad generalized power [over passports] an au-
thority to trench so heavily on the rights of the citizen," and thus
would "construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute"
fundamental rights.
25 4
Notwithstanding Kent, it is difficult to justify the application of a
clear statement requirement that is premised on delegation concerns in
the context of the AUMF As discussed above, in its decisions after
Kent, the Supreme Court construed the general passport statute as
conveying broad discretionary authority to the Secretary of State and,
relying on Curtiss-Wright, made clear that delegation concerns are less
significant when statutes concern foreign affairs than when they con-
247 See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
85 1 (3d ed. 2001).
248 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 48-49), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=62 9 285; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
249 See supra pp. 2o86-87.
250 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (,958).
251 See supra p. 2087.
252 Kent, 357 U.S. at 13o; see also id. at 129 (noting that because the right of American citizens
to travel was a fundamental right, the Court would "not readily infer that Congress" gave the Sec-
retary of State "unbridled discretion to grant or withhold [it]").
253 Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935).
254 Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.
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cern domestic affairs.2 5 5  A clear statement requirement premised on
delegation concerns makes even less sense in the context of the AUMF
in light of the Court's insistence in numerous decisions that delegation
concerns are attenuated, not heightened, with respect to authorization
statutes that implicate concurrent presidential power related to war-
time.2 5 6 Moreover, the functional arguments for allowing broad dele-
gations, such as the need for flexibility in responding to changing con-
ditions, are particularly strong in the context of war.
A clear statement requirement to protect individual liberties is po-
tentially more relevant to the AUMF.25 7  Here there are two major is-
sues. The first arises in identifying the relevant liberty interest to be
protected. Not every potential liberty intrusion during war warrants
protection through a clear statement requirement. For example, Con-
gress need not state clearly, beyond the general authorization to use
force, that the President is authorized to drop bombs on members of
the enemy armed forces on the battlefield abroad, even if they happen
to be U.S. citizens. This is so because individuals who serve in enemy
armed forces have no pertinent constitutional right in that situation,
and thus there is no constitutional value for a clear statement require-
ment to protect.2 58 The second issue is how to reconcile the idea of a
liberty-protecting clear statement requirement with the constitutionally
inspired canon that congressional delegations in areas of concurrent
presidential authority are to be construed broadly.25 9
Three World War II-era decisions provide guidance on these issues.
In Ex parte Endo,260 the Court concluded that Congress had not au-
thorized the President to detain concededly loyal U.S. citizens of Japa-
nese heritage during World War 11.261 Invoking the canon of constitu-
255 See supra pp. 2101-02.
256 See supra p. 2102.
257 For arguments to this effect in the context of the war on terrorism, see Sunstein, supra note
248.
258 Similarly, it is inappropriate to demand a clear statement before the President can occupy,
and institute an occupation government in, a foreign territory that satisfies the nexus requirement
of the relevant authorization of force. Presidents occupied Germany and Japan in World War II,
and Iraq in 2003, pursuant to general congressional authorizations of force. See also Cross v.
Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190, 193 (1853) (upholding the validity of the occupation of Cali-
fornia in the Mexican-American War despite the absence of specific congressional authorization
beyond the general authorization for the war itself). This is reasonable because occupation is a
traditional component of the Commander-in-Chief power that is permitted by the laws of war,
and persons adversely affected by occupation generally lack a constitutionally protected liberty
interest.
259 See supra pp. 2100-02 (discussing Loving, Curtiss-Wright, Kent, Zemel, Haig, and Dames &
Moore); cf Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("[U]nless Congress specifically
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of
the Executive in military and national security affairs.").
260 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
261 Id. at 302-03.
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tional avoidance, the Court noted that, "[i]n interpreting a wartime
measure," the Court "must assume, when asked to find implied powers
in a grant of legislative or executive authority, that the law makers in-
tended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and
unmistakably indicated by the language they used. '262 In Duncan v.
Kahanamoku,263 the Court arguably imposed a clear statement re-
quirement in declining to interpret the Hawaii Organic Act's ambigu-
ous provisions as authorizing the trial of civilians by military commis-
sion.264 By contrast, in Ex parte Quirin, the Court did not demand a
clear statement before concluding that the U.S. citizen enemy combat-
ant in that case could be subject to a military commission trial in the
United States even though neither the authorization to use force nor
the authorization for military commissions specifically mentioned U.S.
citizens.
2 65
These decisions suggest which liberty interests should be protected
through a clear statement requirement, and how the requirement in
this context should be harmonized with the principle that congres-
sional authorization related to war should be construed broadly. The
Court in Duncan and Endo emphasized that the presidential actions in
question were unsupported by historical practice in other wars and
implicated the constitutional rights of U.S. citizen non-combatants
2 66
In this context, where the liberty interest to be protected is at its
height, and the President's Commander-in-Chief prerogative is dimin-
ished because he is acting against a non-combatant, the canon protect-
ing constitutional liberties prevails. This logic for the application of a
clear statement requirement would not apply, however, when - as in
the bombing example above - the presidential action involves a tradi-
tional wartime function exercised by the President against an acknowl-
edged enemy combatant or enemy nation. In this context, a broad
construction of Congress's delegation is appropriate because the Presi-
dent's Article II powers are at their height, and the relevant liberty in-
terests (and thus the need for a liberty-protecting clear statement re-
quirement) are reduced (or nonexistent). These considerations explain
why the Court in Quirin did not demand a clear statement and why
the Court in Duncan emphasized that, although it read the Hawaii
martial law statute narrowly as applied to civilian non-combatants, it
262 Id. at 300.
263 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
264 See id. at 324. For a discussion of these two cases as examples of clear statement require-
ments, see Sunstein, supra note 248 (manuscript at 36-37).
265 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 44 (942).
266 See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 31o; Endo, 323 U.S. at 302.
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was not addressing "the well-established power of the military to exer-
cise jurisdiction over ... enemy belligerents.
'267
This analysis suggests that, in construing the AUMF, a clear state-
ment requirement is appropriate when the President acts against non-
combatants in the United States, but not when he engages in tradi-
tional military functions against combatants.268  The plurality's rejec-
tion in Hamdi of the petitioner's argument based on i8 U.S.C.
§ 400I(a) is consistent with this conclusion. The petitioner argued, and
Justice Souter agreed, that the prohibition in § 400I(a) of detention of
U.S. citizens "except pursuant to an Act of Congress" required a clear
congressional statement that was not satisfied by the AUMF 2 69 The
plurality, by contrast, relied on the historical practice of detaining en-
emy combatants (including U.S. citizens) and the international laws of
war analysis outlined above in its determination that the AUMF, an
"explicit congressional authorization" to detain individuals in Hamdi's
position, satisfied § 400i(a).2 70  One could read the plurality either as
rejecting a clear statement requirement in this context, or as accepting
only a weak version of such a requirement that could be satisfied by
background interpretive factors rather than specific text. Either way,
the analysis in Hamdi is consistent with the general point made above
that when the President takes military action against enemy combat-
ants pursuant to a general and unqualified congressional authorization
to use force, courts should not require more specific evidence of con-
gressional approval.
2 7 '
267 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added). This same distinction - between traditional
presidential powers exercised against enemy combatants, and non-traditional ones exercised
against non-combatants - also explains the different outcomes in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (i866), in which the Court invalidated the use of a military commission with respect to a
non-combatant U.S. citizen, and Quirin, in which the Court upheld the use of a military commis-
sion with respect to a U.S. citizen who was an enemy combatant. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46, 48;
Milligan, 7, U.S. (4 Wall.) at 130-31. The Court in Quirin distinguished Milligan precisely on the
ground that "Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a
non-belligerent." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
268 This conclusion assumes away the difficulties associated with determining someone's status
as a combatant or non-combatant We address those difficulties below in section V.A.2, pp. 2 113-
i6.
269 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part, and concurring in the judgment); Brief for Petitioners at 44-47, Hamdi (No. 03-6696),
available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload5oo/56/Brief_
Petitioners.pdf.
270 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639-40 (plurality opinion).
271 Although the plurality did not reach the issue, we doubt that § 40oI(a) was intended to ad-
dress the military detention of enemy combatants. The legislative history of § 40oi(a) contains
statements expressing disapproval of the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II,
see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-116, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1435-36, but
that internment was controversial precisely because the individuals in question were not enemy
combatants. In his concurrence in Hamdi, Justice Souter relied on the Japanese American in-
ternment decision, Ex parte Endo, in support of his argument that a clear statement requirement
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V. APPLICATIONS TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Under our framework for interpreting the AUMF, courts should
look to its text (including its September ii nexus requirement), prior
Executive Branch practice during wartime, the types of actions that
are permitted under the international laws of war, and any conditions
that international law places on such actions. In addition, a clear
statement requirement is appropriate when the President acts to re-
strict the liberties of non-combatants in the United States, but not
when he engages in traditional military functions that restrict the lib-
erty of combatants.
In this Part, we apply this framework to three important and diffi-
cult issues in the war on terrorism: the identification of the terrorist
enemy, the detention of such enemies when found in the United States,
and the validity of military commissions. Interpreting the AUMF does
not resolve all aspects of these issues. The analysis that follows there-
fore leaves room for, among other things, Executive Branch discretion,
congressional fine-tuning, and judicial determination of questions of
process, constitutional interpretation, and the precise level of deference
to be accorded the Executive.
A. Who Is the Enemy Under the AUMF?
The AUMF authorizes the President to use force against those "na-
tions, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
II, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons. ' '2 2  Which na-
tions, organizations, and persons are encompassed by this authoriza-
tion? The reference to "nations" is similar to authorizations in inter-
was appropriate with respect to the detention of U.S. citizens in wartime. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct.
at 2655 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). As
noted above, however, Endo involved a loyal U.S. citizen detained by civilian authorities, and the
Court expressly distinguished the Quirin decision (which involved the trial of enemy combatants
by military commission) on this ground. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 297-98. By contrast, U.S. military
authorities uncontroversially detained hundreds of thousands of enemy combatants in the United
States during World War II, some of whom were American. See ARNOLD KRAMMER, NAZI
PRISONERS OF WAR IN AMERICA 3 (979); U.S. Army Prisoner of War Info. Bureau, American
Nationals Detained in the Custody of the United States Armed Forces During World War II
(956) (contained in Box 56, Prisoner of War Rosters, 1954-1957, Prisoner of War Division, Re-
cords of the Provost Marshal General, 1941-, Record Group 389, National Archives and Records
Administration; on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (listing more than twenty Ameri-
can nationals detained as prisoners of war by U.S. armed forces in the United States during World
War II); see also In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 144 (9 th Cir. 1946) ("[It is immaterial to the legality
of petitioner's detention as a prisoner of war by American military authorities whether petitioner
is or is not a citizen of the United States of America.").




state conflicts and raises few conceptual questions.27 3  Similarly, the
reference to "persons," although somewhat unusual,2 7 4 is relatively
straightforward. If an individual was involved in the September ii
attacks, or harbored someone who was, he is covered as a "person"
under the AUMF If an individual had no connection to the Septem-
ber I I attacks, then he is not covered as a "person" under the AUMF
even if he subsequently decides to commit terrorist acts against the
United States.
The authorization to use force against "organizations," by contrast,
raises complex conceptual questions because the contours of an "or-
ganization" are much less settled than the contours of a "nation" or a
"person." In what follows, we address two questions related to the
term "organization." First, which organizations are covered by the
AUMF? Second, what kind of affiliation with a covered organization
must an individual have in order to fall within the scope of the
AUMF? Answers to these and related questions can affect the legal
basis for many of the President's actions in the war against terrorism.
Consider the Department of Defense's order establishing Combatant
Status Review Tribunals for the detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, which
defines an enemy combatant as "an individual who was part of or sup-
porting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are en-
gaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition part-
ners. 27 5  Which parts of this definition are supported by the AUMF?
More specifically, which forces "associated" with al Qaeda, if any, are
included within the scope of the AUMF, and what kind of "support"
must an individual give to al Qaeda in order to be included within the
AUMF? 276
273 This aspect of the authorization may implicate factual questions, however, about which na-
tions had the requisite September i i nexus. The President uncontroversially determined that the
Taliban government in Afghanistan had this nexus. But what about other nations, such as Sudan
and Iraq? Sudan harbored and supported Osama bin Laden in the iggos, and President Clinton
authorized missile strikes against Sudan for that reason. See 9/I1 COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 79, at 116-18. As for Iraq, the 9/11 Commission Report documented contacts between al
Qaeda and the government of Iraq before September i i, see id. at 66, but it concluded that these
contacts never "developed into a collaborative operational relationship," id., and it is unclear why
Congress would have enacted, and the President would have sought, the 2002 authorization for
the use of force in Iraq if they believed that the September i8, 2ooi AUMF already included Iraq
within its scope.
274 But cf. supra pp. 2o66-67 (discussing authorizations to use force against private entities).
275 Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7,
2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul20o4/d20o40707review.
pdf.
276 Similar questions arise with respect to the President's November 13, 2001 Military Order,
which authorizes the detention and trial not only of al Qaeda members, but also much more
broadly of persons whom the President determines "engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism" against the United States and its interests. Military Or-
der, supra note 95, § 2(a)(I)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 9i9.
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i. Which Terrorist Organizations Are Covered by the AUMF? -
The AUMF obviously applies to the terrorist organization known as al
Qaeda, since this organization was directly responsible for the Septem-
ber i i attacks. This means that Congress has authorized the President
to use force against all members of al Qaeda, including members who
had nothing to do with the September i i attacks and even new mem-
bers who joined al Qaeda after September I I. Such members are not,
as we explained above, covered by the AUMF in their individual ca-
pacities as "persons" because they had no nexus to the September i
attacks. Nevertheless, they come within the terms of the AUMF be-
cause they are part of an "organization" that is covered by it.277
By its terms, the AUMF also applies to organizations that aided al
Qaeda in relation to the September I i attacks or harbored its mem-
bers. To what extent does it apply to terrorist organizations that are
affiliated with al Qaeda in its conflict with the United States, but that
did not aid al Qaeda in the September I I attacks or harbor its mem-
bers? This class of organizations forms a key component of the war on
terrorism, in part because of changes in al Qaeda since September i i.
Before September i i, al Qaeda was a relatively hierarchical and cen-
tralized, though geographically dispersed, organization that operated
through cells - "small, autonomous clusters of al Qaeda operatives
that may be either dormant or active" 278 - around the globe. Since
September 1 i, al Qaeda has become the leader of a more loosely con-
nected, global movement of Islamic terrorism against the United States
and other nations. 27 9  Today al Qaeda acts less through its own cells
than through a confederacy of affiliated terrorist organizations around
the world that it inspires, leads, and supports2 8° Often, the line be-
277 We analyze below the connection that a person must have to al Qaeda to be considered part
of that organization for purposes of the AUMF. See infra section V.A.2, pp. 2113-6.
278 JONATHAN SCHANZER, AL-QAEDA'S ARMIES: MIDDLE EAST AFFILIATE GROUPS
AND THE NEXT GENERATION OF TERROR 22-23 (2004).
279 See Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, io8th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of George Tenet, Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, Cent. Intelligence Agency), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/
o4o2hrg/040224/tenet.pdf; SCHANZER, supra note 278, at 21-30; Douglas Frantz et al., Al Qaeda
Seen as Wider Threat, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at Ai. To be sure, prior to September ii, al
Qaeda trained thousands of jihadist fighters, and bin Laden viewed himself as the "head of an
international jihad confederation" whose connections dated back to the mujahideen resistance to
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. See 9/1I COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 79, at 55-56, 58,
67. The point is that, prior to September ii, al Qaeda more sharply distinguished itself and its
terror activities from other organizations and their terror activities, while today it is an al Qaeda-
inspired and supported confederation, rather than al Qaeda alone, that threatens the United
States.
280 In addition to the sources in the previous footnote, see PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR,
INC. 195-220 (20o); ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF
TERROR 95 (2003); Rohan Gunaratna, The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda, WASH. Q., Summer
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tween al Qaeda and these affiliated terrorist organizations is unclear.
For example, Jemaah Islamiya, a Southeast Asian terrorist network
that has attacked or threatened to attack U.S. interests, was until re-
cently led by Riduan bin Isomoddin, the now-captured al Qaeda
Southeast Asia operations chief.
2 81
At first glance, it might appear that the AUMF does not extend to
al Qaeda affiliate organizations that did not have a role in the Septem-
ber ii attacks or in harboring those that committed the attacks. Just
as an individual can become part of a covered "organization" by join-
ing it after the September i I attacks, however, so too can a group of
individuals. While a terrorist organization that did not harbor al
Qaeda or aid it in the September i I attacks is not, merely by virtue of
its status as a terrorist organization, covered by the AUMF, a terrorist
organization that joins al Qaeda in its conflict with the United States,
even after September ii, can be viewed as part of the "organization"
against which Congress authorized force. This conclusion is consistent
with dictionary definitions of the term "organization," most of which
emphasize that the term means two or more persons or elements acting
with a common purpose.2 82 It is also consistent with Congress's defi-
nitions of "terrorist organization" in other statutes, all of which concep-
tualize terrorist organizations in broad, functional terms.283
There is no contrary textual basis to justify limiting the organiza-
tions covered by the AUMF to their lowest level of organizational ab-
straction based on formal criteria such as the name or structure of a
particular group as of September i i. Indeed, the fact that Congress
2004, at 95, 93; and James Risen, Evolving Nature of Al Qaeda Is Misunderstood, Critic Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at A18.
281 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 app. B at 123-24,
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/CI 2 ,53.htm.
282 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 '33 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "organization" as "[a] body
of persons.., formed for a common purpose"); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1239 (4 th ed. 2000) (defining "organization" as "[slomething made up
of elements with varied functions that contribute to the whole and to collective functions," or a
"structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to conduct business"); cf.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 1590 (2002) (defining "organization" to mean "a group of people that has a more or
less constant membership, a body of officers, a purpose, and usu. a set of regulations" and "a state
or manner of being organized : organic structure : purposive systematic arrangement").
283 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (West Supp. 2004) (defining "terrorist organization" to
mean, among other things, "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which
engages in" various described terrorist activities); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2000) (defining "terror-
ist organization" to mean, by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a), a foreign organization that engages
in terrorist activity (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)) or terrorism (as defined in 22 U.S.C.
§ 2656f(d)(2)), "or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism," in
ways that threaten "the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United
States"); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(3 ) (2000) (defining the term "terrorist group" to mean "any group
practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism").
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authorized the use of force against "organizations" rather than "al
Qaeda" suggests the contrary. So too does the "purpose" clause of the
AUMF, in which Congress stated that the AUMF's purpose was to
"prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons. 2 8 4 This clause sug-
gests that the AUMF should not be read narrowly to exclude groups
that, in organizational conjunction with the entities responsible for the
September i i attacks, threaten future attacks on the United States.
Standard delegation principles further support this conclusion. As
we have discussed, at least in those situations where constitutionally
protected liberty interests do not mandate a clear statement require-
ment, delegations in the war context should be construed broadly to
give the President flexibility to achieve the purposes for which the
delegation was made.2 5  Interpreting the term "organization" to in-
clude only groups that at the lowest possible level of abstraction were
responsible for the September i I attacks would be contrary to this
principle and would permit the perpetrators of the September i i at-
tacks to take themselves outside the ambit of the AUMF through the
simple mechanisms of changing organizational names or rearranging
organizational structure.
Consistent with the standard view that wartime delegations to the
President should be broadly construed, presidents in prior armed con-
flicts have exercised significant discretion in using force against entities
other than those specifically named in the congressional authorization
of force when those entities had a nexus to the named enemy.286 A
good example is the U.S. military operation in World War II against
Vichy France. In World War II, Congress declared war and author-
ized force against Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ro-
mania.2 7 As the war progressed, the Allies determined that Vichy
France-controlled North Africa was a key strategic target in their
plans to retake Europe and defeat Germany.2 8  The Vichy France
government had a loose alliance with Germany, was in various ways
284 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (200)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the AUMF's "whereas" clauses refer to the "threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence," and to the
fact that "such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States." Authorization for Use of Military Force (emphasis
added).
285 See supra section IV.D, pp. 2I02-06.
286 See CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED
STATES 121-22 (photo. reprint 1970) (1021).
287 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
288 See KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE WAR PRESIDENT 1940-1943, at 592-93 (2000);
GEORGE F. HOWE, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, THE MEDITERRANEAN




under German influence, and engaged in several battles with the
United States's ally, Great Britain.28 9  Although France was not spe-
cifically included in the congressional war declaration or authorization,
the United States and its allies attacked and defeated the military
forces of Vichy France in French North Africa, without legal
controversy.
290
Nothing in the analysis thus far has indicated how close the affilia-
tion between a terrorist group and al Qaeda must be in order to make
the group part of the same "organization" as al Qaeda. Dictionary
definitions of "organization" are not helpful in this regard. The inter-
national law concepts of neutrality and co-belligerency provide better
guidance, and confirm that the "enemy" in an armed conflict can in-
clude the enemy's affiliates. A co-belligerent state is a "fully fledged
belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent pow-
ers."2 91 One way that a state can become a co-belligerent is through
systematic or significant violations of its duties under the law of neu-
trality.292 A neutral state's fundamental duties are nonparticipation in
the conflict and impartiality toward belligerents.2 93  Among other
things, this means that the neutral state must not participate in acts of
war by the belligerent, must not supply war materials to a belligerent,
and must not permit belligerents to use its territory to move troops or
munitions, or to establish wartime communication channels.2 94 Under
these law-of-war principles, a state is deemed to be in an armed con-
289 The Franco-German Armistice of June 22, 1940, divided France into two zones, one under
German military occupation, and the other under a nominally sovereign France known as the
Vichy regime. See generally ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW
ORDER 1940-1944 (I982). On battles between the Vichy French and Great Britain, see id. at 56-
57.
290 See GERALD ASTOR, THE GREATEST WAR: AMERICANS IN COMBAT 1941-1945, at
254-63 (igg); GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF
WORLD WAR II 328, 431-47 (I994). Prior to the attack on Vichy French forces, President Roose-
velt had controversially maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy France in the hopes of fa-
vorably influencing the regime. See DAVIS, supra note 288, at 52-53, 262.
291 MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 531 (I959).
292 See Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 179, at 485, 492-94. If a state violates its neutral duties in a
nonsystematic way, the adversely affected belligerent state is permitted to take reprisals against
the ostensibly neutral party, subject to the general rules of reprisals (including proportionality)
and the limits of the U.N. Charter. See id.; cf. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO.
27-io, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 520 (1956) ("Should the neutral State be unable, or
fail for any reason, to prevent violations of its neutrality by the troops of one belligerent entering
or passing through its territory, the other belligerent may be justified in attacking the enemy
forces on this territory."), available at http://www.osc.army.mil/others/gca/files/FM27-io.pdf.
293 Bothe, supra note 292, at 485.
294 Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654; see also GREENSPAN, supra note 291,
at 536-39; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-91 (6th
ed. 1976); Bothe, supra note 292, at 496-97.
[V01. I 18:2o0472112
WAR ON TERRORISM
flict with a "neutral" state that systematically violates its neutral
duties.
These principles provide a guide for determining which terrorist
organizations are included within the AUMF. Terrorist organizations
that act as agents of al Qaeda, participate with al Qaeda in acts of war
against the United States, systematically provide military resources to
al Qaeda, or serve as fundamental communication links in the war
against the United States, and perhaps those that systematically permit
their buildings and safehouses to be used by al Qaeda in the war
against the United States, are analogous to co-belligerents in a tradi-
tional war. Because the laws of war at a minimum would deem "neu-
trals" that systematically violate the laws of neutrality by supporting
or assisting other terrorist organizations to be lawful military targets,
the AUMF should - consistent with its text, with presidential practice
in prior wars, and with standard delegation principles - extend to ter-
rorist organizations that are functional co-belligerents of al Qaeda.
2. Requisite Association with Terrorist Organizations. - Members
of terrorist organizations do not wear uniforms or other indicia of af-
filiation, and the organizations purposefully obscure their structure
and members' roles, identity, and status. As a result, even after the
terrorist organizations encompassed by the AUMF are identified, a
second question arises concerning which individuals are included
within such organizations. Osama bin Laden clearly is a member of al
Qaeda. So too are persons who commit a terrorist act under the al
Qaeda command structure. But what about an al Qaeda cell member
who has instructions from the organization but has been living quietly
in the United States for a decade? What about bin Laden's driver,
who is currently contesting the legality of his trial before a military
commission? 295 Or, as one judge queried at an oral argument in a case
involving the legality of the enemy combatant detentions in
Guantdinamo Bay, what about "a little old lady in Switzerland" who
contributed money to an organization that was "a front for al-Qaeda,"
even though she thought she was giving money to help Afghan
orphans?296
The text of the AUMF provides little guidance on these issues. It
does not define "organization," let alone describe what is required in
order for an individual to be considered part of an organization. The
distinction in the international laws of war between combatants and
non-combatants is potentially more useful. The laws of war permit
combatants to target other combatants, but prohibit them from target-
295 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
296 Tlranscript of Motion to Dismiss Before the Honorable Joyce Hens Green at 25, Rasul v.
Bush, No. 02-0299 (D.D.C. Dec. i, 2004).
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ing non-combatants unless the non-combatants take part in hostili-
ties.2 9 7 Technically, al Qaeda members - who violate the laws of war
by blurring the combatant/non-combatant distinction - cannot be
"combatants" in the sense of having a right under the laws of war to
target and capture other combatants. 2 98 Nonetheless, law-of-war crite-
ria for combatancy are designed to determine when a person's associa-
tion with or activity related to a party to an armed conflict justifies
subjecting that person to the consequences of combatant status under
the laws of war. These criteria thus can provide guidance on what
type of association with al Qaeda suffices for inclusion within the "or-
ganization" for purposes of the AUME
2 99
First, the laws of war deem most members of the armed forces of
an enemy to be combatants. 30 0 Two important criteria for membership
in armed forces are self-identification through the wearing of a uni-
form or some other distinguishing characteristic, and participation
within the command structure of a party to the conflict.30' Although
terrorists do not self-identify by wearing uniforms, they do sometimes
self-identify verbally.30 2  In addition, terrorist organizations do have
leadership and command structures, however diffuse, 30 3 and persons
who receive and execute orders within this command structure are
297 See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 79, at 27; Knut Ipsen,
Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 179, at 65, 65-68.
298 See Ipsen, supra note 297, at 66 ("[Ojnly a party to a conflict which is a subject of interna-
tional law can have armed forces whose members are combatants." (emphasis added)).
299 We are addressing here only the substantive question of who is covered by the AUMF, not
the process for determining whether someone is covered, and we are not making any claim about
the sufficiency of the existing procedures used by the Executive Branch. See infra pp. 2121-23.
300 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 4 (A)(i), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex arts. I,
3, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295-96, 1 Bevans 631, 643-44 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV]; see also
Additional Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 43(2), I25 U.N.T.S. at 23; GREENSPAN, supra note 291,
at 58; MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 122
(1999); Ipsen, supra note 297, at 66. Chaplains and medical personnel who are in the armed forces
of a state party to a conflict are not deemed to be combatants. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT
OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 179, at 35, 148; GREENSPAN, supra note 291, at 56-57; Ipsen, supra
note 297, at 66; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 43(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23.
301 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 4 (A)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138; 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 3o0, Annex art. i, 36 Stat. at 2295-96, 1 Bevans at
643-44; cf. Additional Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 43, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23 (emphasizing partici-
pation in a command structure but not the wearing of uniforms).,
302 For example, Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," admitted that he was a member of al Qaeda.
Douglas Frantz, "They're Coming After Us." But Who Are They Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2002, § 4, at 12; "I Am an Enemy of Your Country", WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at Ai. Matters of
self-identification are complicated because al Qaeda conceptualizes membership in two ways: ei-
ther by swearing bayat (fealty) to bin Laden, or by being an operative who has not sworn fealty
but who takes assignments from the organization. See 9/1i COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
79, at 67.
303 See 9/Ii COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 79, at 67.
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analogous to combatants and can naturally be deemed "members" of
the organization.
Second, the laws of war extend combatant status beyond the cate-
gories above to persons who take a "direct" part in hostilities.30 4  The
"direct participation" standard includes more people than those who
participate in combat, and fewer people than every civilian who sup-
ports the war effort, which in some modern wars would include every-
one. 30 5  Although there is uncertainty about where the line should be
drawn between these two extremes, 30 6 the key point is that, under the
304 See Ipsen, supra note 297, at 65-104; cf Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. i, 45 (1942) (reasoning, in
the course of distinguishing Ex parte Milligan, that Milligan was not "a part of or associated with
the armed forces of the enemy" (emphasis added)). This proposition is reflected in a variety of
sources, including Article 5 1(3) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which
provides that "[clivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Additional Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 5I(3), 1125
U.N.TS. at 26 (emphasis added); see also Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38 (applying to "persons taking no active part in the hostili-
ties" (emphasis added)); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-9 6- 4 -T, Judgement, para. 629
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Sept. 2, 1998) (concluding that there is no differ-
ence in practice between "direct" and "active" involvement in hostilities), available at
http:l/www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgementlakayooi.htm; The Hostages Trial (Trial
of Wilhelm List and Others) (U.S. Military Trib., Nuremberg July 8, 19 4 7-Feb. 19, 1948), re-
printed in 8 THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 34, 58 (I949) ("We think the rule is established that a civilian who aids, abets,
or participates in the fighting is liable to punishment as a war criminal under the laws of war.").
Technically, neither Additional Protocol I nor Common Article 3 applies directly in the war
against terrorism - the Protocol does not apply because the United States has not ratified it, and
Common Article 3 does not apply because the conflict with al Qaeda is not the type of "internal"
or "civil" war that Common Article 3 contemplates. Nonetheless, U.S. military manuals and
guides embrace the "direct" participation standard, although they interpret the standard in a par-
ticular way.
305 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at para.
1679 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) ("[T]o restrict this concept [of direct participation] to combat
and to active military operations would be too narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort
would be too broad, as in modern warfare the whole population participates in the war effort to
some extent, albeit indirectly." (footnote omitted)); U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 69o-
47, DA CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE DEPLOYMENT GUIDE para. 1-22 (1995) (noting that "[t]aking
part in hostilities has not been clearly defined in the law of war, but generally is not regarded as
limited to civilians who engage in actual fighting"), available at http://www.ima.army.milfilesl
p690_47.pdf.
306 See generally Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the
Rubicon?, 5I A.F. L. REV. Ii1, 117-20 (2ooi); Michael N. Schmitt, "Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities" and 21St Century Armed Conflict, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER
SCHUTZ - CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 505 (Horst Fischer et
al. eds., 2004), available at http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images[Directparticipationpageproofs.
pdf. The International Committee of the Red Cross commentary on Additional Protocol I defines
the term "direct participation" to mean "acts [of war] which by their nature and purpose are in-
tended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the [enemy] armed forces," and
concludes that "direct participation" does not include "gathering and transmission of military in-
formation, transportation of arms and munitions, provisions of supplies, etc." INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, supra note 305, at para. 1942. The U.S. military and some commentators take
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laws of war, enemy organizations will include some individuals who
assist the organization in carrying out attacks, even if they are not
formal members of the organization.
These criteria do not provide complete guidance on the question of
the requisite association with a terrorist organization for purposes of
the AUMF. They do, however, provide some guidance. For example,
they exclude from the AUMF the "little old lady from Switzerland"
and others who give small-scale financial support (especially unknow-
ing support) to a terrorist organization.30 7 By contrast, they include
both individuals who take up arms for purposes of attacking the
United States on a covered terrorist organization's behalf, and also
those who are in the process of "prepar[ing] for combat and return[ing]
from combat. '30 8 They would probably include, therefore, bin Laden's
driver, who is accused of picking up and delivering weapons and am-
munition to al Qaeda fighters, and of driving bin Laden and other
high-ranking al Qaeda members in protective convoys at the time of
the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in Au-
gust 1998, and at the time of the September ii attacks on the United
States.30 9  There will of course be difficult cases between these ex-
tremes. Our claim is simply that the law-of-war concepts outlined
above provide at least some principled guidance for determining who
should be included within a covered AUMF organization. 3 10
a broader view of "direct participation," deeming it to include intelligence agents who gather and
transmit military information, guards and lookouts for an armed force, weapons crew members,
and the like. Guillory, supra, at 117-18 nn.39-4o (collecting sources).
307 We are considering here only the requisite association with an organization for purposes of
the AUMF, not the circumstances under which financial support to a terrorist organization might,
consistent with the First Amendment, be criminalized. For recent decisions addressing that issue,
see, for example, United States v. Afshari, 392 F 3 d 1031 (9th Cir. 2004); and United States v.
Hammoud, 381 F.3 d 316 (4 th Cir. 2004). Cf. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found.
for Relief & Dev., 291 E 3 d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (addressing a First Amendment challenge in the
context of civil liability).
308 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 305, at para. 1943; cf Quirin, 317 U.S. at
38 ("Nor are petitioners any the less belligerents if, as they argue, they have not actually commit-
ted or attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active mili-
tary operations.").
309 See Charge Sheet, United States v. Hamdan (U.S. Military Comm'n), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ju12oo4/d2oo 4o7 I4 hcc.pdf. The driver also would likely fall
within the AUMF because he is in the al Qaeda command structure.
310 We have attempted here to provide only an overview of how the issue might be addressed.
Modern international criminal tribunals have developed an array of theories for collective liability
in the commission of war crimes - including but not limited to joint criminal enterprise, complic-
ity, and command responsibility - that might be relevant in the effort to define the contours of a
terrorist "organization." See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES,
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: TOPICAL DIGESTS OF THE CASE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2004), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2004/ij/digest.pdf; Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prose-
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B. Location of the Battlefield and Length of Detention
The Court in Hamdi held that the AUMF authorized the President
to detain an enemy combatant captured on the battlefield in Afghani-
stan for the duration of hostilities. 31 As noted above, the Court said
very little about how the President's power to detain applies to mem-
bers of terrorist organizations. 312  Two controversial issues about the
detention power as it applies to terrorists concern the geographic scope
of the authorized conflict and the allowable length of detention for
captured enemy combatants. Does the President's authority to use "all
necessary and appropriate force" under the AUMF apply to enemy
combatants present within the United States? And does the Presi-
dent's implicit authority under the AUMF to detain enemy combat-
ants, when applied in the context of a potentially very long war on ter-
rorism, allow him to detain individuals indefinitely without trial?
i. Location of the Battlefield. - The AUMF's text, considered in
light of the factors discussed in Part IV, suggests that the AUMF au-
thorizes the President to use force anywhere he encounters the enemy
covered by the AUMF, including the United States. The text of the
AUMF imposes no geographic limitation on the use of force. This dis-
tinguishes the AUMF from many prior authorizations to use force that
contained geographic restrictions. 313 The case for reading the AUMF
to apply in the United States is enhanced by the facts that the AUMF
was passed in response to the September i i attacks in the United
States, and that at the time of its enactment there was a strong suspi-
cion that enemy terrorist cells still lurked within the country.314 It is
cutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 606 (2004); Patricia M. Wald,
General Radislav Krstic: A War Crimes Case Study, i6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 445 (2003). Ad-
ditional sources that might be relevant include the Lieber Code, see FRANCIS LIEBER,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
FIELD § 4 (N.Y., D. Van Nostrand 1863), reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN,
LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45, 6o-6i (1983) (describing circumstances in which
the military can capture and deny prisoner-of-war status to "[airmed enemies not belonging to the
hostile army"), and the Third Geneva Convention, see Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25,
art. 4(A)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138 (deeming members of militias or other volunteer
corps "belonging to a [p]arty to the conflict" to be combatants).
311 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (plurality opinion).
312 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
313 See, e.g., Joint Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955, Pub. L. No. 4, 69 Stat. 7 (authorizing the Presi-
dent to use armed forces against Chinese communists and others to secure and protect Formosa
and the Pescadores against armed attack); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. i6i, §§ io-II, 23, 4 Stat. 729,
730, 733 (authorizing the President to remove persons from Indian lands); Act of Mar. 3, i819, ch.
93, § i, 3 Stat. 523, 523-24 (authorizing the President to take possession of and occupy East and
West Florida); Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561 (authorizing the President to seize French
vessels hovering on the U.S. coast).
314 See, e.g., R.W. Apple Jr., A Clear Message: "I Will Not Relent", N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001,
at Ai ("The nation and its leaders are confronted with the probability of an enemy within - cells
of bombers or hijackers, lurking unsuspected in dark or not-so-dark corners of American society.
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also enhanced by one of the "whereas" clauses in the AUMF, which
states that the September i i attacks "render it both necessary and ap-
propriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and
to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad."3 15  More-
over, during congressional consideration of the AUMF, there was ex-
press consideration (albeit apparently only at the staff level) of whether
to add the term "abroad" after "force" in the AUMF, and that term was
not added.
3 1 6
The conclusion that the AUMF applies in the United States if the
covered enemy is found here is further supported by standard delega-
tion principles and historical practice. As discussed earlier, delegations
of foreign affairs authority are construed more broadly in areas in
which the President has independent constitutional authority. What-
ever the precise scope of the President's Commander-in-Chief powers,
these powers are enhanced, and probably at their height, when he en-
gages an enemy that has attacked and infiltrated the United States."7
As for historical practice, presidents have always exercised wide dis-
cretion in determining where to send U.S. troops pursuant to general
and unqualified authorizations to use force against an identified en-
Nothing quite like it has ever faced the United States before, and there is no easy way to root out
the potential terrorists.").
315 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2ooi) (emphasis
added).
316 See Abramowitz, supra note i32, at 75 (noting the absence of the word "abroad" in the
original draft of the AUMF and that "inserting this word after 'force' was suggested during staff
discussions"). Mr. Abramowitz suggests that the word "abroad" was unnecessary because the
AUMF refers to the War Powers Resolution, which he says "generally deals with introducing U.S.
forces abroad." Id. This is incorrect. The War Powers Resolution addresses every situation in
which the President introduces U.S. armed forces "into hostilities," Pub. L. No. 93-148, §§ 2(a),
4(a)(i), 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified at 5o U.S.C. §§ 1541(a), 1543(a)(I) (2ooo)), and it expressly
contemplates a situation in which Congress is unable to meet because of "an armed attack upon
the United States." Id. § 5(b), 87 Stat. at 556 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2ooo)). In the
House deliberations on the AUMF, at least one member of Congress specifically noted that the
AUMF, by its terms, seemed to authorize the use of force even in the United States. See 147
CONG. REC. H5675 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Rep. Jackson) ("As written, the resolu-
tion could be interpreted, if read literally, to give the President the authority to deploy or use our
armed forces domestically."). After the Senate had voted to approve the AUMF, Senator Biden
stated that "it should go without saying, however, that the resolution is directed only at using
force abroad to combat acts of international terrorism." Id. at S9423. Senator Biden did not ex-
plain this statement, and we do not believe it overcomes evidence to the contrary.
317 At the Constitutional Convention, one of the stated reasons for altering Congress's power to
"make" war to a power to "declare" war was to preserve the President's authority to "repel sudden
attacks." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 34, at 318 (explanation by James Madison and
Elbridge Gerry). As the Supreme Court made clear in the Prize Cases: "If a war be made by in-
vasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.
He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special
legislative authority." Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
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emy.3 18 Most notably, in the War of 1812, the Civil War, and World
War II - wars supported by broad and geographically unqualified au-
thorizations of force, like the AUMF 319 - presidents and their subor-
dinates exercised traditional military powers against enemies when
they were found in the United States. 320 Finally, although jus in bello
rules of international law regulate the types of targets against which
force can be used, they place no restriction on the geographic location
of the use of force.
For these reasons, the AUMF is best read as authorizing the Presi-
dent to use all necessary and appropriate force against covered ene-
mies found in the United States. 321 The plurality in Hamdi - relying
318 See BERDAHL, supra note 286, at 121-22 ("[Tlhere has never been any serious doubt as to
the President's constitutional power to order the regular forces wherever he may think best in the
conduct of a war, whether within or without the limits of the United States, nor has any President
hesitated to make use of that power in any foreign war in which the United States has been en-
gaged."); cf Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) ("As commander-in-chief, [the
President] is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at
his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and con-
quer and subdue the enemy."). In World War I, for example, Congress declared war and author-
ized the President to use force against Germany and Austro-Hungary, but the President sent
troops into France, Italy, and Russia to fight German and related military forces. See BERDAHL,
supra note 286, at 122.
319 In the Civil War, congressional authorization came four months after Lincoln had already
committed U.S. troops to hostilities. See Act of Aug. 6, i86i, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326, 326.
320 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 36-38, 48 (1942) (upholding the use of military com-
missions for Nazi saboteurs captured in the United States during World War H); Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) at 669-71 (upholding the President's blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil
War); J. MACKAY HITSMAN, THE INCREDIBLE WAR OF 1812, at 237-48 (Donald E. Graves
ed., Robin Brass Studio 1999) (1965) (describing military battles inside the United States). These
wars contrast with the Korean War, in which, as the opinions in Youngstown implied, the battle-
field was located outside the United States. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 587 (1952) ("Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with
faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor dis-
putes from stopping production."); id. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I should indulge the wid-
est latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President's] exclusive function to command the in-
struments of national force, at least when turned against the outside world for the security of our
society. But, when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic
struggle between industry and labor, it should have no such indulgence."). The presidential action
at issue in Youngstown is also distinguishable from the presidential actions in Ex parte Quirin and
the Prize Cases because it was not directed against an enemy found in the United States.
321 Some have maintained that the detention procedures in the USA PATRIOT Act, most nota-
bly those set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226a, imply that Congress did not intend the AUMF to authorize
the President to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely in the United States. See, e.g., Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2659 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and con-
curring in the judgment); Brief of Respondent at 25-26, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004) (No. 03-1027), available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbls69NewsDocumentOrder/
FileUpload5oo/2 8/PadillaBriefOfRespondent.pdf; Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngs-
town Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 386-99, 426-29 (2002). Section i226a permits
the Attorney General to detain aliens (pending removal proceedings or criminal prosecution) who,
among other things, are suspected of activities that endanger the national security of the United
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on past Executive Branch practice and the international laws of war
- properly held that the AUMF's authorization to the President to use
"force" against enemies amounted to a "clear[] and unmistakabl[e]" au-
thorization to detain an enemy combatant for the duration of hostilities
without trial, and satisfied the "Act of Congress" requirement for de-
tention of a U.S. citizen under 18 U.S.C. § 40oI(a).3 2 2  The plurality
limited this holding to a U.S. citizen captured on a traditional foreign
battlefield. 323  The logic of its interpretation of the AUMF, however,
applies to enemy combatants captured in the United States as well.
32 4
The functional need to prevent the enemy from returning to the battle-
field applies at least as strongly (if not more so) when the enemy is
found in the United States. It is no less a "fundamental incident of
waging war" to detain enemy combatants captured in the United
States than it is to detain those captured on a battlefield abroad. The
laws of war do not limit the detention power to persons captured out-
side the home country, and presidents in the War of 1812, the Civil
War, and World War II detained combatants when they were found in
the United States. Moreover, the Hamdi plurality relied heavily on
Quirin, a case involving the exercise of traditional presidential military
functions - the detention and trial of unlawful enemy combatants -
applied to persons captured in the United States.
325
States. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a(a)(i), (3) (West Supp. 2004). This is a much broader category of
persons than the enemy combatants covered by the AUMF, and indeed includes dangerous aliens
with no connection to the war on terrorism. As a result, it is difficult to see how this later-enacted
provision implies that Congress did not intend in the AUMF to authorize the President to exercise
his traditional power to detain enemy combatants, including those found in the United States.
322 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-42 (plurality opinion).
323 Id. at 2639 (defining an enemy combatant for purposes of its analysis as "an individual who
... was "'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners"' in Af-
ghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States"' there" (quoting
Hamdi Respondents Brief, supra note 17, at 3 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 17, at ))).
324 In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), the Court considered the validity of detaining
a U.S. citizen, captured in the United States, who was alleged to be an enemy combatant. Al-
though the Court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, Justice Stevens's dissent, which
was joined by three other Justices, expressed the view that "the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 400i(a), prohibits - and the Authorization for Use of Military Force ... does not authorize -
the protracted, incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the United States." Id.
at 2735 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, who joined the dissent, including the quoted
footnote, was also one of the four Justices in the Hamdi plurality. This might suggest that a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court would not find sufficient authorization for Padilla's detention, since
he was "arrested in the United States." On the other hand, if Padilla were given the hearing
mandated in Hamdi, his detention would not be "incommunicado" and the footnote might not
apply.
325 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640, 2642-43 (plurality opinion). A potential consequence of the
AUMF's applicability in the United States is that in some circumstances it might authorize the
President to target and kill persons covered by the AUMF found in the United States. Several
factors may qualify this conclusion with respect to covered persons in the United States who can
be arrested through normal means and do not otherwise present an immediate threat. As we have
discussed, the AUMF generally authorizes only actions permitted by the laws of war. The laws of
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In understanding the significance of this presidential authority to
detain enemy combatants found within the United States, it is crucial
to distinguish between the power to detain someone with enemy com-
batant status and the processes for determining whether someone is an
enemy combatant. The Supreme Court in Hamdi relied on this dis-
tinction in holding that the President could detain a traditional enemy
combatant until hostilities ended, but also requiring independent pro-
cedural protections - at least for U.S. citizens - to minimize the risk
of erroneous classification of someone as an enemy combatant.
326
Some critics of the detention power have confounded these two issues,
arguing that the power to detain is illegitimate because of the possibil-
ity, especially in a war against a non-uniformed force, of significant
mistakes. This criticism elides the important reasons for detaining en-
emy combatants during wartime. As the plurality emphasized in
Hamdi, the United States can accommodate the competing concerns of
incapacitating the enemy and avoiding erroneous deprivation by con-
sidering the power to detain independently from the processes appro-
priate for detention.
327
As a result, the conclusion that the AUMF empowers the President
to detain enemy combatants found on U.S. soil does not, by itself, re-
solve the issue of what institutions or procedures are appropriate for
determining whether a person captured and detained on U.S. soil is in
fact an enemy combatant. The AUMF's text is silent on this point. It
states that the President can determine which nations, organizations,
and persons contributed to the September ii attacks, but it does not
address his authority to determine which persons are in or adequately
associated with organizations that contributed to the attacks. The
war may require a belligerent, even when targeting a legitimate military target, to avoid unneces-
sary violence and suffering. See, e.g., NAVAL WAR COLL., ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 5.2 (A.R. Thomas &
James C. Duncan eds., I999); U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 292, at para. 3. See gener-
ally MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 72-73, 521-30 (1961) (explaining the necessity principle). This principle might
preclude killing a nonthreatening enemy combatant who can easily be arrested without the use of
force. Furthermore, the laws of war prohibit the targeting of persons who are "out of combat."
See Richard R. Baxter, The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (Law of the
Hague), in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 93, 117 (1988); cf. Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38 (prohibiting
"violence to life and person" for those "hors de combat" (out of combat)). Finally, the Fourth
Amendment might be relevant to attacks on legitimate military targets in the United States if the
targets did not present any immediate threat and could be apprehended by normal law enforce-
ment means. Cf Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. i, ii (1985) (holding that a police officer may not
seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by using deadly force).
326 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2643 (plurality opinion) ("Even in cases in which the detention of
enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains the question of what process is constitu-
tionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status.").
327 See id. at 2646-48.
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Third Geneva Convention sets forth procedures for determining when
a combatant qualifies as a prisoner of war if there is doubt about his
or her status.328 The applicability of these procedures to alleged non-
state terrorist enemy combatants is uncertain at best. In any event, the
AUMF does not appear to alter the traditional habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion over the military detention in the United States of persons not in
the U.S. military.32 9  Because courts have exercised habeas corpus re-
view for this purpose in prior authorized conflicts, Congress's similar
authorization to use force in this conflict should not be viewed as
changing the availability of this judicial remedy. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the plurality in Hamdi concluded that the AUMF did not af-
fect the availability of habeas corpus review for determining whether a
U.S. citizen captured abroad but detained in the United States is in
fact an enemy combatant.330 This distinction between power and
328 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at
140-42 ("Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4,
such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal."); cf. U.S. Dep'ts of the Army, the Navy, the Air
Force, and the Marine Corps, Army Regulation igo-8/OPNAVINST 3 4 61.6/AFJI 31- 3o4[MCO
3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees § i-
5(a)(2) (1997) ("All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections
of the [Third Geneva Convention] until some other legal status is determined by competent au-
thority."), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/ari9o-8.pdf; id. § 1-6 (describing
the requisite competent tribunal).
329 See, e.g., In re Territo, i56 F.2d 142 (9 th Cir. 1946) (World War H); In re Stacy, io Johns.
328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (War of 1812). In the Civil War, President Lincoln, with the later ap-
proval of Congress, suspended the writ of habeas corpus on a number of occasions, acts that were
premised on the assumption that the writ was otherwise available to those placed in military cus-
tody. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755; FARBER, supra note 193, at 17, 157-63; see
also Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. i861) (No. 9487) (holding that President Lin-
coln lacked authority to suspend the writ and ordering the release of a person in military deten-
tion). See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 475 (1963) ("[T]he classical function of habeas corpus was
to assure the liberty of subjects against detention by the executive or the military without any
court process at all .... ); George Rutherglen, Structural Uncertainty over Habeas Corpus & the
Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 397, 398 (2oo2) ("[T]he writ provides the
single most important legal protection against executive tyranny and military government."). Pro-
fessor Gerald Neuman refers to "a long tradition limiting the scope of habeas corpus inquiry in
the military context." Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal
of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1039 (I998). The cases he analyzes for this proposition, how-
ever, concern habeas corpus review of courts martial and related military trials, and detentions of
members of the U.S. military, not military detentions without trial or military detentions of per-
sons not in the U.S. armed forces.
330 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2644 (plurality opinion). The plurality appeared to view the gov-
ernment's position in Hamdi to be that the Commander-in-Chief has essentially unreviewable au-
thority to determine whether a particular U.S. citizen is in fact an enemy combatant. See id. at
2645. This view had a plausible basis in the government's briefs. See Hamdi Respondents Brief,
supra note 17, at 26-2 7.
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process applies just as forcefully, and probably more so, to the deten-
tion of enemy combatants captured in the United States.
33 1
2. Length of Detention. - Unlike some authorizations to use force,
the AUMF does not purport to limit the time period in which the
President can act.332  Moreover, many members of Congress noted in
the debates over the AUMF that the war against the perpetrators of
the September ii attacks might take a very long time, 333 and none
suggested an implicit time limitation on the authorization. The lack of
a time limitation is further indicated by Congress's inclusion of sunset
clauses in other prominent statutes passed in response to the Septem-
ber I I attacks, but not in the AUMF.334
The potentially indefinite length of the authorized conflict raises
difficult questions about how long the United States may detain a cap-
tured terrorist enemy combatant. The traditional law-of-war rule is
that a prisoner of war can be detained until the "cessation of active
hostilities. '335  The purpose of this rule is to prevent enemy combat-
ants from returning to fight.33 6 In a traditional armed conflict, a tem-
porally unqualified authorization to use force like the AUMF would, as
the plurality noted in Hamdi, be interpreted to authorize detention un-
331 In Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), the Court held that foreign citizens held as enemy
combatants at the U.S. naval base in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, could seek habeas corpus review of
the legality of their detention. Although the Court suggested that the detainees at Guantdnamo
Bay might be able to demonstrate that they were held in "custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States" within the meaning of the habeas statute, see id. at 2698
& n.I5, the Court did not establish the extent (if any) to which the Constitution applies there, or
how the procedural rights of the detainees at Guantdnamo compare with the procedural rights of
those held in the United States as enemy combatants.
332 The Lebanon, Somalia, and Taiwan authorizations, as discussed above, had such timing
requirements. See supra pp. 2076-77; see also Act of Dec. 17, 1813, ch. i, § 20, 3 Stat. 88, 93 (stat-
ing that embargo provisions during the War of 1812 would expire a year and a month after pas-
sage); Act of Feb. 6, 1802, ch. 4, § 5, 2 Stat. 129, 130 (providing a two-year period for which sea-
men could be engaged to serve in conflict against Tripoli pirates).
333 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H56 3 9 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Rep. Hastert)
("This will be the great challenge for our generation. It may take years."); id. (statement of Rep.
Lantos) ("We are embarking on a long and difficult struggle, like none other in our Nation's his-
tory."); id. at H56 4 8 (statement of Rep. DeLay) ("Every American should anticipate and prepare
for a prolonged and sustained campaign. They should understand that this war will be measured
in years, not months."); see also id. at S9422-23 (statement of Sen. Biden) (stating that the AUMF
"does not limit the amount of time that the President may prosecute this action against the parties
guilty for the September i i attacks").
334 See, e.g., Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § io8(a), 116 Stat.
2322, 2336 ("The Program shall terminate on December 31, 2005."); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001) ("[T]his title and the amendments made by this title
... shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.").
335 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. iI8, 6 U.S.T. at 34o6, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224.
336 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also CHRISTIANE
SHIELDS DELESSERT, RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AT THE END
OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES 112 (1977); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 51, at 547;
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 179, at 326.
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til the end of hostilities. 337 Translated into the terrorism context, this
rule might mean that a captured terrorist enemy combatant could be
detained for a long time and perhaps indefinitely. Indefinite detention
without trial or charge strikes many as an excessive remedy for mem-
bership in an enemy terrorist organization, especially given the possi-
bility of erroneous designation, as well as the possibility that an enemy
combatant may, after some period, no longer pose a threat to the
United States. In light of these concerns, it is not surprising that the
plurality in Hamdi intimated uncertainty about whether the "cessation
of hostilities" concept should be applied to the war on terrorism.
338
The proper approach here, we believe, is to apply the traditional
law-of-war rule in a way that takes account of both its underlying
purpose and the novel features of the war on terrorism. The tradi-
tional rule is premised on the possibility of an identifiable end of the
conflict, either by formal peace treaty, armistice agreement, or even by
attrition or exhaustion. This is the premise that the war on terrorism
- the end of which is difficult to imagine right now - calls into ques-
tion. Calling into question this premise, however, does not call into
question the functional justification under the laws of war for deten-
tion itself, which is to prevent the combatant from returning to the
conflict. The new circumstances simply call into question how the
laws of war should conceptualize the end of the conflict.
The laws of war traditionally permitted detaining authorities to
address categorically the danger that a prisoner would return to hos-
tilities by detaining all enemy combatants until the conclusion of the
overall hostilities with the nation on whose behalf the combatants had
fought. This approach makes sense in the interstate war context, in
which mistaken detentions are less likely, the costs of a mistaken de-
tention are lower because of the foreseeably finite duration of war, and
the detainee's state has the power to eliminate the reason for returning
to the fight, and thus the reason for the detention, by surrendering or
entering into a peace treaty or armistice agreement. This categorical,
group-based approach makes less sense in the context of the war with
al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. Because the enemy does
not wear uniforms and is not affiliated with an enemy state, and be-
cause of the potentially indefinite duration of the conflict, designation
errors are both more likely and more serious. In addition, no state has
337 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (plurality opinion).
338 See id. at 2641 ("If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding [of the Authori-
zation granting authority to detain for the duration of the conflict] may unravel."). The plurality
also warned that it would not construe the AUMF to permit indefinite detention for at least one
purpose - interrogation. See id.
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the power to end hostilities and thereby end the basis for returning to
the fight, and thus the basis for the detention.
These differences suggest that, with respect to the power to detain
terrorist combatants outside the conflict in Afghanistan, the end of the
conflict should be viewed in individual rather than group-based terms.
Under this approach, the question is not whether hostilities have
ceased with al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, but rather
whether hostilities have, in essence, ceased with the individual because
he no longer poses a substantial danger of rejoining hostilities. A de-
termination of the existence of such a danger could be based on,
among other things, the detainee's past conduct, level of authority
within al Qaeda, statements and actions during confinement, age and
health, and psychological profile.3 3 9 In some cases, the individualized
determination will be easy, in that the detainee might openly profess to
have a continuing intent to engage in hostilities against the United
States. But in most cases it is likely to be difficult, and will depend on
various contested factors, as well as the burden of proof. This diffi-
culty is illustrated by the fact that a number of detainees released from
Guantdnamo Bay, presumably following a determination of non-
dangerousness, have reappeared on the battlefield against the United
States.
340
This interpretation of how the laws of war should apply to the
length of detention of terrorist enemy combatants is supported by the
fact that many of the traditional rules contemplate release of an enemy
combatant based on an individualized determination that the combat-
ant does not present a future threat. The Third Geneva Convention,
for example, requires the repatriation of seriously wounded and sick
prisoners prior to the end of hostilities. 34 1 In addition, the Convention
339 Individualized assessments of future dangerousness are common in other U.S. detention set-
tings, such as in criminal sentencing proceedings, pretrial detention, and civil commitment pro-
ceedings. See generally Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1 (2003). These mechanisms potentially provide models for the type of individualized as-
sessments we contemplate in the text. Of course, the basis for detention in the war on terrorism
context - that the individual is a member of a group waging war against the United States who
potentially threatens to continue to participate in the war if released - is different from the basis
for detention in other contexts.
340 See John Mintz, Released Detainees Rejoining the Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at Ai.
341 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. iog, 6 U.S.T. at 3400, 75 U.N.T.S. at 218. To
reduce the danger that sick and wounded prisoners will return to hostilities after recovering,
states may seek to make arrangements to accommodate them in neutral countries "[t]hroughout
the duration of hostilities." Id. As the International Committee of the Red Cross commentary
explains, such accommodation "ensures that such prisoners of war will not after recovery make
any active contribution in their own country to the war effort." INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, supra note 51, at 511. Prisoners with incurable wounds or sickness and certain other
prisoners whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been "gravely diminished," however,
must be returned to their own countries rather than to a neutral country, Third Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 25, art. iio, 6 U.S.T. at 340o-02, 75 U.N.T.S. at 218-20, because there is little
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permits agreements providing for the repatriation, to neutral states, of
able-bodied prisoners who have undergone long periods of confine-
ment.342 The Convention further provides for the voluntary repatria-
tion of a prisoner based on parole or promise to the extent that it is al-
lowed by the laws of the prisoner's own state, something that is
typically done on the condition that the prisoner not take up arms
against his captor.343 Such state-based mechanisms for ensuring that
repatriated prisoners do not return to the fight are of course not as
readily available with respect to terrorists. There may be conditions
that can be imposed on the release of particular terrorist detainees,
however, that will reduce the likelihood that they will pose a continu-
ing threat to the United States. Travel restrictions, for example, were
imposed in connection with the release of Yaser Hamdi.
344
We do not claim that our proposed individualized approach to de-
termining the end of hostilities in this context is a settled requirement
of the customary laws of war. It is noteworthy, however, that the Ex-
ecutive Branch, under various political and judicial pressures, has
been moving for several years toward the individualized approach de-
scribed above. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi, the
Executive Branch released dozens of alleged enemy combatants from
detention based on an informal process that included interagency con-
sideration of each detainee's intelligence value and threat level. 345 In
the spring of 2004, while Hamdi and Rasul v. Bush346 were under con-
sideration, the Executive Branch established an Administrative Re-
view Board that uses formal procedures to review whether enemy
combatants should continue to be detained or should be released, with
or without conditions.347  In making its recommendations, the Board
danger that they will return to hostilities. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 51, at
515; see also DELESSERT, supra note 336, at 112 ("The detention of a soldier whose mental and
physical fitness has been gravely and perhaps permanently impaired is clearly no longer a military
necessity.").
342 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, arts. iog-io, 6 U.S.T. at 3400-02, 75 U.N.T.S. at
218-20. It also provides, however, that states are forbidden from employing such repatriated
prisoners in active military service. Id. art. 117, 6 U.ST. at 34o6, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224.
343 See id. art. 21, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-36, 75 U.N.TS. at 152-54; DELESSERT, supra note 336, at
179. Although parole is rarely used today, it is a well-established part of the law of war. During
World War II, for example, the United States paroled Italian prisoners of war in Sicily and the
United States after the new Italian government changed sides in 1943. See HOWARD S. LEVIE,
PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 398-4oo (1978).
344 See Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2.
345 See Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks Before the American Bar Association Standing Commit-
tee on Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/
judge-gonzales.pdf.
346 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
34' See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ORDER, ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR
ENEMY COMBATANTS IN THE CONTROL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AT
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considers whether each detainee
remains a threat to the United States and its allies in the ongoing armed
conflict against al Qaida and its affiliates and supporters or if there is any
other reason that it is in the interest of the United States and its allies for
the enemy combatant to remain in the control of [the Department of
Defense].
3 48
Although the reference to "any other reason" for continued detention
goes beyond the law-of-war model described above, the general ap-
proach is consistent with our analysis.
C. Military Commissions
Another area of controversy in the war on terrorism concerns the
President's establishment of military commissions to try certain terror-
ists. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order authoriz-
ing these commissions. 349 The order covers present and former mem-
bers of al Qaeda; individuals who "engaged in, aided or abetted, or
conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in prepara-
tion therefore, that have caused, threatened to cause, or have as their
aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citi-
zens, national security, foreign policy, or economy"; and those who
knowingly harbored any of these individuals.35 0  Under the order, the
military commissions are authorized to try these individuals for "any
and all offenses triable by military commission that such individuals
are alleged to have committed.
'35 1
GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, CUBA (May i, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.
mil/newsfMay2 o0 4/d2 00405 i8gtmoreview.pdf.
348 Id. § 2.A (emphasis added); see also id. § 3.E.
349 See Military Order, supra note 95, § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 919-20.
350 Id. § 2(a).
351 Id. § 4(a). President Bush subsequently determined that fifteen individuals being detained
at the U.S. naval base in GuantAnamo Bay were eligible to be tried before military commissions.
See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., President Determines Enemy Combatants Subject to His
Military Order, http://www.defenselink.milreleases/2003/nr2oo3o7o3-oI73.html (July 3, 2003);
News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Presidential Military Order Applied to Nine More Combatants,
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2oo4/nr2oo4o7o7-o987.html (July 7, 2004). In 2004, the Pen-
tagon announced that four of these individuals had been charged with conspiracy to commit war
crimes and other crimes triable by military commission. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Additional Military Commission Charges Referred, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/
nr20040714-io3o.html (July 14, 2004); News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Guantanamo Detainee
Charged, http://www.defenselink.millreleases/20o4/nr2oo4o6io-o893.html (June io, 2004); News
Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged, http://www.defenselink.miu
releases/2004/nr2oo4o224-o363.html (Feb. 24, 2004). These commission proceedings began in Au-
gust 2004, almost three years after issuance of the November 3 order. See News Release, U.S.
Dep't of Def., First Military Commission Convened at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2oo4o824-Ii64.html (Aug. 24, 2004).
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Some commentators have asserted that the President lacks the au-
thority to establish military commissions because Congress has neither
declared war nor expressly authorized the establishment of military
commissions in the war on terrorism. 3- 2  As we explain, the interpre-
tive principles outlined above suggest that the President does have au-
thority to use military commissions in the war on terrorism, subject to
certain limitations. Once again, we put aside the issue of the Presi-
dent's independent constitutional authority and focus only on his
statutory authority.35 3 We also put aside the question whether the par-
ticular procedures established by the Department of Defense for the
commissions are legally sufficient.
354
As discussed in Part II, a declaration of war is not required in or-
der for Congress to authorize the President to fully prosecute a war; a
broadly worded authorization of force is sufficient. Moreover, as dis-
cussed in Part III, the AUMF is as broad in this respect as authoriza-
tions of force in declared wars. Therefore, arguments that the Presi-
dent lacked authority to establish military commissions because
Congress did not formally declare war, or because the AUMF is nar-
rower in scope than authorizations in other wars in which military
commissions have been used, can readily be dismissed.355
Although the November 13 order states that individuals tried by military commissions have
no right to seek review in any U.S. court, see Military Order, supra note 95, § 7(b), 3 C.FR. at 921,
Alberto Gonzales, then counsel to the President, stated shortly after issuance of the order that it
"preserves judicial review in civilian courts," and that "anyone arrested, detained or tried in the
United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commis-
sion's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Alberto R. Gonzales,
Editorial, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (emphasis added).
He also noted that the language of the order was "similar to" that of President Franklin Roose-
velt's commission order in World War II, which was construed by the Supreme Court (in Quirin)
as permitting habeas review. Id.; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 25 (1942) ("But there is cer-
tainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicabil-
ity to the particular case. And neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens
forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that the Constitution and laws of
the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission."); Proclama-
tion No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. 309 (1938-1943).
352 See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 2, at 1266.
353 Cf. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29 ("It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what ex-
tent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commis-
sions without the support of Congressional legislation.").
354 The November 13 order outlined some minimal procedural requirements for the commis-
sions, such as the requirement of at least a two-thirds vote by members of the commission present,
with a majority being present, for a conviction, but otherwise it delegated the determination of
the procedures to the Department of Defense. See Military Order, supra note 95, § 4(c), 3 C.F.R.
at 92o. The Department of Defense issued a detailed order in March 2oo2 establishing procedures
for the commissions and giving certain rights to the accused. See Dep't of Def., Military Com-
mission Order No. i (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2oo2/
d2002o 3 2 Iord.pdf.
355 In upholding the use of a military commission in Quirin to try saboteurs acting on behalf of
Germany, the Court noted that war had been declared on Germany. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
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The real question, rather, is whether Congress has authorized the
President to use military commissions, either in the AUMF or in some
other statute. 35 6 As with other interpretive issues discussed in this Ar-
ticle, historical practice plays an important role in the analysis. Presi-
dents and military commanders have established military commissions
for a variety of purposes throughout U.S. history.357 These commis-
sions have been used in connection with formally declared wars as
well as other military conflicts, such as the Civil War and conflicts
with Indian tribes. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ince our na-
tion's earliest days, such commissions have been constitutionally rec-
ognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibili-
ties related to war. '358 Consistent with the interpretive framework set
forth above, this historical practice can help inform the meaning of
congressional enactments relating to war.
Unlike most issues of presidential authority discussed in this Arti-
cle, the AUMF is not the only possible source of statutory authority for
presidential use of military commissions. A number of provisions in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) specifically refer to such
commissions. Of most relevance, § 82 1 of the UCMJ states that "[t]he
provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial
do not deprive military commissions ... of concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be tried by military commissions. '35 9 To understand the
meaning of this reference, one must understand the statutory predeces-
sor to § 82 1.
The UCMJ replaced the Articles of War, which had themselves
been recodified in 1916. In the 1916 recodification, Congress expanded
court-martial jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction over members of the
U.S. military) to include offenses against the laws of war.360 Article 15
of the recodified Articles of War, the predecessor to § 821 of the
UCMJ, stated that the creation of statutory jurisdiction for courts-
martial did not "depriv[e] military commissions ... of concurrent ju-
The Court did not, however, state that the declaration of war was a prerequisite for the use of
military commissions. Moreover, as noted below, military commissions have been used histori-
cally by the United States in undeclared as well as declared wars.
356 The analysis in this and the next several paragraphs is drawn largely from Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 238.
357 See AM. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/military.pdf; BIRKHIMER, supra note 76, at 351-69; 2 WINTHROP, supra note 76, at
1295-1302; David J. Bederman, Article II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825 (1993); A. Wigfall
Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1948).
358 Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952).
359 io U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
360 See Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, sec. 3, art. 12, 39 Stat. 61g, 652.
2005] 2129
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
risdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that ... by the law of war
may be triable by such military commissions. '36 1  Although by its
terms this provision appeared simply to recognize the historical au-
thority of the President to establish military commissions, the Supreme
Court in Quirin held that this provision also constituted congressional
authorization for the use of military commissions. The Court noted
that "[b]y the Articles of War, and especially Article I5, Congress has
explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the
law of war in appropriate cases," and held that "Congress [in Article
15] has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such
commissions. "
3 6 2
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, therefore, Article I5 of the
Articles of War authorized the President to use military commis-
sions.3 63  Congress in effect confirmed this interpretation when, in
1950, it recodified Article 15 into what would later become § 821 of
the UCMJ without changing the reference to military commissions.3 64
Indeed, the legislative history of § 821 makes clear that Congress was
aware of and accepted the Court's interpretation. 36S  Other provisions
in the UCMJ contemplate the use of military commissions in ways that
further confirm that Congress has authorized their use. 366
361 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942) (quoting Article I5 of the Articles of War).
362 Id. at 28-29; accord In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I, 19-20 (1946) (quoting Article I5 of the Ar-
ticles of War).
363 Some commentators have implied that the above statements in Quirin were dicta because
Article 82 of the Articles of War, which authorized military commissions to try the offense of spy-
ing, provided a narrower basis for the Court's decision. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, On Justice
and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635,
642-45 (2002). There are at least two problems with this argument. First, the Court clearly be-
lieved that Article 15 was the primary congressional authorization for military commissions. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 (noting that "especially [in] Article i5, Congress has explicitly provided" for
military commissions). Second, in upholding the validity of the military commission in Quirin,
the Court examined only the charges alleging violations of the laws of war, and had "no occasion
to pass on" the other charges, including the spying charges or "to construe the ... 82nd Article[] of
War." Id. at 46.
364 See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, sec. i, art. 21, 64 Stat. 107, 115.
365 See S. REP. NO. 81-486, at 13 (1949), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2222, 2236; H.R. REP.
NO. 81-491, at 17 (1949).
366 Most notably, io U.S.C. § 836 authorizes the President to prescribe "[piretrial, trial, and
post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in
... military commissions and other military tribunals." io U.S.C. § 836(a) (2ooo). Section 836
also requires that the President, "so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district
courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter." Id. (emphasis added).
Although beyond the scope of this Article, we are skeptical of the argument that the italicized lan-
guage means that military commissions must use the same procedures that are provided for in the
UCMJ for courts-martial, see, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, i66-68 (D.D.C.
2004); David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century
Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2013-14 (2003). The UCMJ does not specify proce-
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Notwithstanding this specific source of authority in the UCMJ, the
AUMF is relevant to the issue of the President's authority to establish
the commissions for two reasons. First, the AUMF probably provides
an independent source of statutory authority for establishing the com-
missions. The historical practice of using military commissions during
war, even without specific congressional authorization, suggests that
they are part of the "incidents of war" that Congress implicitly author-
ized in the AUMF. Indeed, in upholding the use of a military commis-
sion in Quirin, the Supreme Court specifically noted:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of meas-
ures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but
to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of
war.
36 7
The plurality in Hamdi quoted approvingly from this portion of
Quirin in concluding that the AUMF implicitly authorized the deten-
tion of enemy combatants, 368 and also made clear that, to the extent
there was any inconsistency between the allowance of the military
commission in Quirin and the disallowance of the military commission
in the Civil War-era decision Ex parte Milligan,369 Quirin was
controlling.
3 70
A second reason that the AUMF is relevant to the President's statu-
tory authority to establish military commissions is that, although the
UCMJ authorizes the use of military commissions to try offenses
against the laws of war, it does not itself authorize the President to
prosecute a war. Presumably, the UCMJ's authorization for military
commissions applies only in the context of a war waged by the Presi-
dent with either constitutional or statutory authority. There is general
agreement that the President has some constitutional authority to wage
war in the absence of congressional authorization (for example, to re-
pel sudden attacks), but, as noted above, the precise scope of that au-
thority is contested.3 71 To the extent that the President needs Con-
gress's authorization to prosecute the war on terrorism, that
authorization would come from the AUMF, and the AUMF, as dis-
cussed above, authorizes presidential action only with respect to na-
tions, organizations, and persons connected to the September i i at-
dures for military commissions, so it is not clear why the President's adoption of procedures dif-
ferent from those specified in the UCMJ for courts-martial would be "inconsistent with this chap-
ter." Section 836 does not say, after all, that the procedures for military commissions may not be
"contrary to or inconsistent with" the procedures set forth in that chapter for courts-martial.
367 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29; accord Yamashita, 327 U.S. at ii.
368 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) (plurality opinion).
369 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
370 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2642-43.
371 See supra pp. 2051-52.
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tacks. The November 13 Military Order, by contrast, purports to au-
thorize the use of commissions for the prosecution of any individuals
who carry out terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.37 2 The legality
of trying terrorists who are not covered by the AUMF in military
commissions would therefore depend on the President's independent
constitutional authority to wage war against those terrorists.
In addition to this possible nexus limitation, the President's statu-
tory authority to use military commissions pursuant to the November
13 order is probably limited by international law. Historically, the
United States has used military commissions for three basic purposes:
to try enemy belligerents for crimes triable under the laws of war, to
administer justice in territory occupied by the United States, and to
replace civilian courts where martial law has been declared.37 3 The
commissions established pursuant to President Bush's November 13
order fall within the first category. Except for two offenses that Con-
gress has specifically authorized to be tried before military commis-
sions - spying and aiding the enemy - the historical jurisdiction of
these commissions has been limited to trying offenses governed by in-
ternational law. 37 4 Congress's authorization in the UCMJ and AUMF,
because it is in effect an endorsement of this historical practice, is
probably also limited to these offenses.37 5  The November 13 order
appears to recognize this limitation, noting in one of its "Findings" that
it is appropriate that individuals subject to the order be tried "for vio-
372 To date, however, the individuals at Guantdnamo Bay who have been deemed by the Presi-
dent to be eligible for trial before military commissions have all been alleged members of al
Qaeda. See News Releases, U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Commissions, at http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Aug2 004/commissions-releases.html.
373 See 2 WINTHROP, supra note 76, at 1295-132 1.
374 In addition to war crimes, such as purposeful targeting of civilians, the jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions has always extended more generally to actions on the battlefield by unlawful
combatants. There is a debate about whether such actions are best construed as war crimes, see
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1942) (suggesting this conclusion), or as crimes that, because
they are committed by unlawful combatants, are not shielded from prosecution by combatant
immunity, see Richard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 329-33 (195i) (suggesting this conclusion and disagreeing
with Quirin on this point). Under either interpretation, these actions fall within the jurisdiction of
§ 821 as crimes that "by the law of war may be tried by military commissions." I U.S.C. § 821
(2000).
375 See AM. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 357, at 6-8
(noting that the jurisdiction of military commissions is limited to trying offenses against the laws
of war); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I, 20 (1946) ("Congress gave sanction, as we held in Ex
parte Quirin, to any use of the military commission contemplated by the common law of war."
(emphasis added)); John M. Bickers, Military Commissions Are Constitutionally Sound: A Re-
sponse to Professors Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 899, 922 (20o3) ("[A] military
commission convened under the [November 13 order] may try only violations of the law of war,
and violations of the two statutory military commission offenses defined by Articles 104 and io6
of the UCMJ[: spying and providing aid to the enemy].").
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In evaluating what actions the President can take in the war on ter-
rorism, it is essential to determine what Congress has, and has not, au-
thorized. Although this inquiry will not resolve all questions of presi-
dential authority, it can affect the presumptive validity of presidential
actions and the role of the courts in assessing such actions. We have
attempted in this Article to sketch a framework for interpreting the
scope of the authorization of force that Congress enacted in the wake
of the September i i attacks. Our framework suggests that the Presi-
dent's congressionally authorized powers in the war on terrorism are
broad, but not unlimited. As we have explained, the AUMF's Sep-
tember i i nexus requirement is an important limitation on its scope.
In addition, because the AUMF's scope is informed by the interna-
tional laws of war, it does not, at least as a general matter, authorize
military actions that are not permitted under the laws of war. A clear
statement requirement is also an appropriate means of limiting the
AUMF when actions taken under it restrict the liberty of non-
combatants in the United States. Finally, the AUMF does not pre-
clude judicial imposition of procedural requirements for Executive
Branch determinations under the AUMF, especially in cases over
which courts can exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction.
We make no claim that these limitations on what Congress has au-
thorized suffice as a policy matter. Like many commentators, we
would welcome additional congressional participation in resolving the
many uncertainties concerning the war on terrorism, and our frame-
work leaves room for such additional participation. Nor do we claim
to have resolved all the interpretive questions that can arise under the
AUMF. We simply hope to have provided a useful starting point for
future discussion and analysis of this important enactment.
376 See Military Order, supra note 95, § i(e), 3 C.F.R. at 918. In addition, the Department of
Defense stated in the crimes and elements that it adopted for the commissions that they "derive
from the law of armed conflict, a body of law that is sometimes referred to as the law of war."
DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2, CRIMES AND ELEMENTS
FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSION § 3 (A) (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/May2 003/d2oo3O43omilcominstno2 .pdf.
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